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Recent research shows that 60% to 80% of the annual equity risk premium can be
earned on just a few days per year (see Savor and Wilson, 2013; Lucca and Moench,
2015). These trading days are known to investors well in advance since on these days
important macroeconomic news about inflation, unemployment, or interest rates is
scheduled for announcement. In contrast, holding stocks on all other days does not yield
a return that is statistically different from zero.
This pattern is particularly strong for days on which members of the Federal Open
Market Committee (FOMC), the Federal Reserve’s monetary policy-making body,
convene. For these scheduled FOMC announcements, which take place eight times per
year, the literature has documented large excess returns: Since 1994, the S&P 500
index has on average increased by about 0.5% in the 24 hours before these meetings,
accounting for about 80% of the annual excess returns in U.S. equity markets (see Lucca
and Moench, 2015).1 A simple trading strategy of buying the index one day before
the meeting and holding it until the announcement would have yielded an annualized
Sharpe ratio of over 1.1. In general, this pre-FOMC announcement drift can be observed
across various industries and is present also in major international stock indices like the
German DAX index. For other major central banks the authors do not find a similar
1Note, their sample period ended in March 2011.
1
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 2
return pattern.
Brusa et al. (2019) argue that these findings suggest ‘a leading role for the Fed
among central banks’ in terms of setting monetary policy. But with the beginning of the
European sovereign debt crisis in 2010, the relationship between the two major central
banks U.S. Federal Reserve and European Central Bank has changed. Whereas the
economy in the U.S. started to recover after the global financial crisis of 2007-2009, in
Europe a debt crisis evolved as a consequence of the Great Recession. These different
economic regimes also resulted in different monetary policies: In the U.S. the Federal
Reserve (Fed) started to raise interest rates again whereas in Europe, the ECB first
lowered rates until the zero lower bound and then announced further unconventional
monetary policy measures, like refinancing operations or asset purchase programs. Thus,
the first time in the history of the European Central Bank2 the course of these two
major central banks fundamentally diverged leading to an increased importance of the
ECB and an emancipation from the Fed.
In this thesis, we now want to analyze whether this new increased importance of the
European Central Bank is reflected in the financial markets, in particular in a return
pattern around the ECB’s monetary policy decision days similar to the pre-FOMC
announcement drift. And if we can observe such an ECB announcement return then we
want to understand what factors are determining this pattern. Particularly, we want
to examine how these returns are related to the ECB’s important role as a lender or
buyer of last resort (see Acharya et al., 2018) during the high uncertainty periods of the
euro crisis, when the concerns about a eurozone break-up were quite severe. Specifically,
we want to analyze whether expectations and hopes from market participants about
the ECB’s supportive actions, the actual (realized) announcement of unconventional
monetary policy measures, or the central bank’s communication in general generate the
observed pattern in equity prices around the disclosure of the monetary policy decision.
2The ECB was created in June 1998.
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The literature on announcement returns agrees upon the notion that the 24h pre-
ECB return is zero, whereas the respective pre-FOMC announcement drift is positive
(see Lucca and Moench, 2015; Brusa et al., 2019). In this thesis, we contribute to the
literature by documenting a statistically significant and sizeable 24 hour pre-ECB return
for the period from 2010 to 2015. Opposite to the pre-FOMC drift, which persists after
the announcement, we also show that the pre-ECB return exhibits a mean-reversion that
starts with the beginning of the ECB’s press conference. Using modern textual analysis
tools and the captions of the press conference webcasts we develop a novel methodology
that automatically creates timestamps for each part of the press conference statement.
Based on these timestamps we then study the real-time impact of the information revealed
by the ECB Chairman on financial markets and relate the mean-reversion dynamic of
the pre-ECB return to fundamental central bank news. With this latter analysis we also
contribute to the large literature that studies how central bank communication affects
asset prices. Particularly, we complement the analysis of Schmeling and Wagner (2019)
who study the impact of the aggregate tone of the ECB’s introductory statement on the
post-announcement returns.
1.2 Structure of the Thesis
The structure of this thesis is as follows:
Chapter 2 is based on the working paper ‘The Euro Crisis and the 24h Pre-ECB
Announcement Return’ of Ulrich et al. (2019a). We show that the European Central
Bank also exhibits a large pre-announcement return of 0.5% (on average) which is
similar to the U.S. evidence reported by Lucca and Moench (2015) when studying the
time period including the euro crisis from 2010 to 2015. In contrast, for the time span
from 2000 to 2009 we do not find an announcement return that is statistically different
from zero. We then study the determinants of the pre-ECB return series and find that
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its time series dynamic is highly driven by uncertainty before the event. Examining
different theoretical explanations, we find that the theories can explain several of the
stylized facts of the observed ECB announcement return but not the whole pattern.
Our analysis also shows that the high uncertainty periods of the euro crisis, which can
be characterized as times of severe eurozone break-up fear, were the main driver of the
average pre-ECB announcement return.
After presenting evidence for a pre-ECB drift and discussing the determinants of
its time series we analyze which information that gets revealed during the ECB’s press
conference is driving the mean-reversion in the equity market. Therefore we rely on
novel textual analysis methods whose foundations are presented in Chapter 3: After a
simple introductory example that illustrates the fundamental problems when working
with textual data we discuss how to automatically collect data from the Internet. We
also present standard pre-processing techniques and how to convert the qualitative
strings into a numerical representation. We conclude the chapter by showing how to
extract topics and the tone from textual statements and how to gain knowledge from
textual data using regression techniques.
Chapter 4 is based on the working paper ‘The Real-Time Impact of ECB Press
Conferences on Financial Markets’ of Ulrich et al. (2019b). In this chapter we present our
novel methodology that uses textual analysis tools and the captions of the ECB’s press
conference webcasts to create timestamps for each part of the introductory statement.
Using clustering techniques we extract fine granular topics from the press conference
statement. Based on the generated timestamps and topics we study the real-time impact
of the different information content on financial markets. We find that the largest impact
stems from the announcement of the ECB’s quantitative easing measures and also from
negative information revealed during the economic analysis, in particular news related
to the course of the European sovereign debt crisis.
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Chapter 5 summarizes the main findings of this thesis and provides a concise outlook
on future research questions.
Chapter 2
The Euro Crisis and the 24h
Pre-ECB Announcement Return
2.1 Introduction
As pointed out in Chapter 1, the literature on the 24h pre-monetary policy announce-
ment premium appears to broadly agree upon the notion that the 24h pre-ECB announce-
ment premium is zero, whereas the respective 24h pre-FOMC premium is positive (see
e.g. Lucca and Moench, 2015; Brusa et al., 2019). In this chapter we use a previously
unexplored rich cross-section of tick-by-tick European industry sector and country equity
return data to uncover that the statement of a zero 24h pre-ECB announcement premium
is inaccurate; as highlighted by Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2. For the period from 2010 to
2015, the 24h pre-ECB announcement premium is statistically significant and sizeable
for a variety of European industry sectors.1
We further document that the magnitude of the pre-ECB announcement return is mainly
driven by periods of high uncertainty during the euro crisis which can be characterized as
times of severe eurozone break-up fear. The magnitude of the pre-ECB return is 2.5 times
higher than for meetings that were held in non-stressed periods. This finding is especially
1Current research on announcement drifts in Europe do either use intraday returns until 2011 or rely
on daily data and hence could not detect the sizeable and significant upward drift in different sectors of
the euro denominated economy; see e.g. Lucca and Moench (2015) or Brusa et al. (2019), which as our
analysis shows exists in particular in systemically relevant sectors of the economy and during the height
of the euro crisis.
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pronounced for the systemically important banking industry, where the magnitude of the
average premium almost reached 3% (per announcement) for the ECB’s monetary policy
decisions that occurred during times of high uncertainty.
In general, for the time period from 2010 to 2015 a simple strategy that buys the Euro
Stoxx 50 24 hours prior to the ECB monetary policy announcement and sells it shortly
before the announcement, earned an annualized return of 6%, which translates to an
annualized Sharpe ratio of 1.5. For selected industries, such as the European banking
sector, the respective premium per year was 12% (Sharpe ratio of 1.6); at a time when
the annual return of the European banking sector was on average flat. In contrast to
the 24h pre-FOMC announcement premium, the 24h pre-ECB announcement premium
mean-reverts back to zero within two hours after the announcement, making it unde-
tectable when looking at daily close-to-close prices.
We do not only study the aggregate European equity market, but also 19 European in-
dustries and 8 EU country indices for the time span of 2000 to 2015. For the time period
from 2010 to 2015 we find that the average 24h pre-ECB announcement return has been
positive for all the 19 EU industries; but the magnitude varies a lot among our set of
industries and countries. Especially the banking, financial services and insurance (BFSI)
sectors and also the cyclical industries (like automobile) exhibit large pre-ECB returns.
The European country indices confirm that the 24h pre-ECB announcement premium
is not a general phenomenon, but rather concentrated among the euro-peripheral coun-
tries. We find the largest pre-ECB returns for the GIIPS countries of our sample (Italy
and Spain). Moreover, we also document that the CAPM explains the cross-section of
European equity on ECB announcement days, while the CAPM fails on non-ECB an-
nouncement days; very similar to the U.S. evidence documented in Savor and Wilson
(2014) and Lucca and Moench (2015).
Looking at data from 2000 to 2015 highlights that 2010 marks a structural break in the
euro area. We hence study the characteristics of the 24h pre-ECB announcement return
for the euro crisis (2010 – 2015) episode. The results show that the time series of the
pre-ECB return strongly covaries with the level of uncertainty prior to the meeting, as
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measured by the VSTOXX and also its dissolution shortly before the announcement (R2
of 25 - 30%). The pre-ECB run-up can also predict the subsequent communication shock
(as defined in Leombroni et al. (2017)) and the post-announcement return in the equity
market, in particular the price change of the Euro Stoxx 50 during the Q&A session
(14:50 to 15:30) and the return until the end of the trading day (15:30 to 17:30 CET).
We document a positive relationship between the corresponding returns and a R2 of 10
to 30%.
Our finding that the positive pre-ECB announcement drift is mainly driven by the level
of uncertainty and its subsequent dissolution is consistent with the theories of Ai and
Bansal (2018) and Wachter and Zhu (2018) who argue that the uncertainty around an
information event requires investors to demand a premium for holding risky assets. It
is also in line with Hu et al. (2019) who state that the pre-FOMC drift is a ‘premium
for heightened uncertainty’. Whereas these explanations are plausible for the observed
pre-ECB return they cannot explain the mean-reversion that follows the announcement.
The behavioral anticipation story of Peterson (2002) (‘buy on the rumor, sell on the
news’) is able to explain both, the positive pre-announcement return and the following
mean-reversion for the overall euro crisis period from 2010 to 2015. But when splitting
the sample into high and low uncertainty meetings we cannot confirm the finding. Thus,
we conclude that existing theories and explanations can rationalize several stylized facts
of the return dynamic around ECB meetings but not the whole pattern.
In addition to relating the pre-announcement drift around central bank meetings to gen-
eral equity market uncertainty (see Hu et al., 2019; Martello and Ribeiro, 2018) we fur-
ther connect the uncertainty in Europe from 2010 to 2015 to the course of the European
sovereign debt crisis.We first use several standard proxies for measuring economic and
policy uncertainty in the EU and then create a new ECB Uncertainty Index using textual
analysis. Based on the ECB’s uncertainty characterization of the economic environment,
revealed in the press conference’s intro statement, we construct a simple wording indi-
cator. We find that the documented pre-ECB announcement return is mainly driven by
the meetings that are classified as ‘high uncertainty’ by our index. Using the information
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content of the respective press conference’s Q&A session allows us to link the general
uncertainty classification to the actual events and developments of the euro crisis. We
find that the high uncertainty periods of the euro crisis can be characterized as times
of severe concerns and fear about a eurozone break-up. Therefore we conclude that this
eurozone break-up fear was a major driver of the 24h pre-ECB announcement return.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 provides a brief dis-
cussion on how the ECB conducts monetary policy. In Section 2.3, we describe the data
used in the empirical analysis that follows. We present the main empirical findings in
Section 2.4. In Section 2.5, we study the determinants of the time series of the pre-
ECB announcement return and Section 2.6 discusses potential explanations and theories.
Section 2.7 relates the pre-ECB announcement return to the euro crisis and Section 2.8
concludes.
Related Literature
This chapter contributes to the large literature on announcement returns around cen-
tral bank meetings. We document a pre-ECB announcement return similar to Lucca and
Moench (2015), who report large average excess returns for U.S. equities. We also find a
mean-reversion that starts with the begin of the press conference which Schmeling and
Wagner (2019) relate to a change in the tone of central bank communication. We do not
find evidence for ECB cycle returns as reported in Cieslak et al. (2019). In contrast to Gu
et al. (2018) who document positive average returns after FOMC announcements that
are accompanied by the SEP release2 and a press conference we find a mean-reversion
of the announcement return with the begin of the ECB’s press conference. Brusa et al.
(2019) argue that the Fed is generally the leader among all central banks since it is the
only one that exhibits pre-announcement returns. Our evidence suggests that this has
changed with the start of the euro crisis. Kaul and Watanabe (2015) study potential
driver of the pre-FOMC announcement drift and argue that market beta completely ex-
plains the drift. As in Savor and Wilson (2014) we also find that the CAPM holds on
2SEP release stands for Summary of Economic Projections release.
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ECB announcement days. Newer studies argue that the FOMC drift has vanished now
or is no longer significant based on empirical evidence covering the last years (see Azar
and Lo, 2016; Gilbert et al., 2018; Ben Dor and Rosa, 2019). One potential reason could
be that the drift has been arbitraged away since its discovery (see Gilbert et al., 2018).3
2.2 The European Central Bank and Governing
Council Decisions
The European Central Bank (ECB) is an EU institution that conducts a single mon-
etary policy strategy for 19 EU member countries. The primary goal of the ECB is to
ensure price stability in the Euro-zone. As long as there is no conflict with price stability,
the ECB shall also support sustainable growth (Article 127 (1) of the AEU contract).
The ECB decides upon the monetary policy strategy for its member countries and im-
plements policies to operationalize the strategy (Article 127 (2) of the AEU contract).
The decision-making committee of the ECB is the ECB Governing Council. It consists
of the 19 member country central bank presidents, as well as six members that are ap-
pointed by the European Council. These six members make up the executive board and
consist of the ECB president, the vice-president and four additional members.
The ECB Governing Council meets bi-weekly and decides upon monetary policy measures
during every third meeting. Prior to 2015, monetary policy decisions were announced
during every second meeting. Similar to monetary policy decisions of the U.S. Federal
Reserve (Fed), monetary policy decision meetings of the ECB Governing Council follow
a strict protocol. The public announcement about the actual monetary policy decision is
released on the day of the meeting at 13:45 a.m. CET. Forty-five minutes later, at 14:30
CET, the president of the executive board reads a public statement in which he explains
the reason that led to the monetary policy decision and takes questions afterwards. Four
weeks later, the ECB publishes a document that summarizes the Governing Council’s
discussion that preceded the monetary policy decision.
3In a recent post Lucca and Moench (2018) argue that the pre-FOMC drift can still be observed,
but only for meetings that are followed by a press conference.
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2.3 Data
Our analysis focuses on the 24h pre-ECB announcement return at scheduled ECB
meetings from 2000 to 2015. We study the anticipatory price movements across different
European equity markets. We accomplish this by studying the 24h return that investors
could realize when systematically buying European equity at 13:30 CET one day prior to
a scheduled ECB monetary policy meeting and selling on the day of the meeting at 13:30
CET. We also compare these 24h pre-ECB announcement returns to the daily close-to-
close return. Dates and exact times of scheduled ECB monetary policy meetings are
taken from the webpage of the ECB.
In order to study the 24h pre-ECB announcement return in European equity we use a
previously unexplored rich panel of European equity data provided by Deutsche Börse.
Our analysis relies on tick-by-tick (15 seconds) return data of the Euro Stoxx 50, 19 Euro
Stoxx supersector indices and seven Stoxx country indices. The 19 supersector indices
include the following European sectors: banking, automobile, basic resources, insurance,
oil and gas, consumer products, chemicals, industry goods, financial services, telecom-
munication, travel and leisure, real estate, utilities, technology, personal and household
goods, food and beverages, media, retail and health care. The seven country indices
are comprised of the Stoxx UK 50, Stoxx France 50, Stoxx Spain 20, Stoxx Italy 20,
Stoxx Eastern Europe 50, the Stoxx Nordic 30 and the Stoxx Sub-Balkan 30. Each of
these country indices tracks the value of the respective regions’ blue-chips. All data are
available from 06/29/2000 to 06/30/2015, except for three sector indices and the Stoxx
country indices which are only available from 2010 onwards.4 As a proxy for the German
market we include in addition to the Stoxx country indices also the DAX index.
To study the determinants of the pre-ECB announcement return time series we rely on
data from various sources. First, we obtain data on policy rates, non-standard monetary
policy measures and the press conference transcripts from the ECB webpage. Then, we
4Data on the Euro Stoxx 50 and the 19 Euro Stoxx supersectors span the period 06/29/2000 to
06/30/2015; except for the Euro Stoxx Personal & Household Goods, Retail, Travel & Leisure whose
data starts in 09/20/2004; and for the Euro Stoxx Real Estate, whose data starts in 09/22/2008. Data
on Stoxx Eastern Europe 50, Nordic 30, Sub-Balkan 30 are available since 01/04/2010. Last not least,
the country indices France 50, Spain 20, UK 50 and Italy 20 are available since 02/21/2011.
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use LexisNexis for historical coverage of major newspapers in the English language. We
also use intra-day prices of German Schatz government bond futures and VSTOXX fu-
tures from the EUREX exchange.5 Daily end of day VSTOXX values are obtained from
the STOXX webpage.6 In addition, we collect the monthly time series of the Industrial
Production Index and Consumer Price Index from the eurostat webpage.7 To calculate
excess returns we use the 6-month yield from the German yield curve as provided by
Bundesbank and convert it to a daily horizon.8 9 The time series for the Economic
Policy Uncertainty Index of Baker et al. (2016) and the categorical index for Greece as
created by Hardouvelis et al. (2018) are downloaded from the EPU webpage10 The Sentix
EBI index is obtained from Bloomberg.
2.4 Empirical Findings
This section summarizes the empirical findings of our analysis. We first study the 24h
pre-ECB announcement return in the eurozone from 2000 to 2015 and then divide the
sample into a pre-crisis period, spanning 2000 to 2009, and a time window covering the
euro crisis (2010 to 2015). Then we move on summarizing the cross-sectional findings.
2.4.1 Pre-ECB Announcement Return since 2000
We run two dummy-variable regressions to assess the magnitude of abnormal returns
on ECB monetary policy announcement days,
rxt = β0 + β1 × It(ECB) + εt, (2.1)
5Note, for the later analysis we always select the most liquid contract.
6The historical data can be downloaded here: https://www.stoxx.com/index-details?symbol=V2TX.
7The eurostat database can be accessed via https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/short-term-business-
statistics/data/database.
8The 0.5 years yield is the shortest maturity provided by the Bundesbank.
9The German yields are highly correlated with the ECB AAA yields but available for a longer time
period (see Schmeling and Wagner, 2019).
10See https://www.policyuncertainty.com.
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where rx is the percentage value of the log excess return on the Euro Stoxx 50 over the
risk-free rate. The constant β0 measures the unconditional excess return that is earned
on days where the ECB does not hold a scheduled monetary policy meeting. The term
It(ECB) is an indicator function that takes the value of one if t is an ECB announcement
day and zero otherwise. Hence, β1 captures the unconditional abnormal excess return
on days where the ECB announces their decision about future monetary policy. The
residuals of this regression are represented by ε. The first dummy regression uses excess
returns earned during the 24h period prior to the public announcement of the monetary
policy decision (13:30 CET on the day before the ECB meeting to 13:30 CET on the
announcement day), while the second dummy regression uses daily excess returns (based
on the market close on the day before the event to the market-close on the announcement
day).
Table 2.1 summarizes the results of both dummy regressions. We document a 27 basis
points abnormal 24h pre-ECB announcement excess return. The robust t-statistic of
2.66 confirms significance at the 99% confidence level. During non-ECB days, the excess
return has been -4 basis points with an absolute t-statistic of 1.9. Column 3 and 4 of
Table 1 show that the daily excess return on a close-to-close basis is statistically speaking
zero, indicating that there is a mean-reversion in prices following the announcement.
Thus, one cannot detect this pattern using end of day returns. In general, these findings
are supplementary to Lucca and Moench (2015) who document a pre-FOMC drift but
report that there is no such price pattern before meetings of the European Central Bank.
Compared to their analysis we include the recent time period of the euro crisis for our
calculations which yields a significant pre-ECB drift.
Table 2.2 quantifies the investment implication of the 24h pre-ECB announcement return.
Investing 12 times a year to earn the 24h pre-ECB announcement excess return would have
yielded on average an annual risk premium of 2.78%, which translates to an annualized
Sharpe ratio of 0.56. The analogous 24h excess return for non-ECB announcement days
would have been -10.27%. The last column of Table 2 shows that an investment strategy
based on end of day returns would have lost money on average (for both announcement
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Table 2.1: Dummy Regressions - Euro Stoxx 50
This table reports the results from the pre-ECB dummy regressions based on daily Euro
Stoxx 50 returns. The log excess return series is calculated (1) based on the 1:30 p.m.
price on date t-1 and the price at 1:30 p.m. on date t and (2) the closing prices of the
ES50 on date t-1 and t. ‘Pre-ECB Dummy’ is a variable that is equal to one when an
ECB monetary policy decision is scheduled in the following 24 hour interval and zero
otherwise. The sample period is from 06/30/2000 to 06/30/2015. Robust t-statistics
shown in parenthesis. *, ** indicate significance at the 5% or 1% level (|t-stat| > 1.96
or 2.58).
2000 - 2015
Euro Stoxx 50 Returns
1.30pm-to-1.30pm close-to-close
Constant - -0.043 - -0.024
(-1.89) (-1.07)
Pre-ECB Dummy 0.232* 0.274** -0.122 -0.098
(2.29) (2.66) (-0.96) (-0.76)
Obs. 3815 3815 3815 3815
N. of ECB 195 195 195 195
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and non-announcement days).
Table 2.2: Sharpe Ratios - Euro Stoxx 50
This table reports the cumulative annual excess return and Sharpe-ratio earned on
(non-) ECB announcement days. The log excess return series is calculated (1) based
on the 1:30 p.m. price on date t-1 and the price at 1:30 p.m. on date t and (2) the
closing prices of the ES50 on date t-1 and t. ‘8x’ (‘12x’) refers to the assumed number
of ECB monetary policy decisions within a year. ‘ECB Sharpe-Ratio’ refers to the





12) * per-meeting Sharpe-Ratio (sample mean of pre-ECB returns divided by its
sample standard deviation). The sample period is from 06/30/2000 to 06/30/2015.
2000 - 2015
1.30pm-to-1.30pm close-to-close
8x 12x 8x 12x
Annual ex-return ECB 1.85 [%] 2.78 [%] -0.98 [%] -1.47 [%]
Annual ex-return non-ECB -10.44 [%] -10.27 [%] -5.77 [%] -5.68 [%]
ECB Sharpe-Ratio (Ann.) 0.45 0.56 -0.2 -0.24
Figure 2.1 plots the cumulative percentage return of the Euro Stoxx 50 from one day prior
to a scheduled ECB announcement to one day after the announcement. The average 24h
pre-ECB announcement return of 0.27% is visible, together with the substantial amount
of noise around the estimate.11 In contrast to the U.S. experience, as documented in Lucca
and Moench (2015), our study for Europe reveals that the ECB announcement return
mean-reverts sharply right after the announcement, while it persists in U.S. markets.
2.4.2 Pre-ECB Announcement Return: Structural Break
We next split the sample into two sub-periods: 2000 - 2009 and 2010 - 2015. The
former resembles a period without concerns of a eurozone break-up, while the latter covers
the European sovereign debt crisis. Figure 2.2 shows that the pre-ECB announcement
return is a phenomenon of the euro crisis. Prior to 2010 there is no evidence of an upward
11Notice that the cumulative return in the figure starts at 09:00 CET whereas the 24h pre-ECB
announcement return starts at 13:30 CET.
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Figure 2.1: Cumulative Return Series of the Euro Stoxx 50 Index
This figure plots the average cumulative 15 seconds return of the Euro Stoxx 50 on a
three day window around scheduled ECB announcement days (i.e. one day prior to the
event, event, one day after the event). The blue line is the average return around ECB
announcement days, the blue shaded area is the respective pointwise 95% confidence
interval. The red line is the average return around non-ECB announcement days, the
black shaded area is the respective pointwise 95% confidence interval. The vertical dashed
line marks the start of the ECB press conference, 2:30 p.m. (local time), on the event
day. The sample period is June 2000 to June 2015.
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drift in the value of the Euro Stoxx 50, while after 2010, the upward drift as well as the
fast mean-reversion after the ECB announcement are clearly visible.
Table 2.3 highlights the previous observation using regression tools. It summarizes the
regression estimates of the dummy regression model from Equation (2.1), applied to
both sub-samples, separately. The table reveals three insights. First, the 24h pre-ECB
announcement return exists only from 2010 onwards. For the period 2010 - 2015, the
24h pre-ECB announcement premium adds up to an average of 0.55% per meeting with
a robust t-statistic of 3.6. Second, return data at the daily frequency does not detect
this pattern as the realized pre-ECB announcement return mean-reverts completely hours
after the actual announcement. Third, statistically speaking, the 24h pre-ECB announce-
ment return for the pre-crisis sub-sample is zero.
Table 2.4 compares the economic magnitude of the pre-ECB announcement return in
both sub-samples. The realized Sharpe ratio for the 24h pre-ECB announcement return
during the non-crisis period (2000 - 2009) is 0.2. In contrast, the same simple buy and
hold strategy would have resulted in an annual Sharpe ratio of 1.47 or 1.2 during the
crisis period (2010 - 2015), depending on whether one works with 12 or 8 scheduled ECB
meetings per year, respectively.
In summary, we document evidence for a 24h pre-ECB announcement excess return dur-
ing the period of the European sovereign debt crisis. This abnormal pre-ECB return
mean-reverts back to zero right after the ECB monetary policy decision is publicly an-
nounced.
The next subsection analyzes whether this pattern originates in a few industries or
whether it is broad-based.
2.4.3 Cross-sectional Evidence
Table 2.5 reports the results of the dummy regression model from Equation 2.1, esti-
mated separately for the 19 different European industries for the two sub-samples. Prior
to the euro crisis (2000 - 2009), only the health-care industry exhibits weak evidence of
a 24h pre-ECB announcement return (robust t-statistic of 2.3). During the euro crisis
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Figure 2.2: Cumulative Return Series of the Euro Stoxx 50 Index: Sub-Periods
This figure plots the average cumulative 15 seconds return of the Euro Stoxx 50 on a
three day window around scheduled ECB announcement days (i.e. one day prior to the
event, event, one day after the event). The blue line is the average return around ECB
announcement days, the blue shaded area is the respective pointwise 95% confidence
interval. The red line is the average return around non-ECB announcement days, the
black shaded area is the respective pointwise 95% confidence interval. The vertical dashed
line marks the start of the ECB press conference, 2:30 p.m. (local time), on the event
day. The upper panel analyzes the sample period of the euro crisis, January 2010 to June
2015. The lower panel studies the pre-Euro crisis period, i.e. June 2000 to December
2009.
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Table 2.3: Dummy Regressions - Euro Stoxx 50: Sub-Periods
This table reports the results from the pre-ECB dummy regressions based on daily
Euro Stoxx 50 returns for two distinct time periods: The upper table shows the dummy
regression results for the sample period from 01/01/2010 to 06/30/2015, the lower one
shows the results for the period of 06/30/2000 to 12/31/2009. The log excess return
series is calculated (1) based on the 1:30 p.m. price on date t-1 and the price at 1:30 p.m.
on date t and (2) the closing prices of the ES50 on date t-1 and t. ‘Pre-ECB Dummy’ is
a variable that is equal to one when a ECB monetary policy decision is scheduled in the
following 24 hour interval and zero otherwise. Robust t-statistics shown in parenthesis.
*, ** indicate significance at the 5% or 1% level (|t-stat| > 1.96 or 2.58).
2010 - 2015
Euro Stoxx 50 Returns
1.30pm-to-1.30pm close-to-close
Constant - -0.016 - 0.001
(-0.50) (0.05)
Pre-ECB Dummy 0.531** 0.548** 0.148 0.147
(3.42) (3.56) (0.77) (0.76)
Obs. 1401 1401 1401 1401
N. of ECB 64 64 64 64
2000 - 2009
Constant - -0.058 - -0.038
(-1.91) (-1.30)
Pre-ECB Dummy 0.085 0.144 -0.254 -0.216
(0.67) (1.08) (-1.56) (-1.29)
Obs. 2414 2414 2414 2414
N. of ECB 131 131 131 131
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Table 2.4: Sharpe Ratios - Euro Stoxx 50: Sub-Periods
This table reports the cumulative annual excess return and Sharpe-ratio earned on (non-)
ECB announcement days for two distinct time periods: The upper table shows the results
for the sample period from 01/01/2010 to 06/30/2015, the lower one for the period from
06/30/2000 to 12/31/2009. The log excess return series is calculated (1) based on the
1:30 p.m. price on date t-1 and the price at 1:30 p.m. on date t and (2) the closing
prices of the ES50 on date t-1 and t. ‘8x’ (‘12x’) refers to the assumed number of ECB
monetary policy decisions within a year. ‘ECB Sharpe-Ratio’ refers to the annualized









8x 12x 8x 12x
Annual ex-return ECB 4.25 [%] 6.38 [%] 1.18 [%] 1.78 [%]
Annual ex-return non-ECB -3.94 [%] -3.88 [%] 0.36 [%] 0.36 [%]
ECB Sharpe-Ratio (Ann.) 1.2 1.47 0.27 0.33
2000 - 2009
Annual ex-return ECB 0.68 [%] 1.02 [%] -2.03 [%] -3.05 [%]
Annual ex-return non-ECB -14.25 [%] -14.02 [%] -9.37 [%] -9.21 [%]
ECB Sharpe-Ratio (Ann.) 0.16 0.2 -0.39 -0.48
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period of 2010 - 2015, roughly half of all industries exhibit a pre-ECB announcement
premium with a robust t-statistic larger than 2. The highest average pre-ECB announce-
ment premium of 1.1% (per announcement) was earned in the banking sector (t-statistic
of 4.1). Also the other BFSI12 sectors exhibit high pre-ECB returns, 0.7% for financial
services and 0.5% for the insurance industry, respectively. In addition, cyclical industries
like the automotive sector or the oil & gas industry also show large pre-announcement
returns, whereas non-cyclical industries like food & beverages or health care exhibit on
average much smaller pre-ECB returns.13 These findings are consistent with Lucca and
Moench (2015) who also report high pre-FOMC returns for the banking, insurance and
trading industry or the automotive sector.
Next, we run CAPM regressions for each of the 19 European supersectors and for each
of the two sub-periods,
rxit = αi + βi × rxm,t + εit, (2.2)
where rxi is the excess return of supersector i, rxm is the excess return of the Euro Stoxx
50, αi, βi are constant parameters and εi captures the residuals. The upper panel of
Figure 2.3 plots the average realized 24h pre-ECB announcement excess return (y-axis) on
scheduled ECB announcement days (upper left panel) and on all other days (upper right
panel) against the respective industry beta for the time of the euro crisis. It is evident
that sectors with a higher amount of systematic risk do also pay on average higher 24h
pre-ECB announcement returns, whereas on non-announcement days the CAPM does not
hold. This finding is consistent with Lucca and Moench (2015) who find the same behavior
for pre-FOMC industry returns and also with Savor and Wilson (2014) who extend this
observation to other macroeconomic announcements (like inflation or employment). In
addition, we document that for the pre-euro crisis period the CAPM does also not hold
for European industries.
12BFSI stands for banking, financial services and insurance.
13The internet appendix contains additional figures on the cumulative returns one day prior and after
an ECB monetary policy announcement for different industries and for both sub-samples.
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Table 2.5: Dummy Regressions - Industries: Sub-Periods
This table reports the results from the 19 pre-ECB dummy regressions based on daily
returns for each of the Euro Stoxx sector indices for two distinct time periods: The left
panel shows the regression results for the sample period of 01/01/2010 to 06/30/2015,
the right panel from 06/30/2000 to 12/31/2009, except for Travel and Leisure, Personal
and Household Goods and Retail sector which start on 09/21/2004 and the Real Estate
sector which starts on 09/23/2008. The log excess return series is calculated based on the
1:30 p.m. price of the corresponding Euro Stoxx sector index on date t-1 and the price
at 1:30 p.m. on date t. ‘Industry’ refers to the corresponding Euro Stoxx supersector
index. ‘beta 1’ (‘beta 0’) reports the estimation coefficient for β1 (β0) of the linear model
stated in Equation (1) run for each sector seperately. Robust absolute t-statistics shown
in parenthesis. *, ** indicate significance at the 5% or 1% level (|t-stat| > 1.96 or 2.58).
2010 - 2015 2000 - 2009
Industry beta 1 beta 0 beta 1 beta 0
Banks 1.11** (4.08) -0.08 (1.51) 0.22 (1.49) -0.06 (1.42)
Automobile and Parts 0.82** (3.53) 0.03 (0.61) -0.16 (0.82) -0.02 (0.39)
Basic Resources 0.77** (3.08) -0.06 (1.43) -0.02 (0.10) -0.00 (0.07)
Insurance 0.67** (3.11) -0.00 (0.11) 0.14 (0.73) -0.08 (1.68)
Oil and Gas 0.59** (3.36) -0.04 (0.99) -0.09 (0.61) -0.03 (0.83)
Construction and 0.56** (2.72) -0.01 (0.34) -0.02 (0.12) -0.02 (0.52)
Material
Chemicals 0.46** (2.93) 0.02 (0.70) -0.08 (0.53) -0.00 (0.09)
Industrial Goods and 0.46** (2.74) 0.01 (0.41) 0.12 (0.88) -0.05 (1.49)
Services
Financial Services 0.46** (3.09) 0.01 (0.21) 0.11 (0.83) -0.04 (1.15)
Telecommunications 0.40** (3.16) -0.03 (0.85) 0.17 (1.13) -0.08* (2.27)
Utilities 0.33* (1.99) -0.04 (1.24) -0.05 (0.49) -0.02 (0.71)
Technology 0.31* (2.15) 0.02 (0.69) 0.47 (1.89) -0.12* (2.40)
Food and Beverage 0.23* (2.10) 0.03 (1.39) -0.01 (0.06) -0.02 (0.73)
Media 0.19 (1.22) 0.02 (0.82) 0.10 (0.71) -0.08* (2.47)
Health Care 0.03 (0.25) 0.04 (1.63) 0.27* (2.32) -0.05 (1.73)
2010 - 2015 2004 - 2009
Travel and Leisure 0.35* (2.22) 0.03 (0.97) -0.08 (0.35) -0.02 (0.51)
Personal and Household 0.31* (2.34) 0.03 (1.13) -0.15 (0.88) 0.00 (0.09)
Goods
Retail 0.14 (1.05) 0.03 (0.91) -0.05 (0.34) -0.01 (0.41)
2010 - 2015 2008 - 2009
Real Estate 0.34* (1.97) 0.01 (0.18) 0.55 (0.81) -0.08 (0.62)
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Figure 2.3: CAPM on ECB Announcement Days - Industries: Sub-Periods
This figure plots the average 24h excess return of the EU supersectors against their
respective CAPM beta. The log return is calculated based on the index value at 1.30 pm
on the day before the ECB meeting and the index value at 1.30 pm on the announcement
day. The upper panels summarize the results for ECB announcement days (upper left)
and all other days (upper right) for the period of the Euro crisis (2010 - 2015). The two
lower panels summarize the results for ECB announcement days (lower left) and all other
days (lower right) for the pre-euro crisis episode (2000 - 2009).
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Table 2.6 summarizes regression results of the dummy regression model from Equation
(2.1) for the Stoxx country indices. One can see that the GIIPS countries of our sample
(Italy and Spain) exhibit the highest pre-announcement returns with an estimate of 0.6%
and 0.5%. France and Germany also have high estimates with a β1 coefficient of around
0.4%, whereas the other countries in our sample have much lower estimates.14
Table 2.6: Dummy Regressions - Countries
This table reports the results from the 8 pre-ECB dummy regressions based on daily
returns for each of the Stoxx country indices and the DAX. The log excess return series
is calculated based on the 1:30 p.m. price of the corresponding Stoxx index on date t-1
and the price at 1:30 p.m. on date t. ‘Country’ refers to the corresponding Stoxx country
index or the DAX. ‘beta 1’ (‘beta 0’) reports the estimation coefficient for β1 (β0) of the
linear model stated in Equation (1) run for each country seperately. The sample period
starts for ‘Nordic’, ‘Eastern Europe’, ‘Sub Balkan’ and ‘Germany’ on 01/05/2010 and
for all of the other Stoxx country indices on 02/22/2011. The sample period ends for all
sector indices on 06/30/2015. Robust absolute t-statistics shown in parenthesis. *, **
indicate significance at the 5% or 1% level (|t-stat| > 1.96 or 2.58).
2010 - 2015
Country beta 1 (| t-stat |) beta 0 (| t-stat |)
Germany 0.45** (3.02) 0.02 (0.52)
Nordic 0.29 (1.92) 0.02 (0.84)
Eastern Europe 0.23 (1.47) -0.03 (0.84)
Sub Balkan 0.14* (2.07) -0.04 (1.86)
2011 - 2015
Italy 0.61* (2.42) -0.03 (0.65)
Spain 0.54** (3.38) -0.01 (0.27)
France 0.42* (2.54) -0.00 (0.05)
UK 0.24* (2.00) 0.01 (0.30)
To sum-up, opposite to Lucca and Moench (2015) we report a significant pre-ECB return
that mean-reverts after the announcement. When splitting the sample one can see that
the pre-ECB drift is a recent phenomenon, driven by the 2010 to 2015 sample which
14Running a CAPM like regression for the country indices yields a similar result as when using the
different industry returns. On announcement days the CAPM holds, whereas on non-announcement days
it fails.
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covers the European sovereign debt crisis. For the cross-section we document the largest
pre-announcement returns for the BFSI and cyclical industries and also for the GIIPS
countries of our sample.
2.5 Determinants of Pre-ECB Announcement Re-
turns
We next study the determinants of the pre-ECB announcement return series. We
draw inspiration from recent studies on what drives markets on central bank announce-
ment days, and analyze how realized monetary policy decisions, market expectations and
monetary policy surprises drive our results. In addition, we examine the impact of market
uncertainty and economic activity on the magnitude of the pre-ECB return.
2.5.1 Monetary Policy Actions
First, we study the relationship between the ECB’s realized monetary policy actions,
like the change in the policy rate or the announcement of non-standard monetary policy
measures, and the pre-ECB return. Therefore, we regress the 1.30pm-to-1.30pm Euro
Stoxx 50 log excess return15 on the change in the policy rate announced at the press con-
ference (∆MRO) and a dummy variable (UMP) that takes the value of one for meetings
at which unconventional monetary policy measures are announced and zero otherwise (as
used in Schmeling and Wagner, 2019).
Table 2.7 shows the regression results. The positive constant with a magnitude of 0.4
reflects the positive pre-announcement drift. We can also observe a negative estimate
of -2.3 for the standard monetary policy decision variable which is consistent with the
intuition that a lower interest rate should have a positive impact on the equity mar-
ket. This finding is similar to Lucca and Moench (2015) who find larger pre-FOMC
15Notice this return is calculated based on the price at 13:30 CET on the event day and 13:30 CET
on the day before the announcement.
CHAPTER 2. EURO CRISIS AND 24H PRE-ECB ANNOUNCEMENT RETURN 26
returns for the easing cycle but with an insignificant estimate.16 Also the announcement
of supportive measures by the ECB should be positive news for the stock market as re-
flected in the positive coefficient for the UMP variable. Nevertheless, both estimates are
not statistically different from zero suggesting that they are not a major driver of the
pre-ECB announcement return. In general, these results do not provide support for a
channel where the leakage of (on average) good information, e.g. a lower interest rate or
non-standard monetary policy measures, are responsible for the pre-ECB announcement
return (see e.g. Bernile et al., 2016; Cieslak et al., 2019).
2.5.2 Market Expectations
A positive pre-announcement return can also be the result of market expectations of
supportive central bank actions. To test for this hypothesis we first construct expecta-
tions measures for monetary policy decisions using textual analysis tools, following the
methodology of Lucca and Trebbi (2011).17 We use all articles containing the term ‘Euro-
pean Central Bank’ and that were published in the week before the start of the pre-ECB
drift.18 Like in Lucca and Trebbi (2011) we first split the articles into the respective
sentences and then filter out the ones relevant for the ECB’s monetary policy decision.
We define a sentence to be relevant if it contains the term ‘interest rate’. Then we count
the occurrence of words associated with positive rate changes based on the following list
P = {‘increase’, ‘rise’, ‘high’} and negative ones N = {‘fall’, ‘decrease’, ‘low’}. The final
expectation measure for the interest rate (Exp MRO) is then calculated as the log ratio
of the number of terms associated with a positive and negative rate change. Correspond-
ingly we define an expectation measure for the non-standard monetary policy measures
(Exp UMP ) based on the number of sentences that contain any word out of the follow-
ing list M = {‘QE’, ‘easing’, ‘stimulus’, ‘liquidity’, ‘purchases’, ‘support’, ‘help’, ‘rescue’,
16Note, during our sample period the ECB mostly lowered the interest rates because of the adverse
economic developments during the euro crisis. Therefore, the period from 2010 to 2015 can be interpreted
as a period of monetary policy easing.
17We use this textual analysis approach since it allows us to extract expectations for both standard
and non-standard monetary policy measures. Using information from the derivatives markets or surveys
would only provide us with an expectation on the interest rate decision.
18Note, since our pre-ECB announcement return starts already the day before the event day t we take
all articles from day t-2 to t-9.
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‘bailout’}.19 Finally, we normalize the number of occurrences by the total number of
articles.
In Table 2.7 we can see that expectations about a potential interest rate change do
not correlate with the pre-announcement return series. The estimate is negative with a
magnitude of -0.2 which is not statistically significant. In contrast the estimate for the
expected unconventional monetary policy measures is positive with an estimate of 5.3
and has a p-value slightly higher than 10% suggesting that our parsimonious measure
is able to capture expectations about non-standard monetary policy actions. In general,
this finding provides weak evidence for the hypothesis that speculations about supportive
central bank actions drive the pre-ECB run-up.
2.5.3 Monetary Policy Surprises
In a next step we want to understand how information published in the ECB’s an-
nouncement relates to the pre-announcement return. As a proxy for the news revealed
we are going to use the overall monetary policy shock as well as its decomposition into
target and communication shock as defined in Leombroni et al. (2017) and also applied
in Schmeling and Wagner (2019).20 We calculate these shocks using intra-day changes
of the German Schatz futures prices for the respective time window.21 The target shock
covers the time period of the ECB’s press release (13:40 to 14:25 CET) and the com-
munication shock the press conference from 14:25 to 15:30 CET. The overall monetary
policy shock is then defined as the change from 13:40 to 15:30 CET. We calculate the
surprise components for both the fixed income and equity market. For the latter we use
the tick-by-tick values of the Euro Stoxx 50.
Column (3) of Table 2.7 reports a negative loading for the monetary policy shock with an
estimate of -5.7 which is significant to the 1% level. The negative relationship for the yield
19The choice of this parsimonious wordlist is motivated by a close monitoring of the news coverage
of ECB events around the announcement of non-standard monetary policy measures. For example, the
headline of a news item on the Bloomberg newswire in March 2015 was ‘European Stocks Advance as
Investors Seek ECB Stimulus Details’.
20Leombroni et al. (2017) build upon the methodology of Gürkaynak et al. (2005) which is also used
in Lucca and Moench (2015) to calculate the surprise measures.
21We first calculate log returns based on the futures trade prices and then convert these returns into
approximative bond yield changes following Cieslak and Schrimpf (2018).
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changes of the Schatz futures implies a positive correlation for the futures returns. Thus
a higher pre-announcement drift predicts higher returns for the short-end of the German
yield curve after the announcement. Column (4) shows that this finding is driven by the
communication part of the monetary policy shock with a remarkable high R2 of almost
20%. These findings are different to the U.S. where Lucca and Moench (2015) report
for the pre-FOMC announcement drift that the ex-post policy surprise is not associated
with the magnitude of the ex-ante returns. A reason for this difference could be that the
FOMC meetings analyzed in Lucca and Moench (2015) are not accompanied by a press
conference22 whereas our ECB meetings were always followed by a press conferences.
When looking at the ex-post surprise in the equity market we see that the results depend
on the specific time window that is used for the calculation of the shock. The overall
post-announcement return from 13:30 to 17:30 CET exhibits a positive relationship with
the pre-ECB run-up. The different sub-windows reveal that there is first a negative coeffi-
cient for the surprise from 14:30 to 14:50 (p-value < 10%) which then then turns positive
for the shock from 14:50 to 15:30 and also for the return until the end of the trading day
(with a notable R2 of almost 30% for the latter). The first time window corresponds to
the time of the press conference where the intro statement is presented by the ECB chair-
man and is then followed by the Q&A session (until 15:30). Thus this result suggests that
investors were first disappointed from news revealed during the intro statement, whereas
the questions and answers session reaffirmed the previous run-up in equity prices. For
the U.S. Lucca and Moench (2015) does not find a significant correlation between pre-
and post-announcement returns in the equity market.23
2.5.4 Uncertainty
We now assess whether the pre-ECB announcement returns are related to market
uncertainty as measured by the EURO STOXX 50 Volatility Index (VSTOXX).24 The
22Only since 2019 every FOMC meeting is followed by a press conference.
23Notice in unreported results we also regress the pre-announcement return series on the ECB tone
level and tone change as defined in Schmeling and Wagner (2019). We do not find a significant relationship
between these variables for our time period.
24The VSTOXX is the European counterpart to the VIX index and is based on Euro Stoxx 50 realtime
options prices.
CHAPTER 2. EURO CRISIS AND 24H PRE-ECB ANNOUNCEMENT RETURN 30
option-implied volatility index is used by various authors to study uncertainty around
FOMC announcements.25
We first want to examine how the level of uncertainty is related to the pre-ECB returns.
Table 2.8 shows highly significant estimates for the VSTOXX index value two days and
one day prior to the announcement and on the event day itself. The estimate is always
positive with the highest loading (around 0.08) for the day before the start of the pre-
ECB drift. The impact is large with a one standard deviation shock translating into an
increase of 0.5% in the pre-ECB return. The R2 ranges from almost 25% to roughly 6%
on the event day. Thus, a large part of the variation in the pre-announcement return
series can be explained by the level of uncertainty prior to the ECB meeting. This finding
is similar to Lucca and Moench (2015) who find a highly significant relationship between
pre-FOMC returns and the two-day lagged level of the VIX, though the R2 is roughly
half the size with 10%.
In a next step we want to understand how the change in uncertainty affects the pre-ECB
drift. Columns (6) and (7) of Table 2.8 show that a drop in uncertainty on the day prior
to the ECB announcement and on the event day significantly increases the pre-ECB
return. E.g. for the one-day lagged change in VSTOXX a one standard deviation shock
implies a large 0.7% increase in the pre-ECB drift. Also this change in uncertainty can
explain a considerable amount of the time series variation in the pre-ECB announcement
return, with a R2 of around 30%. Looking at the intra-day uncertainty changes on the
event day we can see that the change in the VSTOXX from the opening of the trading
day to shortly before the ECB announcement explains over 30% of the pre-ECB return
variation, whereas the changes for the second half of the day only account for around
10%. In general, such an uncertainty resolution can reflect new information entering
the market, e.g. through information leakage or arising speculations in the market place
about the central bank’s actions.
To sum-up, we observe that heightened uncertainty, especially before the announcement,
and uncertainty resolution shortly prior to the event lead to significantly larger pre-ECB
25See, for example Lucca and Moench 2015; Boguth et al. 2018; Gu et al. 2018; Hu et al. 2019.
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returns. This finding is similar to Hu et al. (2019) who report a pattern of large pre-
FOMC returns after heightened VIX values with the uncertainty dissolving mostly prior
to the announcement.
2.5.5 Economic Activity
We next want to analyze whether the pre-ECB announcement returns depend on
fundamental economic activity. We therefore consider, as in Lucca and Moench (2015),
annual growth rates of industrial production (IP) and annual inflation as measured by
the consumer price index (CPI). Similar to the results in Lucca and Moench (2015) we
find both estimates not to be statistically different from zero and with no explanatory
power. Thus we conclude that the pre-ECB return series does not strongly co-vary with
the business cycle or inflation dynamics.
To sum-up, based on our regression analysis we discovered two strong relationships
for the pre-ECB announcement return series. On the one hand it is highly driven by
the level of uncertainty prior to the event and its dissolution, with a R2 ranging from
around 25% to over 30%. On the other hand we find a strong relationship to the post-
announcement returns in the fixed income and equity market, that starts with the begin
of the press conference (R2 from 17% to 29%). The sign depends on the specific time
window, in particular whether the shock covers the intro statement or the Q&A session.
This suggests that the pre-announcement run-up is related to information revealed during
the communication part of the announcement.
2.6 Potential Explanations
In this section we discuss potential explanations for the 24h pre-ECB announcement
return. Therefore we first briefly present the intuition of the respective theory and then
test its implications for the pre-ECB drift. In general, a valid theory has to explain the fol-
lowing six characteristics: (1) positive price drift around an event, (2) pre-announcement
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timing of price run-up, (3) variation in the time series of pre-ECB returns, (4) variation
in the cross-section (industries and countries), (5) mean-reversion following the meeting
and (6) correlation between pre- and post-announcement return.
2.6.1 Ai and Bansal (2018)
Ai and Bansal (2018) develop a theoretical model that allows macroeconomic an-
nouncements ‘to carry information about the prospect of future economic growth’ and
find that generalized risk sensitivity in investor’s preferences is crucial to generate a non-
negative announcement premium. For example under the robust control preferences of
Hansen and Sargent (2001), the uncertainty-averse investor overweighs bad states be-
fore the announcement which results in an extra discounting of the payoffs. After the
release of the macroeconomic information the uncertainty is resolved and asset prices
are discounted using marginal utilities which then gives rise to a positive announcement
premium.
Hypotheses Testing
Next we want to test more formally the implications of the here discussed theory for
our observed pre-ECB drift. Therefore, we are going to discuss each of the six charac-
teristics as stated above: (1) According to the theory of Ai and Bansal (2018) investors
prefer the resolution of uncertainty and thus require a risk premium to hold risky assets
around an important announcement. This implies a positive price drift as documented
in the upper panel of Figure 2.2 and Table 2.3. (2) In general, the premium is realized
when the information gets revealed and thus the uncertainty is resolved. This implies
that the price increase occurs at the time of the announcement. If information would
enter the market already prior to the event, e.g. via an information leakage channel,
then the uncertainty could be resolved before the announcement and thus give rise to a
pre-ECB announcement return. Table 2.8 shows that the resolution of uncertainty one
day before and on the morning of the announcement can explain around 30% of the pre-
ECB return series, indicating that new information is entering the market place already
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prior to the announcement. (3) Ai and Bansal (2018) explain the time series variation
of announcement returns due to ‘differences in their informativeness and the significance
of their welfare implications’. In Table 2.8 we can observe that the magnitude of the
pre-ECB drift strongly comoves with the level of uncertainty prior to the event. In times
of high financial market uncertainty or an economic crisis news from the central bank e.g.
about the economic outlook is of high importance to market participants and thus more
informative than in a low volatility state. (4) A similar argument holds for explaining
the cross-sectional results. The information revealed by the central bank has a different
information content for certain industries (e.g. banking sector) as well as the different
EU countries (e.g. GIIPS) which gives rise to heterogeneous pre-announcement returns
as documented in Table 2.5 and 2.6. (5) The theory of Ai and Bansal (2018) does not
provide an explanation for the mean-reversion of the pre-ECB drift and thus (6) also con-
tains no implications for the correlation between pre- and post-announcement returns.
To sum-up, the theory of Ai and Bansal (2018) provides a plausible explanation for the
pre-ECB announcement return assuming the leakage of information before the event. But
it cannot explain why the return mean-reverts with the start of the press conference.
2.6.2 Wachter and Zhu (2018)
Wachter and Zhu (2018) explain the macroeconomic announcement premium using a
model with rare events in which scheduled announcements inform agents about a latent
disaster probability. For example during the recent euro crisis such a disaster would have
been the break-up of the eurozone and the subsequent major economic downturn. To
prevent these adverse economic developments the European Central Bank decided on non-
standard monetary policy measures which often got revealed on announcement days.26
Therefore, the meetings of the ECB were highly informative for market participants
about the future course of the European sovereign debt crisis and thus the latent disaster
probability. In the model of Wachter and Zhu (2018) this ‘big news’ characteristic of
(certain) announcements is reflected in the assumption that they convey full information,
26Notice beside the announcement of the unconventional monetary policy measures also news about
the economic outlook were of high interest for investors.
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that is, they perfectly reveal whether the economy is in a good or bad state. Especially the
probability of a rare negative event to the economy (e.g. a eurozone break-up) represents
risk that is realized on announcement days and thus investors require a premium to hold
assets over the risky announcement period.27
Hypotheses Testing
In general, this mechanism is similar to Ai and Bansal (2018) since the revelation of
information on an announcement day is associated with uncertainty and to bear this risk
investors require a risk premium. Therefore, the arguments from the previous discussion
in Chapter 5.1 also hold for Wachter and Zhu (2018). The main difference is that Wachter
and Zhu (2018) specifically relate the risk to (negative) information about a disaster prob-
ability whereas the model of Ai and Bansal (2018) is more general in relating uncertainty
to the release of unknown information. The former specification is particularly appealing
in the context of the euro crisis where the fear and probability of a eurozone break-up
and a subsequent recession was quite severe and the ECB’s announcements revealed im-
portant information about the future course of the European sovereign debt crisis. Table
2.9 confirms that several variables that proxy for the economic and policy uncertainty
of the euro crisis and eurozone break-up fear show a positive significant relationship to
the pre-announcement return series. Overall, the theory of Wachter and Zhu (2018) can
rationalize a positive pre-announcement return assuming information entering the mar-
ket prior to the event. But it also cannot provide an explanation for the subsequent
mean-reversion.
2.6.3 Heightened Uncertainty
Hu et al. (2019) argue that the pre-FOMC announcement returns28 can be interpreted
as a premium for heightened uncertainty. In their analysis they do not find conventional
measures of risk (like volatility, skewness or kurtosis) to be elevated around FOMC meet-
27This preference for early resolution of uncertainty is consistent with the concept of risk-sensitivity as
defined by Ai and Bansal (2018), which is a necessary condition for a nonzero announcement premium.
28Notice the authors also document pre-announcement returns for other macro releases in the U.S.,
like Nonfarm Payroll, GDP, and ISM.
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ings but instead document heightened uncertainty in the market as measured by the
CBOE VIX. They relate this uncertainty to market-moving information that is released
on announcement days. They show that prior to the announcement uncertainty slowly
builds up which results in initial price depression, the resolution of uncertainty shortly
before the announcement then gives rise to the significant increase in price, as docu-
mented for the pre-FOMC announcement return. This pattern of heightened uncertainty
is particularly pronounced for FOMC meetings that exhibit a high pre-FOMC drift.
Hypotheses Testing
In the following we test whether Hu et al. (2019) can rationalize the 24h pre-ECB
announcement return: (1) Similar to Ai and Bansal (2018) and Wachter and Zhu (2018)
the authors argue that uncertainty related to market-moving information revealed during
macro and central bank announcements can generate a positive premium as can be ob-
served in the upper panel of Figure 2.2 and Table 2.3. First, this (heightened) uncertainty
prior to the event results in price depression which then gives rise to increasing prices
when the uncertainty is resolved. Table 2.8 documents a strong positive relationship
between the two-day lagged level of uncertainty as measured by the VSTOXX and the
magnitude of the pre-ECB drift. Also it shows that a resolution in uncertainty prior to
the ECB meeting leads to increasing stock price, explaining nearly a third of the variation
in the return time series. (2) Compared to the previous two theories in this chapter Hu
et al. (2019) state that the price drift should be observed prior to the meeting, as for the
pre-ECB return, due to the observed resolution of uncertainty. (3) The authors also argue
that the magnitue of the pre-announcement return depends on the uncertainty prior to
the event: E.g. high uncertainty before the announcement gives rise to large pre-FOMC
returns. For the pre-ECB drift we also find evidence for such a relationship (see Table
2.8). (4) The uncertainty related to market-moving information does not need to affect
every industry or country the same way. E.g. cyclical industries (like the automotive sec-
tor) are more sensitive to economic outlook information revealed during a central bank’s
meeting than for example the food and beverages sector. Thus, we can observe hetero-
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geneous pre-announcement returns for different industry sectors and country’s blue chip
indices as reported in Table 2.5 and 2.6. (5) Like the previous two explanations from this
chapter Hu et al. (2019) cannot rationalize the mean-reversion of the pre-ECB return
and therefore (6) do not provide any (testable) implications for the relationship between
pre- and post-announcement returns.
To sum-up, Hu et al. (2019) provide a plausible explanation for the pre-ECB announce-
ment return based on heightened uncertainty but cannot rationalize the mean-reversion
that follows.
2.6.4 Buy on the Rumor, Sell on the News (BRSN)
The previous explanations associate uncertainty around an information event with
being negative since investors either apply an extra discounting to the cash flows due to
the uncertainty or face actual risk of bad market-moving news which lets them require a
positive risk premium. In contrast, Peterson (2002) demonstrate a relationship between
investor psychology and asset prices around scheduled events explaining that prices first
rise prior to and then mean-revert after the positively anticipated announcement.
According to Peterson (2002) prior to a positively anticipated event investors are in a
positive affect sate (e.g. euphoria) due to the anticipated reward. This affect leads to
an increasing risk-taking and purchasing behavior and thus increasing prices. After the
delivery of the expected reward, the (positive) news, investors’ affect regresses to neutral
which results in a net decrease in positive affect, leading to decreased risk-aversion and
protective investing behavior like selling, and thus a mean-reversion in asset prices.
Hypotheses Testing
We next test the implications of this rationale for the 24h pre-ECB announcement
return: (1) To generate a positive premium, as documented in the upper panel of Figure
2.2 and Table 2.3, the mechanism as described in Peterson (2002) requires a positively
anticipated announcement. We argue that the monetary policy decisions of the European
Central Bank represent such an event since these meetings are scheduled in advance and,
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especially in times of financial stress or a crisis (e.g. the European sovereign debt crisis),
market participants expect the ECB to support the European economy which represents
positive news for financial markets.29 In addition, Column (2) of Table 2.7 provides
(weak) evidence for such speculations or rumors prior to ECB meetings with a p-value of
roughly 10% for the Exp UMP variable. This variable proxies in general for the market’s
expectations of unconventional monetary policy measures but can also be interpreted
as speculations or rumors in the market place regarding supportive measures.30 (2)
According to Peterson (2002) the price drift should occur prior to the event due to the
anticipation of reward which leads to purchasing behavior and thus rising stock prices.
This is consistent with the in this study documented pre-ECB drift (see e.g. top panel of
Figure 2.2). (3) Larger pre-announcement returns could be explained in this framework
by stronger purchasing behavior caused by a more positive affect state due to a larger
anticipated reward. Such a large anticipated reward could have been the prospect of
increasing stock prices after the ECB announcing supportive measures for the economy
particularly in times of high uncertainty. Thus, we would expect higher pre-ECB returns
in times of high uncertainty as documented in Table 2.8. (4) The anticipated reward, the
rising stock prices, can be different for industries and countries since the central bank’s
information and actions have a different impact on the various sectors or blue-chip
indices of the European countries. This can explain the heterogeneous pre-ECB returns
as shown in Table 2.5 and 2.6. (5) As the first theory discussed in this chapter Peterson
(2002) predicts a mean-reversion after the announcement as observed for the ECB
meetings (see upper panel of Figure 2.2). Following the rationale of the author a reason
for this behavior could be that the positive news revealed at the ECB meeting, e.g.
the announcement of non-standard monetary policy measures, rarely exceeded the high
market expectations of a potential stimulus or bailout. Thus, on average investors were
disappointed which lead to a decrease in positive affect and thus protective investing
29In general, monetary policy tend to have an asymmetric impact on stock prices as financial conditions
are eased in times of a crisis but not tightened accordingly in good times. This is called a ‘government
put’ in the literature (see e.g., Diamond and Rajan, 2012).
30In their analysis of the ECB’s foreign exchange interventions in the beginning of the 21th century
Fatum and Hutchison (2002) similarly extract rumors of such interventions from related newswire reports.
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behavior like the selling of stocks. (6) If market participants were indeed disappointed
after their high expectations we would expect a negative correlation between pre- and
post-announcement returns. Table 2.7 shows a weakly significant negative relationship
(only to 10% level) between the pre-ECB return and the post-announcement return for
the time window from 14:30 to 14:50 CET. This is the time of the press conference
where the president of the ECB presents the introductory statement. Whereas the
press release (for our sample period) only comprises the interest rate decision the intro
statement contains also the announcement of non-standard monetary policy measures.
This finding documents a disappointment in the stock market after a corresponding
pre-announcement increase.
To sum-up, all of the here discussed theories and explanations can rationalize our
main finding from the previous chapters, namely an in general positive price drift around
announcement days which covaries strongly with uncertainty prior to the event and also
the resolution of this uncertainty. The latter also documents that information are en-
tering the market already before the announcement which could indicate the possibility
of information leaks or could be a sign for speculations and rumors that are building-up
before the event. Whereas the first three theories (Chapter 5.1 to 5.3) interpret the uncer-
tainty on these event days due to the announcement of unknown information as negative,
the theory of Peterson (2002) argues based on investor psychology that a positively an-
ticipated event can also give rise to a price run-up. In addition, it is the only explanation
that predicts a mean-reversion after the announcement due to market participants being
disappointed from the news revealed. We find weak empirical evidence for such a BRSN
pattern. Overall, we conclude that there are two different fundamental mechanisms, un-
certainty resolution and positive anticipation, that can rationalize the positive pre-ECB
drift but only one that can, in addition, explain the observed mean-reversion.
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2.7 ECB Announcement Returns and Euro Crisis
Uncertainty
In the previous chapters we have learned that the pre-ECB drift is a rather recent
phenomenon, occurring only for the time period of the euro crisis. In addition, we have
seen that it strongly co-moves with uncertainty prior to the respective ECB meeting,
as measured by the VSTOXX. Figure 2.4 visualizes this main finding. The plot shows
that the uncertainty peaks of the VSTOXX correspond to major events of the European
sovereign debt crisis. Giving this observation we are now going to study the relationship
between the pre-ECB announcement return and the uncertainty of the euro crisis in more
detail.
2.7.1 Risk Aversion, Uncertainty and Eurozone Break-up Con-
cerns
The VSTOXX index is a general measure of equity market uncertainty. Therefore in a
first step we apply the methodology of Bekaert et al. (2013) to decompose the VSTOXX
index into proxies for uncertainty and risk aversion.31 The former is estimated as the
conditional variance obtained from regressing the realized variance on the lagged realized
variance and the lagged squared VSTOXX. The difference between V STOXX2 and the
conditional variance measure serves then as a proxy for risk aversion.
Table 2.9 shows that the results are similar to when using the original VSTOXX index. We
observe a larger pre-ECB announcement return in times when risk aversion or uncertainty
in the market is higher. Both estimates are highly significant to the 1% level with a t-
statistic larger than 5. Also the R2 with around 22% is considerable large, comparable to
when using the pure VSTOXX variable. Therefore, we conclude that the result is not just
driven by the expected volatility component of the VSTOXX but also by fundamental
risk aversion.
31Schmeling and Wagner (2019) also use the methodology of Bekaert et al. (2013) to decompose the
VSTOXX.
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Figure 2.4: Daily Pre-ECB Drift Returns and Uncertainty During the Euro
Crisis
This figure plots the 24h pre-ECB announcement excess return together with the VS-
TOXX index. The upper panel depicts the realized 24h excess return (blue line) and a
quarterly moving average (green line). The log excess return series is calculated based
on the 1:30 p.m. price on date t-1 and the price at 1:30 p.m. on date t, for t being
an ECB announcement day. The lower panel plots the time-series of the two-day lagged
VSTOXX index with a couple of major political events. The time period is 01/01/2010
to 06/30/2015.
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Next we want to understand what is driving the risk aversion observed prior to
scheduled ECB monetary policy decisions. Therefore, we regress the risk aversion
variable on several proxies for economic and policy uncertainty in Europe. We first use
the Economic Policy Uncertainty Index (EPU) for Europe as created by Baker et al.
(2016). The index relies on frequency counts of articles containing specific combinations
of terms associated with economy, uncertainty and policy. Table 2.10 shows a significant
positive relationship between the economic and policy uncertainty index and our risk
aversion proxy. The EPU Index can explain roughyl 1/4 of the variation in risk
aversion.32 Hardouvelis et al. (2018) build upon the methodology developed in Baker
et al. (2016) and construct an index to specifically measure the economic and policy
uncertainty related to the Greek economic crisis. In column (2) of Table 2.10 we can
see again a significant positive relationship between the Greek specific EPU and the
pre-ECB return series with a stronger t-statistics indicating that this measure better
reflects the fundamental uncertainty underlying our risk aversion proxy. In addition to
the general EPU index the authors also construct several sub-indices covering different
categories, e.g. monetary or pension policy.33 In our analysis we also include the
EPUC Index which measures uncertainty related to currency or Grexit possibility. An
important keyword for this index is the phrase ‘grexit’ which directly relates to the
fear of Greece leaving the EU and the possibility of a subsequent eurozone break-up.
Regressing our risk aversion variable on this sub-index shows again stronger t-statistics
than for the previous two EPU indices suggesting that uncertainty related to a potential
Grexit of Greece was an important determinant of risk aversion during the euro crisis
period. Table 2.9 also shows that this Grexit related uncertainty measure is directly
related to the magnitude of the pre-announcement return.
To test more directly for this eurozone break-up risk we use the Sentix Euro Break-up
Index (EBI) which is based on a survey among individual and institutional investors
and captures euro break-up news. Table 2.10 documents again a significant positive
32Note as a robustness exercise we also regress our economic and policy uncertainty measures directly
on the pre-announcement return series. The results can be found in Table 2.9.
33The construction of these indices follows always the same methodology, the only difference is the
selection of the corresponding keywords.





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































CHAPTER 2. EURO CRISIS AND 24H PRE-ECB ANNOUNCEMENT RETURN 44
relationship to our risk aversion proxy suggesting that the fear of a eurozone break-up
was a major driver of risk aversion. The regression also shows a remarkable R2 of 37%
which underlines the strong relationship between these two variables. But one drawback
of this measure is that it is only available since Summer 2012 and thus misses the first two
stress periods of the euro crisis. Therefore, we are going to construct now our own Eu-
ropean uncertainty index using textual analysis of the ECB’s press conference transcripts.
Table 2.10: Time Series Regressions - Risk Aversion: Economic and Political
Uncertainty
The dependent variable of the regression model is the value of the risk aversion proxy as
defined in Chapter 6.1 two days prior to scheduled ECB monetary policy decisions. ‘EPU
Europe’ is the economic policy index of Baker et al. (2016) for Europe. ‘EPU Greece’
denotes the respective index for Greece as created by Hardouvelis et al. (2018) and ‘EPUC
Greece ’ a sub-index of the same authors measuring currency or Grexit possibility. ‘Sentix
EBI ’ is the Sentix Euro Break-up Index and ‘ECB Uncertainty Index ’ our own created
uncertainty index using the press conference transcripts of the European Central Bank.
The sample period is from 01/01/2010 to 06/30/2015. Robust t-statistics shown in
parenthesis. *, ** indicate significance at the 5% or 1% level.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constant -224.427 -203.245 -76.255 57.495** 84.086**









ECB Uncertainty Index 112.443**
(4.40)
Adj. R2 [%] 23.7 23.1 36.2 36.6 51.4
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2.7.2 ECB Uncertainty Index
In a next step we create our own uncertainty index based on the ECB’s economic
analysis as revealed in the press conference’s intro statement. Based on a textual
analysis of these statements we extract the uncertainty keywords that characterize
the economic environment. For example, in January 2010 the ‘Governing Council
continues to view the risks to this outlook as broadly balanced’,34 whereas in May
2010 an additional passage was added: ‘The Governing Council continues to view the
risks to this outlook as broadly balanced, in an environment of high uncertainty ’.35
This phrase reflected the increasing tensions in the financial markets around the debt
problems of Greece and the danger of a potential Grexit. In summer 2012, before the
famous ‘Whatever it takes’ speech of Draghi on the 26th of July the statement observes
‘renewed weakening of economic growth and heightened uncertainty’ for the euro area
economy.36 At the end of the year after Draghi’s speech the economic environment
was then only characterized as times of ‘high uncertainty’ (November 2012).37 In
December 2013 the statement uses the phrase ‘related uncertainties’38 and in October
2014 the terms ‘uncertainty’ or ‘uncertainties’ were completely dropped.39 We convert
this uncertainty characterization of the economic environment into a simple wording
indicator variable using a four-value scale40: ‘0’ indicates that the term ‘uncertainty’
is not used at all and ‘4’ characterizes an environment of ‘particularly high uncertainty’.41
Figure 2.5 plots the 24h pre-ECB announcement return together with our ECB Un-
certainty Index. It highlights, that the 24h pre-ECB announcement return peaks at times
when the ECB’s uncertainty classification takes the highest values. To assess this rela-







40Note, such an approach is often used in the former literature that analyzed the impact of central
bank communication on financial markets, see e.g. Rosa (2011).
41An example phrase for the value ‘1’ would be ‘environment of uncertainty’, for the value ‘2’ ‘uncer-
tainty is elevated’ and for value ‘3’ ‘heightened uncertainty’.
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created index. Table 2.9 shows a positive relationship which is significant to the 1% level
between the pre-announcement return series and our newly created ECB Uncertainty
Index confirming the previous visual impression.
Figure 2.5: Pre-ECB Announcement Returns and the ECB Uncertainty Clas-
sification
This figure plots the 24h pre-ECB announcement return together with the ECB’s uncer-
tainty evaluation, for the period January 2010 to December 2012. The upper panel plots
the realized 24h pre-ECB announcement return (blue line) and a one-quarter moving
average (green line). The middle panel depicts the ECB’s uncertainty characterization
of the Euro economy. The lower panel maps the ECB uncertainty into states of low and
high Euro area uncertainty.
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In a further analysis, similar to Hu et al. (2019) and Martello and Ribeiro (2018), we
split our sample of ECB meetings and then re-calculate the average cumulative announce-
ment return series for each class. Using our newly created ECB Uncertainty Index we
create a high uncertainty group (index values ‘3’ and ‘4’) and a low uncertainty category
which comprises all the remaining meetings. The upper panel of Figure 2.6 plots the
cumulative announcement returns for the high uncertainty group. One can see that the
pre-ECB drift first rises to a level above 1% and then drops sharply with the start of the
ECB’s press conference. The lower panel shows the same plot for the low uncertainty
meetings.42 One can clearly see that the pre-announcement drift for this group is much
less pronounced than for the high uncertainty periods. It only rises to around 0.4% which
is over 2.5 times lower than in the upper panel. Also the mean-reversion following the
announcement is much smaller. This observation is consistent with Martello and Ribeiro
(2018) who argue that the finding of Lucca and Moench (2015) actually only occurs for
FOMC meetings during stressed periods. A similar observation is also reported in Hu
et al. (2019) who show a strong correlation between large pre-FOMC returns and high
uncertainty prior to the FOMC announcement. In general we can conclude that the
pre-ECB announcement drift is mainly driven by rather a few ECB meetings which were
held in periods of high uncertainty.4344
In a last step, we are going to connect these ‘high uncertainty’ meetings to the fun-
damental economic developments in the eurozone using the respective ECB transcripts.
In particular, we are going to exploit the information content of the ECB’s Q&A session
since the reporters’ questions are often about the current economic situation that caused
the intro statement’s uncertainty classification in the first place.
Figure 2.5 shows that there are three distinct high uncertainty periods in the time frame
from 2010 to 2012; another one can also be observed around September and October
42To better compare the magnitude of both pre-announcement drifts we deployed the same scale in
the upper and lower panel.
43Only 18 out of 86 meetings are classified as ‘high uncertainty’ which is around 20% of all announce-
ments.
44This finding is also in line with Ben Dor and Rosa (2019) who report that ‘one single FOMC meeting
contributes roughly 0.1% to the average pre-FOMC effect’.
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Figure 2.6: Cumulative Return Series of the Euro Stoxx 50 Index: High and
Low Uncertainty
This figure plots the average cumulative 15 seconds return of the Euro Stoxx 50 on a
three day window around scheduled ECB announcement days (i.e. one day prior to the
event, event, one day after the event). The blue line is the average return around ECB
announcement days, the blue shaded area is the respective pointwise 95% confidence
interval. The vertical dashed line marks the start of the ECB press conference, 2:30
p.m. (local time), on the event day. The upper panel comprises all ECB meetings from
January 2010 to June 2015 that occur within a period of high uncertainty. The lower
panel studies all remaining meetings in the same time period.
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2015 (not shown in this plot). The first high uncertainty period started in May 2010 and
lasted until July. During the Q&A session of the May 2010 meeting the first reporter
asked all of his three questions about the ‘consequences of Greece’s fiscal crisis on finan-
cial markets’, supportive ECB actions and whether the European Union needs an ‘orderly
default procedure for its member countries’.45 In addition, most of the questions that
followed were about the same topic reflecting the first euro crisis peak with the danger
of a potential Grexit.46
The second high uncertainty period then occurred in summer 2011 and lasted until the
beginning of the next year. Again, the dominating topic was the European sovereign
debt crisis, in particular its contagion from Greece to other member states like Spain
and Italy and the supportive measures of the ECB. For example, in the August meeting
one reporter asked all of his three questions about the ‘Securities Markets Programme’,
‘contagion in the eurozone’ and about the economic outlook that the ECB characterized
as ‘particularly high’.47
The third stress period occurred in summer 2012. During the Q&A session of the July
press conference the first questions of the reporters were again about the ongoing euro cri-
sis, in particular about the European banking sector and that ‘some countries [...] are still
in kind of credit crunch territory’. Also other journalists asked (and speculated) about
further non-standard monetary policy measures, e.g. another LTRO program. Other
topics targeted the EFSF and ESM48 which were created to support European countries
which had problems raising funds in the financial markets.49
The last high uncertainty period occurred around late summer and autumn 2015. On
27th of June 2015 the Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras announced a referendum
45See https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pressconf/2010/html/is100506.en.html.
46At the end of the year 2009 Standard and Poor’s downgraded Greek government bonds leading to
speculations about a bankruptcy of Greece. After rising tensions and risk premia in the financial markets
the EU member states agreed on a first austerity program for Greece finally leading to the set-up of the
750 € bn European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) in June 2010 (see Illing, 2013). For a detailed
description of the Greek crisis also see the timeline of the ‘tagesschau’ (German television news service):
https://www.tagesschau.de/wirtschaft/griechenland640.html.
47See https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pressconf/2011/html/is110804.en.html.
48EFSF stands for the European Financial Stability Facility and ESM for the European Stability
Mechanism.
49See https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pressconf/2012/html/is120705.en.html.
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about the bailout conditions in the country’s government-debt crisis proposed by the
Troika. It took place on 5th of July 2015 and a majority of over 61% voted with ‘No’ re-
sulting in a new Greek legislative election in September 2015 and re-emerging Grexit and
eurozone break-up fears. These adverse developments were also reflected in the ECB’s
assessment of the economic situation as can be seen in their July statement: ‘[...] June
2015, again associated with increased political uncertainty related to the breakdown of
the negotiations and the announcement of the referendum’. In addition, the Grexit fear
was reflected in the reporters’ questions in the corresponding Q&A session.50
To sum-up, we can observe a close relationship between periods of high uncertainty in
Europe and the peaks of the European sovereign debt crisis which can be character-
ized as times of severe eurozone break-up concerns. Given the finding that the pre-ECB
announcement return is especially pronounced for these high uncertainty periods we con-
clude that the Grexit fear and eurozone break-up concerns have been a major driver of
the pre-ECB drift as documented in this study.
2.7.3 Grexit Fear, the European Central Bank and BRSN Pat-
tern
Especially during the high uncertainty times of the euro crisis where the danger of a
potential Grexit was quite severe, market participants expected or hoped for supportive
actions from the ECB as the lender or buyer of last resort (see Acharya et al., 2018),
rendering the ECB’s monetary policy decisions a very positively anticipated event in the
sense of Peterson (2002) (‘buy on the rumor’). Also Figure 2.6 and 2.7 show that the
mean-reversion of the pre-ECB announcement return happens entirely during the hour
of the communication event suggesting investors being disappointment from the news
revealed (‘sell on the news’). In particular, we can observe a sharp drop that starts with
the begin of the press conference. Taking together these arguments with the preliminary
50One of the questions asked by the first journalist was: ‘[...] question regarding terminology: time
out on the eurozone, a potential temporary Grexit that’s been talked about in the last week and a half,
and at 4am on Monday morning it seemed a potential Grexit was a possibility. I just wondered whether
using that terminology has opened Pandora’s box on the perception of eurozone membership, and by
inference the euro?’ See https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pressconf/2015/html/is150716.en.html.
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evidence for a ‘buy on the rumor - sell on the news’ story in the sense of Peterson (2002)
from Chapter 5.4 we now test whether this behavioral anticipation explanation also holds
for the high uncertainty periods or even shows stronger explanatory power than for the
overall euro crisis period. Therefore, we re-run the regressions of columns (2) and (6) of
Table 2.7 for the high uncertainty meetings only. We find neither the estimates for the
‘rumors’ variable nor for the ‘disappointment’ proxy to be significant and. Therefore we
cannot conclude that the BRSN explanation following Peterson (2002) fully explains the
pattern of the ECB announcement returns. Instead the regression results suggest that
the sharp decrease during the press conference is decoupled from the pre-announcement
run-up, at least during the high uncertainty periods of the euro crisis.
2.8 Conclusion
With this chapter’s analysis we contribute to the large literature on announcement
returns, in particular around central bank decision days. Supplementary to Lucca and
Moench (2015) we provide empirical evidence for a pre-ECB announcement return
that occurs prior to the scheduled meetings of the European Central Bank and which
as opposed to the pre-FOMC drift mean-reverts with the start of the ECB’s press
conference. We argue that the pre-ECB announcement return in Europe is a recent
phenomenon that started when the course of the Federal Reserve and the European
Central Bank diverged with the begin of the European sovereign debt crisis in 2010.
We also document that the high uncertainty periods of the euro crisis, when the fear of
a eurozone break-up was severe, were a major driver of the average pre-announcement
premium. Due to the bank-sovereign nexus (see Acharya et al., 2018) the financial
sector was particularly affected by the euro crisis and thus benefitted greatly from the
non-standard monetary policy measures which is reflected e.g. in the huge pre-ECB drift
for the banking sector (almost 3% for the high uncertainty periods). In addition, find
larger pre-ECB returns for cyclical industries (like the automotive sector) and the GIIPS
countries of our sample (Italy and Spain). We also document that the CAPM holds
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Figure 2.7: Cumulative Return Series of the Euro Stoxx Banks Index: High
and Low Uncertainty
This figure plots the average cumulative 15 seconds return of the Euro Stoxx Banks on a
three day window around scheduled ECB announcement days (i.e. one day prior to the
event, event, one day after the event). The blue line is the average return around ECB
announcement days, the blue shaded area is the respective pointwise 95% confidence
interval. The vertical dashed line marks the start of the ECB press conference, 2:30
p.m. (local time), on the event day. The upper panel comprises all ECB meetings from
January 2010 to June 2015 that occur within a period of high uncertainty. The lower
panel studies all remaining meetings in the same time period.
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(only) on announcement days for European industry and country’s blue-chip indices.
The magnitude of the observed pre-announcement return is strongly driven by the level
of uncertainty prior to the meeting and also highly co-moves with the resolution of
uncertainty shortly before the event (with an R2 of around 25% to over 30%). The
pre-ECB return strongly predicts post-announcement returns in the fixed income and
equity market (R2 ranging from roughly 20% to 30%), especially for the time period
of the press conference and its aftermath. The former findings can be reconciled with
the theories of Ai and Bansal (2018) and Wachter and Zhu (2018) who argue that the
uncertainty around an information event requires investors to demand a risk premium.
They are also in line with Hu et al. (2019) who argue that the pre-FOMC drift is
a ‘premium for heightened uncertainty’. The announcements first bring heightened
uncertainty to the market, its subsequent dissolution then gives rise to the pre-event
price appreciation. Whereas these explanations are plausible for the pre-ECB return
they do not explain the mean-reversion that follows the announcement. In this study
we also discuss the behavioral anticipation theory of Peterson (2002) that matches all of
the stylized facts of the ECB announcement return for the overall euro crisis period; but
when testing it for the high uncertainty periods we cannot confirm these results.
Compared to recent studies that relate the pre-FOMC drift also to heightened uncertainty
(see Hu et al., 2019; Martello and Ribeiro, 2018) we connect the general equity market
uncertainty as measured by the VSTOXX to the course of the European sovereign debt
crisis using textual analsis of the press conference statements. We find that the pre-ECB
drift is particularly pronounced for the high uncertainty periods of the euro crisis, where
the concerns about a potential Grexit were quite severe, with the magnitude being 2.5
times higher than for the low uncertainty meetings. We therefore argue that the fear
and risk about a eurozone break-up was a major driver of the pre-ECB announcement
return.
Chapter 3
Textual Analysis in Finance: A
Primer
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter we are going to introduce fundamental techniques used in textual
analysis and discuss how they are applied in the field of financial economics. Particularly,
we focus on the concepts that are necessary to understand Chapter 4 of this thesis. In
general, the goal of this primer is to give the reader a sense of how textual analysis is
applied in financial studies instead of giving a comprehensive review. For a more thorough
and extensive discussion of the natural language processing concepts we refer to Jurafsky
and Martin (2017) and Manning and Schütze (2003). For methodological surveys that
cover contemporary statistics and machine learning in general we recommend Hull (2019),
Bishop (2006) or Murphy (2012).1
3.1.1 Introductory Example
In this section we are going to present and discuss a simple introductory example to
illustrate the key challenges and problems inherent in the analysis of textual statements.
1Note, sometimes we omit a formal introduction of a statistical concept and focus only on the main
idea underlying the concept and how it is applied in the economic analysis. In these cases we refer the
interested reader to the recommended literature for further details and explanations.
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In general, the main goal of textual analysis is the automatic content extraction
and knowledge discovery from textual information. For example, every six weeks the
European Central Bank announces its monetary policy decision where the Governing
Council reveals among others things whether the key ECB interest rates have been
changed.2 These information are of high interest for all market participants since
they directly affect the valuation of stocks and bonds. Therefore, the announcement
is highly followed and the information is incorporated into asset prices immediately.
Processing this newly published information in an automated and thus very fast way
can be beneficial for different trading strategies or risk and asset management decisions
in general. Also it allows ex-post to analyze which kind of information was driving asset
prices.
Usually, the interest rate decision is announced within a short statement. See for
example the press conference from 25th of October 2018:
“Based on our regular economic and monetary analyses, we
decided to keep the key ECB interest rates unchanged.”
The key economic information here is that the central bank did not change the short-
term interest rates. A human investor can easily understand the statement and extract
the valuable investment insights but how can a machine automatically extract the relevant
piece of information? In particular, the following questions and challenges arise:
1. How can a computer work with the qualitative raw text data?
2. How can the text mining algorithm separate the important words (e.g. ‘rates’,
‘unchanged’) from the uninformative ones, the so-called ‘noise’ (e.g. ‘Based on our
... we decided’)?
2For an introduction on monetary policy see https://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/intro/html/index.en.html.
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3. How does the machine know that some terms form an expression or entity (e.g.
‘key ECB interest rates’)?
4. How can it understand that some expressions relate to each other and together
constitute the valuable information?
In our example the important information about the monetary policy decision is
contained in the following two expressions and their relationship to each other: ‘key +
ECB + interest + rates’ and ‘keep + unchanged’.
“Based on our regular economic and monetary analyses, we
decided to keep the key ECB interest rates unchanged.”
In the following we will present a first naive approach of how a machine could process
this raw text data automatically and generate valuable insights.
In general, for a computer a textual document is internally represented as a string
data type (sequence of characters) and thus cannot serve directly as an input for quanti-
tative methods. Therefore, one has to transform it first to a quantitative representation.
A simple approach is to create a count vector where every entry of the vector corresponds
to one term and comprises the number of occurrences of the respective word in the
overall text document.
Figure 3.1 illustrates the idea for our example. The first row corresponds to the first
word in our document (‘Based’) which occurs exactly one time in this sentence. Note,
the order does not matter in the construction of the count vector (often it is constructed
based on the alphabetical order). In our simple example this vector representation
already exhibits a dimensionality of 18 × 1. In a more realistic setting the number of
unique terms can easily exceed 10,000. So a lot of techniques in textual analysis relate
to the task of reducing this high dimensionality of the vector representation.
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Figure 3.1: Count Vector Representation of the Interest Rate Decision Statement
Now imagine that we also observe the intra-day asset price response, for example
in the equity market, to this news and that we collect a time series of the statements
with their corresponding returns for all monetary policy announcements of the last 10
years. To analyze which words are responsible for the variation in the returns we can
now, as a simple approach, employ a standard regression model and check the estimates
for statistical significance:
Yt = β0 + β1 ×X(Term 1)t + ...+ βV ×X
(Term V )
t + εt, (3.1)
with Yt being the intra-day return for the interest rate decision statement published at
time t, X
(Term v)
t being the number of occurrences of term v in the respective monetary
policy decision statement and V the number of unique terms across all announcements.
The error term of this regression is represented by εt, with εt ∼ i.i.d.(0, σ2). For example,
in our use case one can imagine a positive and statistically significant relationship
between the word ‘decrease’ or ‘lower’ and the corresponding announcement return since
a lower discount rate leads to higher stock prices.3
A problem within that naive approach is that the resulting X-matrix is sparse and
high dimensional and in comparison we usually only have few Y observations. This
is a typical example of the multi co-linearity problem which leads to non-trustworthy
estimates in the previous specified regression model (see Equation 3.1). Thus, the key
3In the following sub-section we show an implementation of this example using an artificially created
dataset.
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challenge is to reduce the dimensionality of this machine learning problem. This can
be done for example via an efficient pre-processing (e.g. filtering out stopwords, see
Chapter 3.3), a sophisticated choice of the representation (e.g. tf-idf, see Chapter 3.4),
an aggregation of the information to topic (see Chapter 3.5) and tone level (see Chapter
3.6) or via the statistical method (e.g. using a penalized regression, see Chapter 3.7).
Another challenge is how to incorporate the context of a given word into the machine
learning model. In our example the important information is a combination of ‘interest
rates’ and ‘unchanged’. Within our specified regression model every term is an indepen-
dent input variable. One possibility would be to also include interaction terms for the
different words in the regression. Here the question arises which interaction terms to in-
clude? Adding all possible combinations would yield the curse of dimensionality problem
again as discussed before. One popular technique to include the word order and thus the
context in the analysis is the n-gram representation (see Chapter 3.4).
Simulation Exercise
In this sub-section we are going to look at an implementation of the simple regression
problem from the previous chapter using simulated data. In particular, we are going to
discuss the following steps:
1. First, we are going to create an artificial dataset which comprises short textual
statements about the interest rate decision (increase, decrease, unchanged) and a
quantitative number for the corresponding stock market response. In total, we are
simulating 60 statement-return pairs.
2. Next, we are going to transform the raw textual data into a quantitative represen-
tation using count vectors.
3. In a last step, we are going to deploy a standard regression model to learn about
the relationships between the independent words on the one side and the respective
intra-day return series on the other side.
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Figure 3.2 shows our three different interest rate statements which announce an in-
crease or decrease of the key ECB interest rates or no change at all. If there is a decrease
(increase) in the interest rate we assume a positive (negative) stock market reaction of 20
bp. If there is no change at all then we associate a zero response for the equity returns.
The only variation in the three statements that can explain the variance in the returns,
lies in the keywords ‘increase’, ‘lower’, ‘keep’ and ‘unchanged’. In total, we create a bal-
anced dataset of 60 observations which comprises of the three different statement-return
pairs to an equal share.
Figure 3.2: Simulated Interest Rate Decision Dataset
In a next step, we are going to transform the textual data into a quantitative repre-
sentation constructing count vectors as discussed before. Then we put them together into
one matrix with the count vectors as the rows. Figure 3.3 shows the first 5 rows of this
matrix containing the observations for the interest rate announcements and their corre-
sponding stock returns. The columns represent the unique terms across all statements
and the number indicates the occurrence of the respective word for each statement (be-
side the return). In total, we observe 20 different terms, 18 as discussed in the previous
chapter and two more words characterizing the statements for the interest rate ‘increase’
or decrease (‘lower’). Since the count for the term ‘unchanged’ is 1 and the return is 0.0
the first rows only show statements where the interest rates were not changed.
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Figure 3.3: Quantitative Representation of the Simulated Dataset
After this preparation we can now use a standard regression model to analyze which
information or words are driving the variation in the returns. Figure 3.4 shows the
estimated coefficients for the regression problem as defined in Equation 3.1.
Figure 3.4: Estimated Coefficients of the Regression Model
One can clearly see the high t-statistics (> |8|) for our four keywords that indicate
how the interest rate was adjusted (‘increase’, ‘lower’, ‘keep’ and ‘unchanged’). Also the
magnitudes of the estimates correspond to the simulated returns from our dataset (-0.2,
+0.2 and 0.0) which suggests a reasonable fit for this naive approach. But one has to
keep in mind that within our simulation study we looked at an easy toy example with
only 20 dimensions. In a realistic setting we can easily end up with over 10,000 unique
terms and thus independent explanatory variables. In addition, Figure 3.4 shows another
problem: Some of the other words that occur in all of the three statements and thus
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do not contain explanatory power for the variation in the stock returns also show up
significantly (e.g. ‘and’, ‘based’, ‘decided’).4 The problem here are the relatively few y
observations compared to the high dimensionality of the X-matrix which makes it very
difficult to clearly identify the different effects. To get rid of this multicollinearity problem
one needs to significantly reduce the number of independent variables in the regression
model. This is one of the key challenges in textual analysis and popular methods to
achieve that goal are discussed in the next sections.
3.1.2 Motivation
Through the digital revolution, the digitalization, there has been an exponential
growth in the amount of data created. Figure 3.5 shows that the volume of the digi-
tal data generated worldwide in 2018 was around 33 zettabytes (33 trillion gigabyte) and
the projection for 2025 is over five times as high: 175 zettabytes. This data is generated
not only by computers but all kinds of devices like smartphones, or the internet of things
and industry 4.0. In our daily lifes we also generate lots of data e.g. through Google
search queries, the usage of social media or messaging services or online shopping. Nowa-
days, a lot of companies, especially the big tech firms like Google, Facebook or Amazon,
exploit this data and monetarize its valueable information.
Clearly one cannot manually screen the vast amount of data and then extract the
valuable information by hand. Instead one needs a technical system that processes
the different data automatically (see Figure 3.6). Given that a lot of this raw data is
text-based and unstructured5 one needs to deploy text mining techniques to extract the
information. In addition, one often needs to first collect the textual documents in an
automatic way using Web crawling algorithms.
4The other terms exhibit very small estimates that are not statistically different from zero (to the
5% level).
5Unstructured data usually does not have a pre-defined data model compared to a series of stock
prices which typically consists of the information ‘date’ and ‘price’ for each time point.
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Source: Statista 2019
Figure 3.5: Projection of Annually Generated Volume of Digital Data Worldwide in 2018
and 2025 (in Zettabyte)
Source: Peterson 2016, p. 57
Figure 3.6: Large-Scale Text Analytics
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These systems and methods are also popular in the field of news analytics in finance.
‘It is widely recognized news plays a key role in financial markets. [...] There is a
strong yet complex relationship between market sentiment and news. The arrival of
news continually updates an investor’s understanding and knowledge of the market and
influences investor sentiment’ (see Mitra and Mitra 2011a, p.1) and hence, affects their
risk and asset management decisions. Figure 3.7 illustrates this idea.
Source: Mitra and Mitra 2011a, p. 3
Figure 3.7: A Simple Representation of News Analytics in Financial Decision Making
Using this alternative data risk and asset management companies try to make better
investment decisions (generate an ‘alpha’) or to improve their risk monitoring. Important
news and data sources are e.g. SEC filings, social media or central bank communication.
3.1.3 Definitions and Text Mining Process
In this chapter we are going to provide definitions for ‘text mining’ in general,
technical terms used in textual analysis and we are also going to present the classical
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text mining process.
Compared to entries in a database, which follow a pre-defined pattern or schema,
textual data is not structured. There is no emphasis on the key words or fundamental
concepts in the text, their relationships to each other and how certain parts of the text
relate to the key terms. A human reader can intuitively grasp these characteristics
but a computer needs a set of tools to extract that structure. Heyer, Quasthoff and
Wittig define text mining as a group of methodological approaches to structure texts
and thereby extract new and relevant information (see Heyer et al. 2012, p. 3f).
Figure 3.8 shows the classical text mining process. It consists of the three logical
steps: ‘Data Collection’, ‘Pre-Processing’ and ‘Text Mining’.
Source: Chakraborty et al. 2013, p. 7
Figure 3.8: Text Mining Process Flow
First, the basis for every text mining process is a collection of documents. This
collection can comprise of hundreds to millions (and more) of documents. In general, one
can use a static collection of documents like PubMed6 or one can apply Web crawling
techniques to collect articles from the Internet (e.g. Wikipedia articles or central bank
6https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed.
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statements).
Second, after collecting the potentially large amount of documents one usually has
to apply some filtering techniques to obtain the most relevant ones. Also one has to
consider and check the quality of the articles. In a next step the documents need to be
transformed into a quantitative representation (e.g. tf-idf, see Chapter 3.4).
Third, based on the created representations one can extract the topic of the documents
or perform a sentiment analysis (e.g. calculate the tone). These measures can then be
used in a machine learning model (e.g. regression) to further analyze the information
content of the respective documents.
3.1.4 Applications
We now turn to applications of textual analysis in finance. In the following two sub-
chapters we are going to present a selection of important papers that illustrate the typical
research study design and methodologies used, rather than providing a comprehensive
literature survey. The interested reader we refer to more extensive survey papers.
Equity Market
A popular application of news text analytics is the prediction of stock prices. Already
in the early 20th century Cowles (1933) examined whether financial publications could
actually forecast the stock market. For the analysis he first selected, during the time
period from January 1928 to June 1932, 24 publications from professional financial
services, financial weeklies, bank letters, or investment house letters, manually read
them and then subjectively classified them into ‘bullish’, ‘bearish’ or ‘in doubt’. These
forecasts have then been tested with actual fluctuations of the stock market as reflected
by the Standard Statistics Company index of 90 representative stocks (a precursor
of the S&P 500). On a week-to-week basis the average forecasting performance fell
approximately 4% per year below a record created by pure change.
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A similar idea lies behind the study of Antweiler and Frank (2004) who, roughly 70
years later, use modern computational linguistic and machine learning techniques to
automatically and objectively classify more than 1.5 million messages posted on stock
message boards. Based on the classes ‘bullish’, ‘bearish’, or ‘neither’ they construct a
bullishness index and use it to predict the returns of the 45 companies in the Dow Jones
Industrial Average and the Dow Jones Internet Index. They find that stock messages
help to predict market volatility but their effect on stock returns is economically small.
A doubling of the number of messages posted leads to a -0.2% decrease in the stock
price.
In general, there are two ways to determine which words are most useful to dis-
criminate between a positive and negative sentiment of a document. Either one can
use a machine learning algorithm (like in Antweiler and Frank 2004) which, based on a
training set, automatically learns the most important words or one can specify a wordlist
up-front (like a dictionary) and then for example count the number of negative words in
the respective document.
An example for the latter method is the seminal work of Tetlock (2007) who used the
Harvard Psychosociological Dictionary to extract the sentiment from the ‘Abreast of the
Market’ column of the Wall Street Journal and study its relationship to stock returns.
He finds that high media pessimism predicts negative returns on the next day. A one
standard deviation change in pessimism leads to a -8.1 bp change in Dow Jones returns
which (in absolute terms) is higher than the unconditional mean of these returns (5.4
bp).
A few years later Loughran and McDonald (2011) emphasize the importance of the
choice of the dictionary. In their study they show that a wordlist developed for other
disciplines misclassifies common words in financial documents (e.g. almost three-fourths
for the Harvard negative wordlist). Based on SEC 10-K company filings they propose
their own lexicon (LM dictionary) which is nowadays the most commonly used dictionary
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in financial textual analysis studies.
Jegadeesh and Wu (2013) point out that when using the dictionary approach to
calculate a sentiment score the implicit assumption is that all words in the list have
the same weights and thus are of same importance. In their study they present a new
approach to determine the weights using the market’s reactions to 10-K filings within
a simple regression model (the words from the dictionary serve as the independent
variables). They find that their quantitative scores have very low correlation with
the ones assigned by the LM dictionary. In addition, their methodology objectively
determines whether words carry a negative or positive sentiment based on the sign of
the estimated coefficient.
This popular text regression method is also applied in Manela and Moreira (2017)
who construct a text-based measure of uncertainty. In particular, they run a support
vector regression (SVR)7 using front-page articles of the Wall Street Journal (as the
explanatory variables) on the VIX index. Based on the long coverage of this newspaper
they create a time series of the news implied volatility index (NVIX) starting 1890.
Another advantage of their methodology is that one can relate uncertainty peaks to
the specific news events. They find that news related to wars and government policy
explains most of the variation in risk premia over time.
For a more thorough literature review we refer the interested reader to the following
survey papers: Loughran and McDonald (2016), Tetlock (2014) and Kearney and Liu
(2014).
Central Bank Communication
The Bank of England’s discussion paper (Bank of England, 2015) emphasizes
the important role that central bank communication played ‘in the crisis response,
7Compared to the standard linear regression model a SVR selects only a relatively small number
of observations called support vectors and ignores the rest. See Manela and Moreira (2017) for a more
detailed introduction of this concept and further references.
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from forward guidance to disclosure of stress-test results.’ But ‘how frequently, in
what form and about what, should central banks communicate?’ And how does the
communication affect financial markets? Is there a ‘risk of communication’ which adds
volatility to financial markets or encourages the public to overrely on public signals
(see Bank of England, 2015)? To find an answer to these questions a new strand of
literature emerged which uses textual analysis tools to extract the information con-
tent from different central bank statements and to quantify the respective market impact.
Focusing on the U.S. central bank Hansen and McMahon (2016) examine the
information released by the Federal Reserve. Applying computational linguistic tools
to FOMC statements they first measure the news on the state of economic conditions,
as well as the forward guidance. Within a factor augmented VAR framework they
find that in the last 18 years shocks to forward guidance are more important than the
economic information. In particular, a more expansionary forward guidance about future
rates tends to decrease longer maturity bonds significantly whereas there is almost
no significant reaction of yields when the FOMC statement is talking more about an
economic contraction.
Jegadeesh and Wu (2017) analyze the FOMC minutes which are released about three
weeks after the monetary policy decision and contain additional details and comments
about the rationale of the decision. From the raw statements they first extract eight
distinct topics and then calculate for each topic the corresponding tone and uncertainty.8
In a last step, they regress these measures on the market reaction around the release
of the documents and find that the FOMC minutes contain significant incremental
informational value, despite that they are released a few weeks after each FOMC meeting.
Specifically, the market finds the Fed’s discussion of its policy stance, inflation and
employment to be the most informative, compared to topics like trade or consumption
which seem to be not informative for market participants.
8In particular, to extract the topics they deploy the Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) which was
first introduced in Blei et al. (2003). An intuitive video explaining the basic idea behind LDA can be
found here https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3mHy4OSyRf0&t=1058s.
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For the European Central Bank Schmeling and Wagner (2019) show that the tone
of the introductory statement of the ECB’s press conference moves asset prices. The
authors use standard textual analysis tools to first pre-process the raw text data and
then calculate the tone as a simple word count of negative terms obtained from the LM
dictionary. They find that a more positive tone leads to higher stock prices and interest
rates whereas credit spreads decrease. Thus, central bank communication seems to pro-
vide a channel through which monetary policy can affect risk premia in financial markets.
Analyzing the Bank of England’s inflation report Hansen et al. (2018) show that
information about future expected economic conditions can affect short- and long-run
market rates. While studying both qualitative and quantitative information in the
inflation report they find that the narrative about risks and uncertainty affects long-run
yields, in particular their term premium component.
Figure 3.9 illustrates the common research design of these studies:
• First, these studies focus on official communication releases published by the ma-
jor central banks (ECB, Fed or Bank of England). To automatically collect the
statements they deploy standard Web crawling techniques.
• In a next step, they use standard textual analysis tools to pre-process the raw text
data and transform it into a quantitative representation.
• Then they calculate the tone either of the aggregate statement, the individual topics
or on a sentence level, often using a dictionary approach. To extract the topics a
clustering algorithm is deployed.
• In a final step, the extracted topic and tone measures or the individual terms
are used as the explanatory variables in an often standard regression model. For
the independent variable the authors use stock returns or bond yields, either end
of day values or for a narrow time window around the release of the statement.
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These analyses allow to answer the question which information content is driving
financial markets.
Figure 3.9: Typical Research Study Design
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Overall, this common research design follows closely the three major steps from the
classical text mining process as defined earlier in this chapter (see Figure 3.8).
The following chapters will explain the fundamental techniques used in text mining
(in finance). Since there are a vast amount of textual analysis topics we focus on a
selection that is necessary to understand this thesis. For further concepts or a more
detailed explanation we refer the interested reader to fundamental books or papers.
3.2 Data Collection: Web Crawling
Some texts (e.g. newspaper articles) can be retrieved via news databases like Nexis9
or Factiva10. But a lot of textual data, like social media feeds or press releases from
central banks, has to be collected from the World Wide Web (‘the Web’). To automatize
this process one needs to understand the basic architecture underlying the Web and the
Internet. Therefore, in this chapter we will briefly introduce the most important Web
technologies and present the technique of Web crawling.
3.2.1 Web Technologies
The Web was invented in 1989 by Tim Berners-Lee when he was working at CERN
(Halsall, 2005, p. 568) and is the most popular service of the Internet (short for
interconnected network). The Internet is the underlying network of networks whereas
the Web is the actual application which uses the Internet to exchange messages and
documents between different computers or devices. Other applications are for example
e-mail, Voice-over-IP or file sharing.
In our daily lifes the Web is often used for information browsing. For example, if you
like to inform yourself about the latest monetary policy decision you can go to the ECB’s
web page and look up the information you need. Figure 3.10 illustrates this use case and
9See https://www.nexis.com.
10See https://www.dowjones.com/products/factiva/.
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highlights the main technologies providing the service.
Figure 3.10: Web Page of the European Central Bank
Usually, one starts with opening the web browser that is installed on your computer
and then types in a URL, which is the address for the web page of interest. If the request
is submitted (by hitting ‘enter’) one can see that the full URL starts with ‘http(s)’ which
stands for the HTTP protocol11 and ‘www’ which is the acronym for the World Wide
Web. An address for a FTP file sharing service usually starts with ‘ftp://’ instead of
‘http://www’. The requested resource is then provided by the respective server as a
HTML page which gets displayed by the web browser. If one wants to navigate to the
next page or resource one usually uses a hyperlink which contains the new address.
When clicking on the respective link the new page is requested by using its URL and
the HTTP protocol (see Halsall, 2005, p.569 ff).
In the following sub-chapters we are going to present the most important technologies
in more detail. For a comprehensive discussion we refer the interested reader to funda-
11If one uses the secure version of the HTTP protocol then this is indicated by ‘https’.
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mental text books (like Halsall, 2005; Tanenbaum, 2003; Kurose and Ross, 2013) or the
respective technology specification of the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C).
HTML
‘To publish information for global distribution, one needs a universally understood
language, a kind of publishing mother tongue that all computers may potentially
understand. The publishing language used by the World Wide Web is HTML’ (Faulkner
et al., 2017, Chapter 2.2).
The key challenge for the Web lies in the heterogeneity of computers or devices (e.g.
mobile phones) that want to use it. These clients have different operating systems, web
browsers (also with different versions) and large or small screens with various resolutions
but everybody wants to have a good user experience. Therefore, one needs a specific set
of rules about how a page is structured (e.g. headline, paragraphs) and how it should
get displayed on the different client systems. This is specified by the HyperText Markup
Language (HTML), specifically by annotating the raw text with HTML tags.
This is illustrated in Figure 3.11 which shows the official ECB web page in the Safari
web browser and its underlying HTML file. One can see that the document starts with
the < html > tag which defines that it is a HTML file. Then the meta information
follow within the < head > tag.12 The < body > of this file contains the content of the
web page. Our press conference text is then located within the < article > tag and the
different paragraphs of the introductory statement are in a list of < p > elements. Each
of these < p > tags contains the actual text that is shown on the web page (e.g. ‘Ladies
and gentlemen ...’). Note, one can exploit this explicit structure in the later analysis,
e.g. for studying the information content of different paragraphs instead of the aggregate
document.
12The < /head > command closes the previous < head > tag and thus indicates that the next element
starts.
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For a more detailed description we refer the interested reader either to (Halsall, 2005,
Chapter 9.4) or the official HTML specification (Faulkner et al., 2017).
Figure 3.11: Source Code of the ECB Web Page
URLs and HTTP
The Web comprises of a vast collection of documents that are stored on millions of
(server) computers distributed all over the world. Two questions or challenges arise.
First, how can we identify all these files? And second, how can we access them on all
the different machines?
The first challenge is addressed by the Uniform Resource Locator (URL). The URL
is a uniform naming scheme for locating resources on the Web.13 The standard format
of an URL comprises of (see Halsall, 2005, p. 577):
• the application protocol which is used to retrieve the page,
13This concept is similar to a post address in the real world.
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• the domain name of the server,
• the pathname or the file,
• the file name.
Figure 3.12 shows the URL for the ECB’s web page as used before. The ap-
plication protocol in this example is the secure version of ‘http’, the domain name
is ‘www.ecb.europe.eu’, ‘/press/pressconf/2018/html/’ represents the pathname and
‘ecb.is.181025.en.html’ is the file name. The ending of the file indicates that the requested
resource is a html page. Note, one can also see that the date of the press conference is
incorporated in the name of the file (2018/10/25). This suggests a systematic structure
of the URLs and allows for an automatic retrieval of all press conference transcripts.
Figure 3.12: URL for the ECB Web Page
To establish a communication between all the heterogeneous computers in the
Internet (e.g. Linux vs. Windows based servers) we need a standardized set of rules, a
protocol. For the Web HTTP is the standard application protocol. It follows a simple
request-response pattern: the browser side sends a request message and the server side
returns a response message (Halsall, 2005, p. 581).14
Figure 3.13 shows a schematic diagram for a HTTP communication. It usually
starts with the user typing in the URL of the web page of interest in his web browser:
‘https://www.ecb.europe.eu/press/pressconf/2018/html/ecb.is.181025.en.html’ (1). Af-
ter hitting ‘enter’ the browser creates an HTTP request message and sends it to the
server computer as identified by the first part of the URL (‘www.ecb.europe.eu’) (2).15
14For a more detailed and technical explanation see the W3C specification of the HTTP
https://www.w3.org/Protocols/.
15Note, for the sake of brevity we skip the host name resolution by the Domain Name System (DNS),
that maps the logical names on the corresponding IP address (like a phone book in the real world).
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Due to the standardized application protocol (HTTP) computers with a different tech-
nology stack (e.g. Windows or Linux operating system) can communicate with each
other. The web server program that runs on the server machine (and listens to port 80)
receives that message and routes it to the corresponding implementation or class (using
the relative path information) and method (via the HTTP method).16 Within the GET
method the html file can then be retrieved, e.g. from a database or file server (3). It is
then attached to the HTTP response message and sent back to the client (4). The web
browser of the user receives that message, extracts the html file and displays it accord-
ingly to the structure as defined by the html tags (5). Note, a HTTP GET request does
not necessarily need to be issued by a web browser but can also be executed by any other
program, e.g. a web crawler (see also Halsall, 2005, p. 577 f).
Figure 3.13: Example for a HTTP Communication
A more detailed discussion can be found in Chapter 9.3 of Halsall (2005) and in the
specifications of the HyperText Transfer Protocol.17
16Note, the standard HTTP method that is used when requesting a Web page is ‘GET’.
17See https://www.w3.org/Protocols/.
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3.2.2 Web Crawler
Knowing the basic web architecture and technologies one can now write a program
that automatically issues the HTTP GET requests and then extracts and saves the html
files from the response messages. Such a program is called a web crawler.
Figure 3.14 shows the structure of a web crawler that automatically collects all the
press conference transcripts from the ECB web page. The program performs for every
press conference date the following steps:
1. Construct the specific press conference URL by combining the base URL
and the dynamic part, here the press conference date (e.g. ‘181025’):
‘https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pressconf/2018/html/ecb.is’ + DATE +
‘.en.html’.
2. Send a HTTP GET request to the specified URL (like a normal web browser).
3. Extract the HTML page from the HTTP response message.
4. Instead of displaying the HTML page to a user we need to parse and pre-process
it. In particular, one needs to extract the main text (that is located between the
< article > tag)
5. and remove the HTML tags.
6. In a last step we save the processed text files for further analyses.
3.3 Pre-Processing
When working with text files one usually starts with preparing the raw textual data.
In this chapter we will present the standard pre-processing steps that are used in textual
analysis.
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Figure 3.14: Web Crawler for ECB Press Conference Transcripts
3.3.1 Tokenization
In a first step, we need to split the raw text document into its constituents, initially
into the sentences and then the words. Manning and Schütze (2003, Chapter 4.2.2)
define tokenization as the process ‘to divide the input text into units called tokens where
each is either a word or something else like a number or a punctuation mark.’
A simple rule-based approach is to split the document on white spaces and punctu-
ation. But this will also split hyphenated phrases like ‘vice-president’ or numbers like
‘1.8%’. Therefore, in practice, one should use a specialized library for this task.
For example, if we tokenize our previous interest rate decision statement
“Based on our regular economic and monetary analyses, we
decided to keep the key ECB interest rates unchanged.”
we would obtain the following list of individual terms:
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[ ‘Based’, ‘on’, ‘our’, ‘regular’, ‘economic’, ‘and’, ‘monetary’, ‘analyses’, ‘,’, ‘we’, ‘de-
cided’, ‘to’, ‘keep’, ‘the’, ‘key’, ‘ECB’, ‘interest’, ‘rates’, ‘unchanged’, ‘.’ ].
Multi - Word Expressions
As one can see in the above example the tokenization process splits the raw text into
its individual tokens regardless whether certain terms belong together. E.g. the words
‘key’, ‘ECB’, ‘interest’ and ‘rates’ refer to the ECB’s official interest rates for the euro
area.
To mitigate this problem one can use a multi-word expression (MWE) tokenizer which
groups these tokens together. In our example the previous four interest rate terms would
become the following unified token ‘key ECB interest rates’. In general, the information
on which expressions should be treated as one must be specified by the user.
3.3.2 Punctuation, Numbers or Non-Alphabetic Characters
To reduce the number of items in the list and thus the dimensionality of the later
representation one should filter out tokens that are not informative (‘noise’). A first
method is to remove non latin alphabet tokens, like punctuation (‘,’ or ‘.’), numbers or
non-alphabetic characters (e.g. ‘@’ or ‘:)’).
Note, in some applications it might be important to keep the numbers (e.g. ‘GDP
increased by 0.5%’) since they contain valuable information. Also when working with
social media content, e.g. tweets, non-alphabetic characters like smileys ‘:)’ can represent
an informative feature.
Filtering out the non latin alphabet tokens from our interest rate statement yields
the following list of tokens (reduced by two items):
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[ ‘Based’, ‘on’, ‘our’, ‘regular’, ‘economic’, ‘and’, ‘monetary’, ‘analyses’, ‘we’, ‘decided’,
‘to’, ‘keep’, ‘the’, ‘key’, ‘ECB’, ‘interest’, ‘rates’, ‘unchanged’ ].
3.3.3 Stopwords
A second popular method to reduce the dimensionality is filtering out stopwords.
According to Das (2014, Chapter 3.3) ‘stopwords are non-contextual words, i.e., not
germane to interpretation of the text that are removed from the data before conducting
textual analysis.’ Typical examples are ‘a’, ‘are’, ‘for’, ‘the’, ‘to’, etc. which appear often
in the English language but can be seen as being redundant. Since there is no definitive
list of stopwords one should always be careful when using a predefined one.18 A good
practice is to use the list of stopwords incorporated in standard NLP packages.19
Applying this technique to our interest rate decision sentence we obtain the following
wordlist:
[ ‘Based’, ‘regular’, ‘economic’, ‘monetary’, ‘analyses’, ‘decided’, ‘keep’, ‘key’, ‘ECB’,
‘interest’, ‘rates’, ‘unchanged’ ].
After these basic pre-processing steps we already decreased the dimension of our list
of tokens from 20 to 12.
3.3.4 Linguistic Roots
One can further decrease the dimensionality by collapsing similar word forms to a
common root word. For many applications one does not loose information when using
the linguistic root instead of the grammatical form of a word. For example, one could
treat ‘economical’ and ‘economic’ as equivalent tokens.
18Also sometimes it is necessary to keep all the words of a text, e.g. when calculating a readability
measure which is based on the length of a sentence.
19Also common is to drop rare words, for example those that appear less than a given threshold.
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In general, there are two options to create the root forms: stemming and lemmatiza-
tion. In Chapter 4.2.3 Manning and Schütze (2003) define stemming as ‘a process that
strips off affixes and leaves you with a stem.’ A popular stemming algorithm (for the
English language) that is used in the textual analysis literature is the Porter stemmer.
This algorithm maps for example the two above mentioned terms to ‘econom’.
Alternatively, the process of lemmatization first tags each token with its part of speech
(POS) and then looks up each word-POS pair in a dictionary to find the root. For
example, in the sentence ‘we saw a recovery in the economy’ ‘saw’ would be tagged as a
verb and thus be converted to its root form ‘see’. In the case of the phrase ‘this is a big
saw’ it would be tagged as a noun and left unchanged.
3.4 Representations
Based on the list of terms obtained from the pre-processing one can create a
quantitative representation for the collection of documents. In the following we will
present the most commonly used methods.
3.4.1 Count Vector - Term-Document Matrix
A popular approach is the bag of words (BoW) model. Within this model ‘all the
structure and (linear) ordering of words within the context is ignored’ (see Manning and
Schütze, 2003, p. 237).
Given the tokenized, filtered and stemmed list of words from the pre-processing part
the BoW model counts the occurrences of unique tokens in each document. These word
counts xd,v are then collected in the term-document matrix X which is defined as follows:







Every row represents one document d and each columns an unique term v from the
overall corpus. The dimensions of this matrix are D × V .
The key characteristics of this matrix are its high dimensionality and its sparsity.
The former is a result of the large number of different words used in a collection of
text documents. The latter stems from the fact that not all the words appear in every
document and thus exhibit a count of zero.
Example
We now extend the previous interest rate statement example by two more ‘decisions’:
A rate increase and one lowering of the key ECB interest rates:
“Based on our regular economic and monetary analyses, we
decided to keep the key ECB interest rates unchanged.”
“Based on our regular economic and monetary analyses, we
decided to decrease the key ECB interest rates.”
“Based on our regular economic and monetary analyses, we
decided to increase the key ECB interest rates.”
We can now create a quantitative representation of these three decisions. The
respective term-document matrix is shown in Figure 3.15. Note, in our example the
terms only occur at most once in every document. In practice, the counts are often
larger than one.
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Figure 3.15: Example Term-Document Matrix
Compared to our introductory example from Chapter 3.1 we reduced the number of
columns of this matrix from 20 to 14 due to the applied pre-processing steps.
3.4.2 TF-IDF Weighting
‘If we count up how often each word (type) of a language occurs in a large corpus,
and then list the words in order of their frequency of occurrence, we can explore the
relationship between the frequency of a word f and its position in the list, known as its
rank r’ (see Manning and Schütze, 2003, Chapter 1.4.3). According to Zipf’s law there
is an inversely proportional relationship between the frequency of a particular term and
its rank. This means that ‘in human languages [...] there are a few very common words,
a middling number of medium frequency words, and many low frequency words’ (see
Manning and Schütze, 2003, Chapter 1.4.3). This observation can distort raw word
counts as discussed previously.
Also usually the most commonly used words carry very little meaningful information
about the actual contents of the document (see also stopwords). In the above example we
can see that certain words, like ‘analyses’ or ‘decided’, appear in every of our documents
and thus have no discriminative power if one likes to differentiate between the different
interest rate decisions. We know that the three statements only differ with respect to
the terms ‘keep’, ‘unchanged’, ‘decrease’ and ‘increase’ which appear only once in the
overall corpus. So the question arises how can we incorporate this characteristic into our
quantitative representation?
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Definition
A popular approach is to use the TF-IDF (term frequency - inverse document fre-
quency) weighting scheme which is defined as follows (see Jurafsky and Martin, 2017, p.
805):
tf − idfd,v = tfd,v × idfv.
The tf-idf score consists of two components: First the term frequency tfd,v of word






where dfv is the number of documents containing term v and D is the overall number of
documents. This weighting scheme assigns high scores to words that occur many times
in few documents.
Example
In our example the term ‘analyses’ appears once in all three interest rate statements
and thus is not very characteristic for a single document. The idf score is therefore very
low (around 1).20 To correct for the document length the value is also normalized using
the L2 norm. Since the L2 value for the first count vector is roughly 4, the first matrix
entry yields 0.25 (1 x 1/4).
Figure 3.16: Example TF-IDF Matrix
The four most important terms, according to the tf-idf score, are ‘unchanged’, ‘keep’,
‘increase’ and ‘decrease’ and match our keywords from the simulated dataset. Their
20Note, to prevent a division by zero the implementation of the used NLP package differs slightly from
the standard textbook notation. For the implementation details, see Chapter 4.2.3.4. of https://scikit-
learn.org/stable/modules/feature extraction.html#text-feature-extraction.
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weighted score is factor 1.5 to 2 times higher than for the uninformative features.
Application
In their seminal study Loughran and McDonald (2011) also compare their newly
constructed dictionary (based on the SEC 10-K filings) with the Harvard negative wordlist
using the tf-idf weighting scheme. They find in their return regression analysis that when
using tf-idf weights both wordlists are ‘essentially identical in their impact’. This finding
emphasizes the importance of considering a weighting scheme.
3.4.3 Ngram Models
The simple bag of words model considers only individual terms and destroys all
information on the word order. This might be sufficient for certain applications but in
some contexts we need the order information. Consider the following two sentences which
have the same representation according to the BoW model, but share a different meaning:
“The interest rate was not increased.”
“Not the interest rate was increased.”
Here, the different semantics stems from the context of the term ‘not’. If it is located
next to the verb ‘be (was)’ then the sentence says that the action was not executed.
Placed in the beginning it negates the noun ‘interest rate’.
To include the context of a given word one can alternatively consider adjacent
phrases, called n-grams. Typically, people use n = 2, 3 or 4 and these models are referred
to as bigram, trigram or four-gram (see Manning and Schütze, 2003, p. 193).
In the example a bigram would be ‘the interest’, ‘interest rate’, ‘rate was’ and so on.21
21Note, one can construct the n-grams also after the pre-processing steps when stopwords are already
filtered out.
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A trigram would include three adjacent terms, e.g. ‘interest rate was’, ‘rate was not’
and a four-gram would be ‘interest rate was not’ or ‘rate was not increased’.
One can see that the last four-gram accurately captures the context of the term ‘not’
and ‘increased’, saying that the interest rate was not increased which is the relevant
piece of information here. In general, working with the n-gram model is similar to
using individual terms (v now indexes the unique bigrams/ trigrams/ four-grams rather
than the unigrams). The problem is how to choose n so that the context is accurately
captured? If n is too high then the curse of dimensionality problem arises (again).
The n-gram model is used for example in Manela and Moreira (2017) who construct a
news-implied volatility index based on an uni- and bigram representation of Wall Street
Journal abstracts.
3.5 Similarity and Clustering
In this section we are going to introduce several measures that can be used to quantify
how similar two sentences or documents are to each other. Given the similarity scores
one can then apply a clustering algorithm which groups related documents together.
3.5.1 Document Similarity
In general, one can interpret the individual rows of the term-document matrix as
vectors in a V -dimensional space. Thus, to determine how alike two documents are we
can now calculate the similarity between the corresponding vectors.
As a first approach one could calculate the Euclidean distance which is defined as (see
Manning and Schütze, 2003, p. 301):
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with vector ~xi (~xj) representing the row of the term-document matrix that contains
document i (j) and xi,v (xj,v) being the respective row entry for term v.
The problem with this measure is that vectors which comprise of an identical set of
words but have a different word count (e.g. ~x1 = [3, 6]
> and ~x2 = [1, 2]
>) exhibit a large
Euclidean distance whereas our intuition would tell as that they cover a similar topic. In
Figure 3.17 this is illustrated by the vectors ~x1 and ~x2 which point in the same direction
but have a different document length. A better approach would be to consider whether
the vectors point in the same direction or not.
Figure 3.17: Vector Space Example
This idea is implemented by the popular cosine similarity. It measures ‘the distance
between two documents by the cosine of the angle between their vectors. When two
documents are identical they will receive a cosine of 1; when they are orthogonal (share
no common terms) they will receive a cosine of 0’ (see Jurafsky and Martin, 2017, p.
803). The cosine similarity between two documents is calculated as:




with ~xi and ~xj as defined above.
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Example
Prior to the announcement of the interest rate decision the ECB President welcomes
the audience to the respective press conference. We now add this ‘welcome’ sentence to
our previous example. One can immediately see that this sentence is very different to
the other three, since it uses a completely different vocabulary:
“Ladies and gentlemen, the Vice-President and I are very pleased
to welcome you to our press conference.”
In a next step, we first calculate the term-document matrix for the four sentences and
then the cosine similarity for each document with respect to all the others. The results
are shown in Figure 3.18:
Figure 3.18: Example Cosine Similarity
The first three columns correspond to the three interest rate decision statements
as defined previously. The fourth column represents the similarity scores for the
‘welcome’ sentence. One can see that the first three documents share a high similar-
ity score (around 0.9), whereas the newly added one is not similar at all (the score is zero).
For the following illustration we first transform the similarity matrix into a distance
matrix
dist = 1− cos sim
and then reduce the dimensionality of this matrix (to two) which allows us to visualize
the distances between the different documents.22
22Specifically, we use the Multi-Dimensional Scaling (MDS) algorithm which is similar to the principal
component analysis but uses a distance matrix as an input instead of the covariance matrix. For a detailed
introduction of this algorithm we refer the interested reader to a basic statistics textbook.
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The left panel of Figure 3.19 plots only the distances between the three interest rate
decision statements. One can see that they are all a bit different but when adding the
new ‘welcome’ sentence (as shown in the right panel) one can clearly see that they share
a commonality compared to the introductory sentence (represented by point far to the
right). Interestingly, the three interest rate decisions mostly differ across the second axis,
the value for the first factor is roughly the same. Thus, one could conclude that factor
one separates the documents across different topics and factor two differentiates within
the topic, e.g. whether there was an increase or decrease in the interest rates.
Figure 3.19: Example Visualization of Document Similarity
Application
Hoberg and Phillips (2010) apply the cosine similarity measure to product descrip-
tions of 10-K filings to extract a continuous representation of the pairwise similarity
of any two firms. They use it as an extension to the normal industry classification
methodologies like the Standard Industry Classification (SIC) or the North American
Industry Classification System (NAICS).
Also Merkley (2014) uses the cosine similarity and a vector space model to measure the
amount of repetitive information within R&D narrative disclosures.
In addition to the cosine similarity measure also other scores are used. For example,
Tetlock (2011) uses the Jaccard coefficient to determine the staleness of a news story,
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extracted from the textual similarity of a new information compared to the older ones.
For a comprehensive list of similarity measures and a more detailed discussion of their
properties we refer the interested reader to Manning and Schütze (2003, p. 299) or
Jurafsky and Martin (2017, p. 697 ff).
Sequence Matching
Instead of calculating a similarity score using the respective document vectors one
can compare directly two words or sentences with each other based on their string
representation. One distance measure for strings is the minimum edit distance which ‘is
the minimum number of editing operations (insertion, deletion, substitution) needed to
transform one string into another’ (see Jurafsky and Martin, 2017, p. 107 f). If each
operation has the cost of one then it is called the Levenshtein distance.
The Levenshtein distance for the example in Figure 3.20 is 2 since two characters have
to be substituted to convert the one expression into the other.
Figure 3.20: Example Edit Distance
This minimum edit distance can now be used to compare words/ strings/ sequences
with each other and match them based on the lowest distance value.
3.5.2 Clustering
Based on the obtained similarity scores we can now group similar observations (doc-
uments) together. Therefore, we deploy a clustering algorithm. These algorithms belong
to the class of unsupervised learning methods, which means that they uncover previously
unknown patterns in the data set without pre-existing labels. The hidden structure in
textual documents can be thought of as topics, the underlying theme of the document.
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K-Means
A popular method to extract topics from text is the K-means clustering algorithm. In
general, it ‘partitions a set of vectors {~x1, ~x2, ... ~xn} into a set of clusters {D1, D2, ... DK}’
(see Feldman and Sanger, 2007, Chapter V.3.1).
The algorithm proceeds as follows (Feldman and Sanger, 2007, Chapter V.3.1):
Initialization:
K seeds, either given or selected randomly, form the core of K
clusters. Every other vector is assigned to the cluster of the closest seed.
Iteration:
The centroids ~uk of the current clusters are computed (based on the







Each vector is reassigned to the cluster with the closest centroid.
Stopping Condition:
At convergence – when no more changes occur.
To determine the closest centroid one usually uses the Euclidean distance as the
standard distance function (see Manning and Schütze, 2003, p. 515 f).
Figure 3.21 illustrates one iteration of the K-means algorithm. The first step assigns
objects (documents) to the closest cluster mean (shown as circles). In the second step
cluster means are recomputed as the center of mass of the set of objects that are members
of the cluster (see Manning and Schütze, 2003, p. 517).
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Source: Manning and Schütze 2003, p. 517
Figure 3.21: One Iteration of the K-Means Algorithm
Example
We now apply the K-means clustering procedure to our previous example. The
algorithm takes two input values: First, the term-document matrix (e.g. the tf-idf
matrix) and second the number of clusters (e.g. n = 2). The output is a list of topic
labels [ 0, 0, 0, 1 ] which correspond to our four documents.
Figure 3.22 illustrates the result. The algorithm groups the three interest rate decision
statements together, the introductory sentence forms a separate topic.
Figure 3.22: Example K-Means Clustering
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In addition, Figure 3.23 shows the top words per cluster. One can see that cluster
0 clearly represents the interest rate decision (e.g. ‘interest’, ‘rates’, ‘decided’) whereas
cluster 1 captures the introduction (e.g. ‘welcome’, ‘gentlemen’).
Figure 3.23: Top Words of K-Means Cluster
In general, one can choose the number of clusters either based on expert knowledge
or via the within-cluster sum-of-squares criterion (inertia), which is calculated based on





||~xd − ~uk||2. (3.3)
Table 3.1 shows the calculated inertias for our example.23
# Clusters 1 2 3 4
Inertia 16.5 2.67 1.0 0.0
Table 3.1: K-Means Inertias
Figure 3.24 illustrates how the error diminishes with the increasing number of
clusters. The error decreases a lot when using two instead of one cluster, but only
slightly when adding a third one. This ‘kink’ in the function can serve as a rule of thumb
when deciding on how many clusters to incorporate in the clustering procedure. In our
example, both the rule of thumb and our expert knowledge yield the same number of
clusters (n = 2).
23Note, when using four clusters for four documents then the error is zero.
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Figure 3.24: Inertia for K-Means Clustering
Other Algorithms
In general, the K-means algorithm produces a one hot encoding for each document,
which means that it belongs to exactly one topic (see the topic label list in the previous
example). This works well in certain applications but can be too restrictive for documents
that contain several topics, e.g. information about inflation and economic growth. In
these cases one should use mixed-membership models. A popular algorithm in this field
is for example the Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) (see Blei et al., 2003).
3.6 Tone and Sentiment
In this chapter we are going to discuss two main techniques to extract the sentiment or
tone from a given document: First, based on a lexicon or wordlist which classifies specific
words ex-ante into positive or negative. The second approach builds upon classification
algorithms which learn from a labeled training set the words that are characteristic for a
negative or positive sentiment.
3.6.1 Dictionary
A lot of textual analysis studies in finance use a simple wordlist to assess the
tone of a certain document. This method works surprisingly well since people, often
unconsciously, tend to use certain words (e.g. ‘risk’, ‘uncertain’, ‘afraid’) more often
when they are in a specific mood (e.g. anxiety). If one then just counts the num-
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ber of occurrences of these terms then this can yield already a meaningful sentiment score.
In general, this wordlist has to be specified prior to the analysis and thus depends
on a subjective choice made by the researcher. Also such a pre-specified sentiment or
affective lexicon focuses ‘only on certain words, ones that carry particularly strong cues
to sentiment or affect’ (see Jurafsky and Martin, 2017, p. 327) rather than considering
every term as a feature. This is advantageous in the sense that it reduces the dimen-
sionality of the term-document matrix significantly by focusing only on a subset of words.
A popular lexicon that was used for example in Tetlock (2007) is the General
Inquirer24 which stems from psychology research and was developed by Philip Stone
and his colleagues in the 1960s in Harvard (Stone et al., 1966). It comprises of 77
categories, covering e.g. negative, positive, strong, weak, active or pleasure related words.
A more recent dictionary which was developed especially for financial applications is
the LM dictionary.25 It was constructed in Loughran and McDonald (2011) based on
the most frequent words in SEC 10-K company filings.
After selecting the wordlist one needs to define the actual sentiment measure. In the
literature one often considers the fraction of the number of positive (negative) words P
(N) to the total number of words in the document T . E.g. Schmeling and Wagner (2019)








Dong et al. (2018) also use an extreme tone measure, defined as the maximum of the
24http://www.wjh.harvard.edu/ inquirer.
25https://sraf.nd.edu/textual-analysis/resources/.
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In general, dictionaries are based on the raw word count. If one applies e.g. the tf-idf
weighting scheme (as defined previously) to the LM dictionary then it yields similar
results as the Harvard dictionary in a stock return regression analysis (see Loughran and
McDonald, 2011). Also Jegadeesh and Wu (2013) emphasize the importance of term
weighting when using a dictionary. They develop a methodology which uses a simple
regression approach and the stock market reaction to determine the corresponding term
weights (direction and magnitude).
Das (2014, p. 52) points out that ‘word count classifiers may be enhanced by focusing
on “emphasis words” such as adjectives and adverbs, especially when classifying emotive
content. One approach used in Das and Chen (2007) is to identify all adjectives and
adverbs in the text and then only consider words that are within +/- 3 words before and
after the adjective or adverb. This extracts the most emphatic parts of the text only, and
then mood scores it.’
Example
We now illustrate the usage of a lexicon within our interest rate decision example.
Therefore, we are going to define a simple central bank dictionary ourselves since other
popular wordlist tend to misclassify terms in the monetary policy context.26
Based on our expert domain knowledge we specify the following positive and negative
wordlists:
Pos = [decrease, lower, cut],
Neg = [increase, raise, hike].
26For example, the Harvard dictionary classifies the term ‘decrease’ as negative whereas a lower
interest rate should be positive news to financial markets.
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with P , N and T as defined previously.
“Based on our regular economic and monetary analyses, we
decided to keep the key ECB interest rates unchanged.”
Tone: (0 - 0) / 12 = 0.0027
“Based on our regular economic and monetary analyses, we
decided to decrease the key ECB interest rates.”
Tone: (1 - 0) / 11 = 0.09
“Based on our regular economic and monetary analyses, we
decided to increase the key ECB interest rates.”
Tone: (0 - 1) / 11 = -0.09
“Ladies and gentlemen, the Vice-President and I are very pleased
to welcome you to our press conference.”
Tone: (0 - 0) / 8 = 0.00
Overall, one can see that in our example the defined tone measure (which uses our
pre-specified wordlists) nicely captures the different semantics of the ECB statements.
Nevertheless, in a more realistic setting this task is quite challenging since the choice of
the appropriate dictionary is difficult (one cannot always create tailored wordlists) and
also the meaning of the specific terms can be ambiguous and context-dependent.
In a next step, one can either calculate the aggregate tone across all statements or
27Note, for calculating the tone we do not consider the stopwords.
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group it with respect to the different topics (e.g. interest rate decision and introduction).
Then, one can use the tone measure within a regression model to examine for example
the relationship between the sentiment of the statement and the corresponding return.
Boolean Search - Regular Expression
Another technique that uses keywords to reduce the dimensionality is the Boolean
search. Whereas dictionary methods consider the intensity (frequency) of word use to
be informative the Boolean search just looks for the occurrence of the specified keyword.
The result of a boolean query is either 1 (word is in text) or 0 (expression is not
included). To check whether a specific keyword occurs in a text one often uses regular
expression, ‘a language for specifying text search strings’ (Jurafsky and Martin, 2011, p.
51 ff).
Within our previous example one could imagine that we are only interested in whether
a statement is about the interest rate decision or not. To check this one can define the
regular expression pattern
pattern := ‘interest rates′
and search for it in all the texts (strings). If the expression occurs (at least once) in the
respective statement the query responds with ‘True’ or ‘1’ and thus we know that the
document is, at least partly, about the interest rate decision.
In general, a pattern can be defined in a very flexible way. One can use com-
binations of alphabetical and numerical characters as well as other symbols (e.g.
HTML tags). For example, when one needs to split central bank statements based
on (bold) keywords, like < strong > key ECB interest rates < /strong > or
< strong > economic analysis < /strong >28 one can define these expressions as
patterns and search for them in the textual document. Based on their position in the
28See https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pressconf/2018/html/ecb.is181025.en.html.
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text one can then split the document.
To construct the Economic Policy Uncertainty (EPU) index29 (see Baker et al., 2016)
or the Equity Market Volatility (EMV) Tracker (see Baker et al., 2019) the authors use
Boolean searches. In particular, they specify three groups with certain keywords (for
the EPU e.g. ‘uncertainty’ in group 1, ‘economic’ in group 2 and ‘congress’ or ‘deficit’
in group 3)30 and retrieve all newspaper articles that contain at least one keyword from
each category. Then, based on the raw counts of the retrieved articles they construct
their respective index.
Lucca and Trebbi (2011) also rely on raw counts of Boolean type queries. They use the
Google search engine to extract a semantic orientation score with respect to the expected
interested rate decision of the Federal Reserve. Note, in this application the authors do
not have control over the corpus (the Internet), they just receive the number of hit counts
for their query (e.g. statement + ‘hawkish’).
3.6.2 Supervised Learning - Classification
As an alternative to using an ex-ante specified or selected dictionary one can ‘let
the data speak’ and apply supervised machine learning techniques to determine the
document sentiment. According to Murphy (2012, p. 2), in the ‘supervised learning
approach, the goal is to learn a mapping from inputs x to outputs y, given a labeled set31
of input-output pairs D = {(xi, yi)}Ni=1. Here D is called the training set, and N is the
number of training examples.’ As a result these machine learning algorithms determine
ex-post which input values (e.g. words) are most important for a specific category or class.
This methodology works especially well with shorter documents where hardly any
terms from a wordlist are used, like social media tweets. Antweiler and Frank (2004)
29See http://www.policyuncertainty.com.
30The EMV keywords are for example: ‘economic’ in group 1, ‘stock market’ in group 2 and ‘volatility’
in group 3.
31Class labels could be for example ‘positive’, ‘neutral’ or ‘negative’.
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apply a supervised machine learning algorithm to classify more than 1.5 million messages
about U.S. companies posted on Yahoo! Finance and Raging Bull. Based on the different







where Mt is the respective number of buy (sell) messages.
To classify the messages Antweiler and Frank (2004) apply the simple Naive Bayes
algorithm.33 As a robustness exercise they also use a Support Vector Machine34 for their
classification task which yields similar results in their study.
A critical issue when applying a supervised machine learning technique is to obtain
the class or category labels. One possibility is to use the Web which ‘contains an
enormous number of on-line reviews for restaurants, movies, books, or other products,
each of which have the text of the review along with an associated review score: a value
that may range from 1 star to 5 stars, or scoring 1 to 10’ (see Jurafsky and Martin, 2017,
p. 333 ff). In a financial application one can often use stock returns or other asset prices
to obtain the class label (e.g. return ≥ 0 and < 0). Alternatively, one can either man-
ually classify the text or crowdsource a training set (e.g. via Amazon Mechanical Turk).35
An overview of financial studies using dictionary or supervised machine learning
methods for sentiment analysis is presented in Kearney and Liu (2014). Further details
and explanations with respect to sentiment analysis in finance can also be found in Mitra
and Yu (2016).
32This idea is similar to counting positive or negative words when using the lexicon approach.
33See Jurafsky and Martin (2017, Ch. 6) for a detailed explanation on how to use this algorithm for
sentiment classification.
34See Murphy (2012, Ch. 14.5).
35See https://www.mturk.com.
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3.7 Text Regression
After transforming the qualitative textual data into a quantitative representation
and after extracting the topic and/ or tone we can now use standard statistical and
machine learning methods to analyze the relationship between the information revealed
and e.g. the financial markets. When performing these analyses one always has
to keep in mind the high-dimensionality of the input data which can easily lead to
multicollinearity problems due to the curse of dimensionality (see Murphy, 2012, p. 18 f).
In the following we will briefly discuss the most popular methods used in the (financial)
text analysis literature to avoid this problem.
3.7.1 Linear Regression Model
When using a standard linear regression model one usually cannot plug-in all the
unique words as an input variable due to the multicollinearity problem (see also the
introductory example from Chapter 3.1). Instead one needs to reduce the dimensionality
up-front, e.g. through working with the topics and the tone of the document. The
comparatively low number of topic dummy variables or tone measures serve then as the
input for the regression model avoiding the curse of dimensionality problem.
Topic
Equation 3.4 shows the specification of the linear regression model when using the
topics as the explanatory variables:
Yt = β0 + β1 × I(Topic 1)t + ...+ βK × I
(Topic K)
t + εt, (3.4)
with Yt being for example the time series of stock returns and I(Topic k)t an indicator
function which is one when the document covers topic k.
In our ECB statement example from the previous chapters we identified two clusters
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(topics): interest rate decision and introduction. For our analysis we would use the time
series of both dummy variables over our press conference sample to assess the impact
of the two topics on the stock market (the respective price changes would serve as the
dependent variable Yt). As a result we would get the individual average asset price
response to each information revealed. This approach is used in Chapter 4 of this thesis
to quantify the real-time response of financial markets to the different content of ECB
press conferences.
Tone
Compared to the general topic it is also important to quantify the actual semantics of
the respective document. For example, whether the information revealed carries a more
positive or negative sentiment for investors. Schmeling and Wagner (2019) construct an
aggregate tone measure for the intro statement of ECB press conferences and study the
impact of the tone change on European stock returns and bond yields using the following
specification:
Yt = β0 + β1 ×4Tone(Agg)t + εt, (3.5)
with Yt being the time series of asset price changes and 4Tone(Agg)t the shift in aggregate
sentiment for the whole ECB statement.
Topic and Tone
A drawback of the previous aggregate tone measure is that one cannot disentangle the
different effects that the various information have on asset prices. Therefore, Hansen and
McMahon (2016) first extract several financial and economical topics from the Federal
Reserve’s FOMC statements and then analyze the impact of each topic’s tone on financial
markets. In our model specification we can account for this by using an interaction term
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between the topic and tone measures:
Yt = β0 + β1 × I(Topic 1)t × Tone
(Topic 1)




t + εt, (3.6)
with the variables as defined previously.
A similar methodology is also used in Jegadeesh and Wu (2017) who first analyze the
information content of the overall FOMC minutes using a tone measure and then study
the individual topics.
3.7.2 Penalized Regression
When using the full term-document matrix as an input one needs a mechanism that
discriminates within the high-dimensional input vector. One popular technique from
statistics is the ridge regression (see Hoerl and Kennard (1970) or Murphy (2012, Ch.
7.5)).
A ridge regression is similar to a standard linear regression but incorporates a penalty
term that punishes the complexity of the model36 (hence it is also called penalized least
squares). Specifically, it adds a `2 regularization term to the normal objective function













with the first term being the mean squared error as usual and the second term the
complexity penalty. λ is a free so-called hyperparameter that determines the ‘strength’
of the penalty term.37
36Given the penalty term one cannot estimate the regression model via Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)
but instead has to use, for example, a Maximum Likelihood Estimator (MLE).
37Note, to determine this hyperparameter one can use cross validation techniques (see Murphy, 2012,
p. 207f).
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In general, adding the regularization term encourages the parameters to be small and
thus can prevent multicollinearity. A related technique is the lasso regression which uses
the `1 regularization instead of the `2 norm.
This regression technique is for example applied in the study of Ardia et al. (2019)
who use the penalized least squares method to discriminate between a high-dimensional
input vector of sentiment scores obtained from different dictionaries and weighting
schemes to forecast economic growth in the United States. Generally, in such a
regression setup one can use the full term-document matrix as an input and let the
algorithm decide (ex-post) which words are most informative.38
3.7.3 Other Regression Techniques
The standard linear regression model and also the penalized least squares assume a
linear relationship between the dependent and the independent variables which could be
too restrictive in some settings (especially when working with textual data). Therefore,
Manela and Moreira (2017) use a (non-linear) support vector regression (see Murphy,
2012, Ch. 14.5.1) to analyze the correlation between uni- and bigrams of the Wall Street
Journal abstracts and the VIX index. Based on the found relationship (trained model)
they construct the news-implied volatility index (short NVIX) which can be calculated
back until July 1889.
Kelly et al. (2019) develop a high-dimensional selection model, the hurdle distributed
multiple regression (HDMR), which improves machine learning from text. Their frame-
work can be used to backcast, nowcast, and forecast financial variables using newspaper
articles and outperforms alternative state-of-the-art approaches in an out-of-sample
exercise.
38This is different to the dictionary approach where one decides ex-ante which terms are most impor-
tant.
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Another methodology is called the ‘Principal Component Regression’ (PCR) which
basically first applies a PCA to the term-document matrix and then includes the latent
factors in a then standard regression model. Another option is to use regression trees to
account for the non-linearity in the analysis.
Classification Exercise
Instead of running a regression analysis to examine the relationship between financial
variables and text one can formulate the problem as a classification task: Class 1
corresponds to e.g. positive returns (≥ 0) and Class 2 to negative ones (returns < 0).
But in the financial text analysis literature this approach is seldom used.39
39In general, one can use the same algorithms as presented in Chapter 3.6.2 of this work.
Chapter 4
The Real-Time Impact of ECB Press
Conferences on Financial Markets
4.1 Introduction
‘The arrival of news continually updates an investor’s understanding and knowledge
of the market and influences investor sentiment, [...] hence asset prices, asset price
volatility and risk’ (Mitra and Mitra, 2011b).1 In todays information society all kinds
of news stream in 24 hours a day from a variety of sources thus it is challenging to
understand the overall information flow and in particular to ‘identify the piece of
information that initially triggers the change’ (Moniz et al., 2011).
According to financial theory, stock prices rapidly incorporate all relevant information
about a company (Fama et al., 1969) leading to the notion of ‘efficient markets’ (see
Fama, 1970). Given todays speed in the market place with which news are incorporated
into prices2 we can use the real-time response of asset prices to gauge the information
content of the different news elements and are able to identify ‘what type of information
causes [e.g.] analysts to revise their earnings expectations’ (Moniz et al., 2011) or
whether information about the economic outlook revealed by a central bank matters to
1According to Barber and Odean (2008) ‘significant news will often affect investors’ beliefs and
portfolio goals heterogeneously, resulting in more investors trading than is usual’.
2Recent developments in automatic and high frequency trading lead to trades executed within mil-
liseconds (see Mitra et al., 2011).
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market participants.
In this chapter we develop a new methodology that explicitly ‘allows [us] to trace the
information flow, and thus to investigate to what type of statements financial markets
react predominantly’ (Ehrmann and Fratzscher, 2009) using Webcasts of the press
conferences accompanying the communication event.3 Using the captions of the video
and modern textual analysis tools we fully automatically create timestamps for the
different news items which allows us to align them with the corresponding asset price
respones in the financial markets and thus study their information content. To the best
of our knowledge we are the first study that uses the information implicit in the subtitles
of videos.
Our approach is comparable to exploiting the news flow of a financial news service
provider as in Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2009) who use Reuters news snaps for 13
consecutive month (2004 - 2005) to study the impact of ECB statements on finan-
cial markets. But working directly with the press conference content avoids several
caveats as outlined in Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2009): For example, statements can
be wrongly reported or misinterpreted. Also different newswire services can report
different news items based on the same original source. Our methodology overcomes
these problems since we work directly with the press conference statement. In addition,
we can use textual analysis tools to exploit the structure inherent in these statements
and thus can examine the impact of fine granular topics. Another advantage of our
methodology is that we extract the exact time the ECB president needs for reading
the respective part of the statement while news snaps from a newswire service always
come with a delay (since journalists have to prepare and publish them). In general, our
approach allows to study every communication event with a press conference, even if it is
not covered in detail by the news service provider (or the coverage has only started lately).
3In a press conference the information gets revealed piece by piece which enables us to trace the
information flow. In contrast, a press release reveals all its information at once and thus it is difficult to
study the impact of the individual information on financial markets.
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Also closely related to our analysis is the work of Busse and Green (2002) who use
taped videos of the Morning Call or Midday Call TV show from CNBC. While the
authors manually record the videos and the starting times our methodology makes use
of the Webcast videos (which are available for the last years) and of financial news
services to extract the exact start time of the communication event. Instead of manually
labeling the information content we identify the topics using modern textual analysis
tools. Thus, our methodology is fully automatic and can be easily applied to a long
history of press conferences.
We then apply our newly developed methodology to the press conferences of the
European Central Bank4 whose broadcasts are highly followed by market participants.
By applying our methodology to the ECB we can directly relate the mean-reversion of
the pre-ECB announcement drift (as documented in Schmeling and Wagner, 2019 and
Chapter 2 of this thesis) to the information revealed in the introductory statement.
Using fixed income futures we can also shed light on the question which topic contributes
the most to the communication shock (as defined in e.g. Leombroni et al., 2017) or has
the largest impact across the yield curve.
In detail, applying our methodology to the ECB press conference statements from
2011 to 20175 yield the following results:
First, we document that the pre-ECB announcement return as shown in Schmeling
and Wagner (2019) and in Chapter 2 of this thesis further increases by 20% (+10 bps)
with the start of the press conference. We find that this appreciation in equity prices
is entirely driven by the non-standard monetary policy measures as announced by the
ECB, in particular the refinancing operations, the asset purchase programs and by
further implementation details and comments.
4The ECB was one of the first central banks that streamed their press conferences and thus provides
the longest history of videos.
5The sample period is defined by the starting point of the ECB webcasts and our data availability.
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Second, we observe that after this first initial increase equity returns drop by about half
the size of the pre-ECB run-up (-24 bps). Information from the ECB’s economic analysis
account for over 50% of this fall, with a roughly equal contribution of real economy
and inflation news. We can relate the former to information about the course of the
European sovereign debt crisis and its subsequent recovery.
Third, information about the monetary analysis (e.g. money growth) seem to be of
second-order importance to investors with a small estimate of -4 bps.
Fourth, we find that comments by the ECB Chairman about the situation of the
European banking sector and the implementation of structural reforms and fiscal policy
within the EU member states further decreased prices in the equity market by -7 bps.
Fifth, using the rich cross-section of Euro Stoxx supersector and Stoxx country indices
we find that the positive effect of the ECB’s non-standard monetary policy measures
and the negative impact of the economic information is particular pronounced for the
banking and insurance sector as well as the GIIPS countries of our sample. These
industries and countries have been at the core of the euro crisis (also connected via the
bank-sovereign nexus) and thus very sensitive to the announced actions of the central
bank as well as its superior economic (outlook) information.
Sixth, using fixed income futures on German, French and Italian government bonds we
document that the non-standard monetary policy announcements and the information
on the real economy have the biggest impact on yield changes. The effect is particularly
pronounced for the long-end of the yield curve and here specifically for the Italian
government bond.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 provides an overview
over the related literature. Section 4.3 presents our new method to create the content
timestamps. Section 4.4 explains our clustering approach and Section 4.5 describes the
financial data we use in our empirical analysis. Section 4.6 shows our empirical results
and Section 4.7 concludes this study.
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4.2 Literature
Our analysis contributes to several strands of literature. The first strand of literature
quantifies monetary policy and growth shocks through studying asset price responses
around central bank’s announcement days. The seminal paper of Kuttner (2001)
proposes to measure the unexpected change in the target funds rate with changes in
the price of Federal funds futures settling in the month of the meeting. Bernanke
and Kuttner (2005) also use the change in Federal funds to examine the impact of
(unanticipated) changes in monetary policy on equity prices. Gürkaynak et al. (2005)
improve on this single-factor analysis by extracting two latent factors, to proxy for
the information content of FOMC statements, using a standard principal component
analysis from the asset price response (money market rates) in a narrow window around
the release of the information. They label these factors ‘current federal funds rate target’
and ‘future path of policy’. Brand et al. (2010) and Leombroni et al. (2017) build
upon this methodology and exploit the institutional feature of the ECB with a separate
announcement for the monetary policy decision and its explanation to extract separate
target and communication shocks from high-frequency asset prices. Recently, Altavilla
et al. (2019) extend this literature by extracting both conventional and unconventional
monetary policy communication surprises from the press release and press conference
windows.
Other studies exploit the comovement of bonds and stocks to distinguish between
monetary policy and economic growth shocks. Jarocinski and Karadi (2018) disentangles
the two components using a structural vector regression and Cieslak and Schrimpf (2018)
exploit the comovement combined with monotonicity restrictions across the yield curve
to separate the monetary policy, economic growth shocks and shock to risk premia. They
find that the non-monetary news accounts especially during a economic crisis period.
A problem with these ‘indirect’ asset price based approaches is that it is unclear what
kind of information is revealed to investors (Woodford, 2012) and thus driving the
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actual shock(s).6 Instead, our approach aligns the different information revealed by
the central bank with the corresponding returns and yield changes and thus allows to
study directly the different information content. In addition, our methodology quantifies
information shocks on a fine granular level which, first, allows us to separate the effect
of standard versus non-standard monetary policy measures (see target vs. QE factor in
Altavilla et al., 2019) and to distinguish between monetary and non-monetary news (see
Cieslak and Schrimpf, 2018) in one framework and second, to even further decompose
the different news shocks.7
The second strand of literature studies directly the impact of information revealed
by the central bank on financial markets (instead of infering the news component
from asset prices). In earlier work narrative approaches and subjective communication
indicators have been used to quantify the qualitative textual information. Nowadays,
modern textual analysis tools gain popularity for analyzing central bank statements in
an automatic and objective manner.
In their important contribution Romer and Romer (2004) use a narrative approach to
subjectively identify monetary policy shocks from central bank statements. Subjective
indicators (glossaries) are also used by other authors to measure the tone of ECB
communication and to analyze its impact on financial markets (see e.g. Rosa and
Verga, 2007, 2008; Heinemann and Ullrich, 2007; Gerlach, 2007 or Berger et al., 2011
amongst others). Rosa (2011) first uses a narrative approach in the sense of Romer and
Romer (2004) to measure the tone of FOMC statements and then estimates the market
expectations of the Fed’s announcement using a forecasting regression for extracting the
surprise component.
Compared to the subjective indicators Lucca and Trebbi (2011) use tools from compu-
tational linguistics to develop an automated and objective procedure to measure central
6See also the criticism of Lucca and Trebbi (2011) who state that ‘such an immediate approach is,
however, limited by its indirectness. Econometric models measuring the impact of communication on
interest rates based on these measures, in essence explain rates with rates’.
7For example, we can decompose the economic growth shock into information about inflation and the
real economy and the latter into news about the economic outlook compared to realized GDP information.
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bank communication and apply it to FOMC statements. Hansen and McMahon (2016)
also deploy tools from computational linguistic to analyze in addition to the monetary
policy stance the economic information revealed in the FOMC statements based on a
topic and tone approach. Jegadeesh and Wu (2017) extract the general topics of FOMC
minutes using a LDA clustering approach. Schmeling and Wagner (2019) analyze the
ECB’s introductory statement and document that a change in central bank tone has a
significant effect on asset prices. Hansen et al. (2018) use the Bank of England’s Inflation
Report to study how quantitative and qualitative information about future economic
conditions affect the short and long end of the yield curve.
With this chapter we contribute to this strand of literature with respect to two
dimensions. First, we use modern textual analysis tools to (objectively) exploit the
template structure of the ECB’s introductory statements which allows us to study the
revealed information on a fine granular level which is new to the literature. Second,
we develop a fully automatic methodology to create timestamps for the different
information pieces using the videos of the corresponding press conferences. This allows
us to study the real-time impact of the information revealed by the ECB Chairman on
financial markets and thus to quantify the different information shocks (news component).
Third, our analysis relates to the recent literature documenting and explaining
announcement returns around central bank decision days. For example, Lucca and
Moench (2015) documents a pre-FOMC announcement drift for the U.S. equity market
that persists after the FOMC meeting. The price pattern exists across various industries
and countries and for the U.S. market also over the full FOMC cycle (see Cieslak et al.,
2019). Chapter 2 of this thesis and Schmeling and Wagner (2019) document similar
pre-ECB announcement returns for the European equity market, especially for the euro
crisis period. Compared to the U.S. returns the EU drift mean-reverts with the begin of
the ECB’s press conference resulting in large negative post-announcement returns.
We contribute to this literature by identifying the information revealed in the press
conference that leads to the decline in European equity returns.
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Fourth, with this chapter we contribute to the literature that evaluates the ECB’s un-
conventional monetary policy actions during the European sovereign debt crisis. Acharya
et al. (2018) for example find that the ECB’s long-term refinancing operations (LTRO)
temporarily reduced the funding pressure for banks, but did not help to contain sovereign
risk. In contrast, the ECB’s announcement of the Outright Monetary Transaction (OMT)
program was able to reduce the bank-sovereign nexus. Krishnamurthy et al. (2018) also
compare the effects of the Securities Market Programme (SMP), the OMT and the LTROs
on government bond yields and find that on average across Italy, Spain and Portugal the
SMP and OMT program lead to significant lower yields. Decomposing the fall they find
that reduced market segmentation accounts for 50% of this reduction in yields. Other
studies (amongst others) also find a beneficial impact of the ECB’s non-standard mon-
etary policy measures for asset prices in the euro area (see Fratzscher et al., 2016) and
that the announcements of asset purchase programmes have lowered market uncertainty
(see Coenen et al., 2017).
We contribute to this strand of literature by quantifying the real-time response of the
financial markets to the announcement of the ECB’s non-standard monetary policy mea-
sures.
4.3 Methodology
In this section we introduce a novel methodology to the literature which uses the cap-
tions of press conference webcasts and their start time to automatically create timestamps
for the different information content. These timestamps allow us to explicitly study the
information flow and also align it with the price responses in the financial markets which
can then be used to directly assess its information content. To the best of our knowledge
this study is the first that makes use of the information contained in the subtitle files.
In the following we are going to apply our methodology to the press conferences of the
European Central Bank.
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4.3.1 Start Times
As in Fleming and Piazzesi (2005) and Lucca and Moench (2015) we rely on
timestamps of Bloomberg newswires.8 Around ECB monetary policy meetings there
are several news stories published regarding the progress of the press conference. First,
usually a few minutes before the actual press conference a reminder on the event is
published. As shown in Figure 4.1 for the press conference held on 25th of January
2018 at 14:28 CET the news says ‘Mario Draghi Speaks at ECB News Conference:
LIVE <GO>’. Second, when the ECB Chairman and Vice-President enter the press
conference room a further news element is published saying e.g. ‘MARIO DRAGHI
PRESIDES AT ECB NEWS CONFERENCE IN FRANKFURT: LIVE’ (14:31 CET).
Third, another news element gets published when the ECB Chairman or the host of
the press conference starts to address the audience with some personal remarks or with
reading the introductory statement, e.g. ‘*ECB PRESS CONFERENCE STARTS IN
FRANKFURT: LIVE’ (14:32 CET). This latter news element indicates the actual time
when the speech of the ECB chairman starts and is explicitly marked with a ‘*’ by
the Bloomberg service. Fourth, for every information that gets revealed in the press
conference another news item is published. The first of these news items is usually
about the monetary policy decision which follows after the introduction. For our further
analysis we use the issuance timestamp (which is available on a second basis, e.g.
14:32:13) of the third news item which indicates the actual start of the press conference
and which aligns with the start of our caption.910 A full list of the start times is reported
in Table A.2.
8In general we consider German and English news items and take the element that is issued first.
9For the earlier part of our sample Bloomberg only issued one news item regarding the start of the
press conference compared to the two elements (2) and (3) as shown in Figure 4.1. We then use the
issuance timestamp of this item. Whenever there is no news item before the start of the press conference
we exclude the respective meeting from our sample. This is true for the first four monetary policy
decisions in our sample.
10As a robustness check we manually compare every timestamp of the first content news item (e.g.
14:33:42 in Figure 4.1) with the timestamp obtained from our allocation procedure. Overall, we observe a
very close fit which gives us confidence that our reported start times are close to the true starting points.
We exclude the meetings from January 2017 and April 2018 since the time difference between the last
item before the start of the meeting and the first content news is too large. We keep the press conference
from October 2011 because it starts with introductory remarks by Bundesbank President Weidmann
which naturally extends the time difference between the start and the first content news item.
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Figure 4.1: Starting Procedure of the ECB Press Conference
This figure illustrates the usual starting procedure of an ECB press conference. The
dotted, dashed and solid vertical line indicates the different start times of the ECB
webcast.
4.3.2 Subtitles
For our further analysis we use automatically generated subtitles obtained from ECB
press conferences webcasts. These videos are provided by the ECB via its Web page since
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January 201111 Figure 4.2 shows a subtitle example for the press conference which was
held on 4th of August 2011. The SubRip text (.srt) files comprise formatted lines of plain
text which are grouped in blocks separated by a blank line. Every block is numbered
sequentially, starting at 1. The next line contains the start and end timestamps of the
text that follows. The timecode format is hours:minutes:seconds,milliseconds. After the
timestamps the actual subtitle text is reported. Due to the defined structure of these
.srt files we can use a parsing algorithm to extract the timestamps and text information
for each block and press conference.12
Figure 4.2: Caption of ECB Press Conference Webcast
This figure shows the beginning of the .srt file containing the subtitle for the ECB press
conference which was held on 4th of August 2011. In red are shown the normalized
timestamps which are obtained by substracting the start time of the first cell.
The timestamps of the subtitle blocks are reported relative to the starting point of
the webcast. Depending on whether the video already includes the scene when the ECB
staff is entering the press conference room or whether the video starts right before the
11Link: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/tvservices/webcast/html/index.en.html.
12Generally, the idea of exploiting the timestamp information inherent in subtitles is similar to using
the videocassette-recorder counter as in Busse and Green (2002).
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ECB Chairman reads the statement the value of the first timestamp varies significantly.13
Usually, the first words that are recorded in the caption are when the microphone gets
turned on and the ECB Chairman addresses the audience which we define as the start of
the press conference. We then substract the start time of the first block from all other
timestamps to have a normalized starting time of 00:00:00 for each press conference.14
All other timestamps are then relative to the moment when Draghi starts to talk. Since
this time point also corresponds to the reported ‘*’ Bloomberg timestamp we can then
add up this normalized relative timestamp and the start time of the press conference. For
example, in Figure 4.2 we first substract 310 milliseconds from all other timestamps to set
the starting time of the first block to 00:00:00,000 and then add the start time 14:30:43
(from Table A.2). The next subtitle block ‘our press conference’ does then coincide to
the start (end) timestamp 14:30:47,410 (14:30:48,580) and so on.1516
4.3.3 Matching Algorithm
To obtain the start and end time of every sentence of the ECB introductory statement
we first split the text using standard textual analysis techniques (sentence tokenizer)
and then match each sentence of the transcript with the subtitle of the respective press
conference. For this matching task we employ an algorithm that compares pairs of
sequences and returns the best match for a given string.
For example, if we want to find the start and end time for the first sentence of
13During our sample period from January 2011 to April 2018 the webcasts mostly start right before
the audience gets addressed.
14Only for the press conference on 3rd of December 2015 the microphones already record a ‘Thank
you’ during shooting the photos. We adjust the timestamp so that the beginning coincides with the real
start of the press conference as defined above.
15For the earlier part of our sample the ECB press conference webcast does not include the Q&A
session. Also most of these videos stop right before the ‘Disposal for Questions’ expression. Thus,
for the further analysis we select the part of the introductory statement that starts with ‘Ladies and
Gentlemen’ and ends right before the ‘Disposal for Questions’ (or similar) expression (like in Schmeling
and Wagner, 2019).
16We exclude three press conferences from the further analysis. First, the press conference from 5th
of May 2011 since the video does not include the first paragraph of the introductory statement and thus
misses the start of the speech. Additionally, we remove the press conferences that were held on the 8th
of May 2014 and 22nd of October 2015 since for both meetings the ECB Chairman started reading the
transcript while the microphone was not yet turned on. Also we exclude the introduction by Bundesbank
president Weidmann from 6th of October 2011 which preceded Trichet’s introductory statement.
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the introduction from the ECB press conference held on 4th of August 2011 (‘Ladies
and gentlemen, the Vice-President and I are very pleased to welcome you to our press
conference.’) we compare this sentence (sequence one) with every block from the caption
(sequence two) and take the timestamps of the best match as indicated by the highest
score. As can be seen in Figure 4.2 the best match in our example comprises of block one
and two which yields the following start (end) timestamp 00:00:00,000 (00:00:05,580).
The respective score is 0.95 which is close to the maximum score of 1.0 (which describes
two identical sequences).
Since the cells of the caption do not ncessarily cover a full transcript sentence we
also use a combination of blocks in the matching procedure. For example, in Figure
4.2 we look for a match not only in the first block on its own (‘ladies and gentleman
the vice president and I are very pleased to welcome you to’) but we also use the
combination with block number two (‘ladies and gentleman the vice president and I
are very pleased to welcome you to (+) our press conference’). The start timestamp
is then taken from the first block, the end timestamp from the last block. Overall, we
use up to fifteen combined blocks in the matching procedure.17 We create these com-
binations on a rolling basis, shifting it always by one block (e.g. Block 1+2, 2+3, 3+4, ...).
Table 4.1 shows descriptive statistics for the matching results. On average we observe
a very high score of roughly 0.9 with a very low standard deviation of 0.07 for the matching
of the official transcript sentences with the corresponding captions which yields a very
good matching result. This can also be seen in the relatively large 5% quintile which
shows that 95% of the matches have a score higher than 0.76. Overall, we only observe
eight sentences (out of 3641) with a score lower than 0.60 which is around 0.2% of the
total sentences. Such a low score can be observed for example if a sentence from the
transcript is not said in the press conference and thus the algorithm tries to match it
with some other sequence. Also correct matches can have a lower score when e.g. the
17The maximum number of combinations used in the matching procedure is twelve.
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automatically created caption exhibits spelling errors or uses written out numbers instead
of a numerical representation.18 We manually check all of these low score sentences and
exclude bad matches.19
The average length of a press conference sentence is around 14 seconds. The shortest
sentence spans only two seconds and is said on the press conference held on the 3rd of
February 2011 (’We therefore decided to leave them unchanged.’). The maximum length
of a sentence is roughly 50 seconds, 90% of the sentences have a duration between 6 and
25 seconds.
4.3.4 Paragraph and Category Time Stamps
Based on the timestamps for the individual sentences we also derive the start and
end times for coarser parts of the statement: Paragraphs and categories. A paragraph
comprises of several sentences and is separated from the next one by a blank line.2021
A category comprises of several paragraphs and is directly related to the ECB’s
communication approach as explained in the following.
Since 2003 the ECB follows a clear defined structure in their introductory statement
as presented in a press seminar on 8th of May 2003. First, they announce the monetary
policy decision which ‘aim[s] to maintain inflation rates close to 2% over the medium
term’. Then, they use the two-pillar structure which provides the support for the policy
decision. The economic analysis ‘focus[es] on shorter-term price movements’ and is
followed by the monetary analysis with the ‘focus on longer-term price trends’. These
two different type of information are then cross-checked so that ‘based on all information
[the] Council comes to a single assessment’ (see Issing, 2003). Based on that structure we
derive four categories which make up every press conference statement: (1) ‘Monetary
18Due to these issues the minimum score of 0.39 still belongs to a correct match.
19As an additional robustness check we plot the time difference of the start (end) timestamp of every
sentence to the previous start (end) timestamp. A wrong match would show up as an outlier. We do
not observe such a data point after removing the wrong low score matches.
20It can be easily extracted from the statement’s HTML page via the < p > elements.
21Jegadeesh and Wu (2017) also use the paragraph level in their analysis of FOMC minutes.
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Table 4.1: Matched ECB Press Conference Transcripts
This table reports descriptive statistics for the matching procedure of press conference
sentences with the corresponding captions of the ECB webcasts. The column ‘Score’
refers to the matching score reported by the algorithm and lies between 0 and 1 (1
indicates a perfect match). The length of a sentence, paragraph or category is reported
in minutes and seconds. ‘Paragraphs’ (‘Categories’) refers to the paragraphs (categories)
of the ECB introductory statement comprising several sentences (paragraphs). The
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Policy Decision’, (2) ‘Economic Analysis’, (3) ‘Monetary Analysis’ and (4) ‘Summary’
which contains the ‘Cross-Check’, ‘Structural Reforms’ and ‘Fiscal Policy’. In the
statement the keywords of these categories are marked bold and thus can be extracted
in a consistent and transparent way using textual analysis tools.
For the start time of a category we use the starting time of the first sentence of the
respective category. For the end time we use the starting time of the next category or
the end time of the last sentence of the current one (if it is the last category of the
statement). This approach produces non-overlapping category timestamps.
Figure 4.3 shows the category length of each press conference within our sample
period. First, one can see that the aggregate length matches the one obtained from
the original videos.22 Also our time series of the duration of the press conferences
is similar to the plotted number of sentences shown in Cieslak and Schrimpf (2018).
Second, the duration of the monetary policy decision category always shows a peak
when the ECB announces their non-standard monetary policy measures. Third, the
economic analysis takes always longer when the two macro projection paragraphs are
added in the statement. The macro projections are included every quarter and thus
every third press conference until 2015. Starting 2015 they are incorporated in every
second press conference (due to the 6 week cycle). Forth, for the monetary analysis we
can see a longer category duration in the first half of our sample which is due to the euro
crisis in which the ECB added new paragraphs to the statement regarding the special
situation of the European banking sector. After the height of the crisis these parts were
dropped again which can be seen in a lower category length. The last part contains the
summary paragraph and the remarks on structural reforms and fiscal policy. At first,
the summary was rather extensive repeating most of the information from the monetary
policy decision. After the first press conferences in our sample this was reduced to a
couple of sentences which also lowered the category duration significantly.
22One can see notable time difference for the press conferences from October 2011 and May 2012
since in our analysis we exclude the introductions by Bundesbank president Weidmann (2011) and by
Governor Ordóñez (2012). Also Draghi’s introductory remarks in December 2014 about the new ECB
premise are excluded.
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Overall, the economic analysis category is the longest with 4 minutes and 18 seconds,
before the monetary policy decision with 3 minutes and 42 seconds. The monetary
analysis takes on average 2 minutes and 23 seconds and the last part 2 minutes and 20
seconds. The full press conference takes on average 12 minutes and 43 seconds.
Analogously to the categories we use the starting time of the first sentence of the
respective paragraph as the paragraph’s start time. For the end time we use the next
starting time or the end time of the last sentence of the paragraph (if it is the last para-
graph for a given press conference).
Unlike the four categories not every paragraph is included in each press conference state-
ment and thus we cannot label them according to a hard-wired rule. Instead we need a
more flexible procedure that groups similar paragraphs together. Our clustering approach
is explained in the next section.
4.4 Clustering
The introductory statements of the ECB’s press conferences are based on a template
which gets adjusted from meeting to meeting to reflect the central bank’s current assess-
ment and its intended communication to the public.2324 Thus, in addition to the category
structure as described in Issing (2003) the statements also exhibit a strong similarity on
the paragraph level. To exploit this structure and extract the topics we use a standard
clustering algorithm as it is popular in the literature.25 In the following we will outline
our approach.
23This is a quite popular approach among central banks which ‘often [...] start from the previous
statement, and update the earlier text at the margin’ (see Ehrmann and Talmi, 2017).
24Amaya and Filbien (2015) calculate the Jaccard similarity (Jaccard, 1901, as used in Tetlock, 2011)
for bigrams of the introductory statement and report a high similarity of about 60% for successive
conferences.
25See for example Jegadeesh and Wu (2017) who apply a clustering algorithm to FOMC minute
paragraphs to extract topics or Hansen and McMahon (2016) who work with clustered sentences from
FOMC statements.
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Figure 4.3: ECB Press Conference Category Length
This figure shows the time series for the duration of the four categories of the introductory
statement as well as the aggregated category length (sum of individual category lengths)
and the one obtained from the original ECB webcast videos. The duration is measured
in minutes. The sample comprises 66 ECB press conferences from June 2011 to March
2018.
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4.4.1 Approach
To facilitate the clustering procedure we incorporate our domain knowledge about
the structure of the press conference statements into the algorithm. By studying the
statements we can see that each of the different paragraphs of the ECB introductory
statement comprises highly characteristic words and phrases that are always used in
this section and hardly in any other part of the statement. For example, in the press
conference from the 25th of January 2018, as part of the economic analysis the ECB
revealed the following information on the economic outlook risks:
“The risks surrounding the euro area growth outlook are
assessed as broadly balanced. On the one hand, the prevailing
strong cyclical momentum could lead to further positive growth
surprises in the near term. On the other hand, downside risks
continue to relate primarily to global factors, including develop-
ments in foreign exchange markets.”
The expression ‘risks surrounding the euro area growth outlook’ is only used in this
paragraph and thus highly characteristic for this part.26 In addition, this expression
reflects the overall topic of the paragraph. To incorporate this knowledge into the
clustering procedure the algorithm has first to understand that the different words
form one expression and then that this phrase is highly informative for the topic of the
paragraph.
To group the different words of the expressions together we use the multi-word
tokenization (as e.g. in Hansen and McMahon, 2016 or Lopez-Lira, 2019) in the
pre-processing of our documents. As a result the seven tokens from our expression
above (‘risks’, ‘surrounding’, ‘the’, ‘euro’, ‘area’, ‘growth’, ‘outlook’) are treated as
26Other examples are ‘Ladies and gentlemen’, ‘key ECB interest rates’, ‘non-standard monetary policy
measures’ or ‘euro area annual HICP inflation’.
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one token in the subsequent analysis: ‘risks surrounding the euro area growth outlook’.27
The entries of the standard term-document matrix contain pure frequency counts
of the respective terms and thus all words are of same importance. To increase the
weight for the highly informative phrases we are going to use a weighting scheme. The
tf-idf weighting scheme, as already used in Loughran and McDonald (2011), puts more
weight on terms that occur in only a few documents (paragraphs) compared to words
that appear in every part. This works perfectly for our ECB statements since the
characteristic phrases only occur in certain paragraphs and thus have a high idf score.28
The ECB dedicates in her intro statement each paragraph to a different topic. In the
previous example we can see that this part only talks about the risks to the economic
outlook. There is no other information revealed in this paragraph. Therefore, we need
an algorithm that assigns a ‘one-hot encoding’ to each of our paragraphs.29 A very
popular clustering algorithm producing such a label is the k-means which is perhaps the
most widely used fully automated clustering method (MacQueen, 1967).
To sum-up, to group our different intro statement paragraphs using our domain
knowledge we apply the multi-word tokenization in combination with the tf-idf weighting
scheme and the k-means algorithm. In the following we will discuss the implementation
details.
27Note, the single words of this expression are not necessarily characteristic for the paragraph. For
example, ‘risks’ also appears often in the context of inflation risks which is a different topic than risks
regarding the economic outlook. Thus, only the full expression is highly informative for the topic of the
corresponding paragraph.
28Jegadeesh and Wu (2013) also emphasize that ‘the appropriate choice of term weighting in con-
tent analysis is at least as important as, and perhaps more important than, a complete and accurate
compilation of the word list.’ In our use case the idf weighting scheme fits perfectly.
29One-hot encoding means that the respective document only gets assigned one topic label. Compared
to a mixed-topic approach like the LDA algorithm (as used in Hansen and McMahon, 2016) which assigns
different topic probabilities to every single word of the document. This would not suit us here.
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4.4.2 Pre-Processing and Feature Extraction
In a first step we have to transform the qualitative textual representation of the
paragraphs into a quantitative number. Therefore, we apply standard textual analysis
methods to split the paragraphs into their respective sentences and words. Then, we
remove any tokens not containing letters and apply a stemming algorithm. In a last step
we remove stopwords.
In addition to the standard pre-processing steps we use multi-word expressions to
group tokens that occur often together and are highly characteristic for the corresponding
paragraph. Out of a collection of n-grams with the highest frequency, expressions with
the highest likelihood ratio and pointwise mutual information (PMI)30 we select a par-
simonious list of expressions that are very informative about the respective paragraphs
and also standard economic phrases like ‘inflation rate’ or ‘monetary policy stance’. A
full list can be found in the appendix (Table A.3).
Based on the resulting list of words we create a term document matrix that describes
the frequency of terms v that occur in a collection of documents (corpus), D, indexed by
d. The documents are our extracted paragraphs from the ECB statements. As discussed
before we use ‘the standard weighting scheme for term-document matrices in information
retrieval, called tf-idf’ (Jurafsky and Martin, 2017, p. 278), defined as:
tf − idfd,v = tfd,v × idfv, (4.1)
where the first part is the term frequency (tf), simply the frequency of the word v in the






where N is the number of documents in the corpus (|D|) and dfv the number of documents
30As discussed in Manning and Schütze (2003), Chapter 5.
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containing the term v. Overall, the tf-idf feature prefers words that appear often in the
current document d but are rare in the overall collection.31
4.4.3 Clustering of Paragraphs
Using the term document matrix we can now apply the k-means clustering algorithm
to assign a single cluster label to every paragraph. The k-means clustering aims to
partition N observations into K clusters in which each observation belongs to the cluster
with the nearest mean. It also returns the centroids of the K clusters which can be used
to obtain topic labels for the training set and also to label new data points (e.g. a new
press conference).
Let Dk be the set of all documents that belong to cluster k. The centroid of this




d∈Dk ~xd, with ~xd ∈R
V
+ being the vector that represents document
d. The k-means algorithm chooses the cluster assignments {D1, ..., Dk} to minimize the





||~xd − ~uk||2. (4.3)
The optimization procedure uses two inputs: First, the tf−idf matrix and second the
number of clusters. Since the categories of the intro statement discuss different topics we
can apply the algorithm separately to each of the four parts which significantly reduces
the dimensionality for the clustering algorithm. Therefore, we first divide the full corpus
D into four distinct sets of documents Dmon pol dec, Decon, Dmon and Dsum and then cal-
culate the respective term document matrices tf − idfmon pol dec, tf − idfecon, tf − idfmon
and tf − idfsum which serve as an input for the k-means optimizations.
To find the second input parameter, the number of clusters, we perform a manual
assessment of the ECB introductory statement. As a result we identify the structure as
31For example, the highly characteristic expressions ‘fixed rate tender procedures’ and ‘as-
set purchase programme’ have one of the highest idf scores with roughly 3.8 and 3.4.
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shown in Figure 4.4: After the (1) introduction by the ECB Chairman the monetary pol-
icy decision follows. Specifically, the (2) change in the key ECB interest rate gets disclosed
which is accompanied by further explanations. Then, especially during the height and
aftermath of the euro crisis non-standard monetary policy measures got announced. Here
we can distinguish between the ECB acting as the (3) ‘lender’ or (4) ‘buyer of last resort’
(see Acharya et al., 2018). These decisions can also be accompanied by (5) further ex-
planations and details, e.g. about the practical implementation of these measures. Then,
the information about the real economy is revealed, particularly about (6) realized GDP
and the economic environment, the (7) quarterly macroeconomic staff projections and
also the (8) risks to the economic outlook. Following a similar structure the information
about (9) realized inflation, (10) the inflation projections and the (11) inflation outlook
are published. After the economic analysis the monetary assessment follows. Specifically,
information about the (12) money supply, loans and the (13) banking sector. The press
conference concludes with a (14) cross-check of the economic and monetary analysis and
with (15) final remarks or comments about fiscal policy and structural reforms in the
euro area.32 Based on this structure we want to identify 15 (5+6+2+2) topics which
serves as our starting value for the number of clusters in the optimization procedure.33
In general, our derived topics follow previous studies: For example, Berger et al. (2011)
divide the ECB’s communicated monetary policy stance into ‘price stability’, ‘real econ-
omy’ and ‘monetary’ related indicators. Jansen and De Haan (2005) use the categories
‘M3’, ‘Economic growth’, ‘Inflation’ and ‘Interest rates’ to analyze statements made by
ECB officials and Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2009) differentiate between statements on
‘economic outlook’, ‘inflation’, ‘money growth’ and ‘interest rates’ when analyzing news
32Note, the information about the risks to the price developments were dropped during our sample
period and are currently not included in the introductory statement. Also the paragraph about the
banking sector was only included temporarily during the height of the European sovereign debt crisis.
33Since not every of our defined groups is identified immediately we increase the number of clusters
sequentially until we have obtained the structure as shown in Figure 4.4. If one group consists of several
(by the algorithm identified) clusters we subsume them within the corresponding topic. For example,
separating the macro projections GDP and inflation section is quite difficult since the wording of both
paragraphs is very similar so that the algorithm separates other groups first which are based on two or
three different templates (e.g. the risks to the economic outlook). Therefore, in total we need 24 clusters
to identify the 15 topics.
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Figure 4.4: ECB Press Conference Structure and Cluster Allocation
This figure shows the structure and our cluster allocation for the ECB press conference
introductory statements. For determining the clusters we use a k-means algorithm.
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snaps from ECB press conferences. In addition to these broader categories we also ex-
plicitly exploit the paragraph structure of the ECB intro statement to derive very fine
granular topics. To the best of our knowledge our study is the first who makes use of
that implicit structure.
4.4.4 Visualization
For a graphical illustration and inspection of the paragraphs and our clustering results
we first determine the similarity of each paragraph di with all the other paragraphs
dj, j ∈ [1, ...N ]. Based on the tf − idf matrix for the full corpus D we calculate the
cosine similarity:




We then define the respective paragraph distance as:
disti,j = 1− cos simi,j. (4.5)
The result is a N x N matrix containing in each row the distances disti,j of each paragraph
i to all of the other ones j ∈ [1, ...N ]. We use the multidimensional scaling algorithm
(MDS)34 to reduce the dimension of this matrix to two which allows us to visually inspect
the results. The plot is shown in Figure 4.5. Similar paragraphs are located closer to
each other on the two dimensional scale compared to very different sections. For example,
the welcome section with the phrase ‘Ladies and gentlemen, ...’ (depicted in purple) has
usually a quite similar wording and thus the points lie close together.35
34The general aim of the MDS algorithm is ‘to find a configuration of points in a space [...] where
each point represents one of the objects or individuals, and the distances between pairs of points in
the configuration match as well as possible the original dissimilarities between the pairs of objects or
individuals’ (Cox and Cox, 2008). In general, the MDS algorithm is similar to the PCA analysis but
uses a distance matrix as an input instead of the covariance matrix.
35In general, we also used the graphical visualization to verify the clustering results. Figure 4.5 clearly
shows the similarity of paragraphs within the same group. To further validate the cluster and topics,
we read through the individual cluster elements and compared the documents with each other and also
with the top words of the cluster (see Grimmer and Stewart, 2013). Overall, we find a very good fit for
our clustering results. An extensive discussion of the clustering results can be found in the appendix.
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4.5 Financial Market Data
To analyze the impact of the different ECB topics on the stock market we first use
actual Euro Stoxx 50 index futures trades obtained from the EUREX exchange. For the
analysis we use the most liquid futures which usually coincides with the contract with
the nearest maturity.36 As a robustness exercise we also use tick-by-tick (15 seconds)
index values of the Euro Stoxx 50. The data is available for all of our press conference
days from June 2011 until the end of September 2017.
To study the cross-section we use the 15 seconds index values for 16 Euro Stoxx
supersector indices: banking, automobile, basic resources, insurance, oil and gas,
consumer products, industry goods, financial services, telecommunication, travel and
leisure, utilities, personal and household goods, food and beverages, media, retail and
health care.37
For our cross-country analysis we include the following Stoxx country indices: Stoxx
UK 50, Stoxx France 50, Stoxx Spain 20, Stoxx Italy 20, Stoxx Eastern Europe 50, the
Stoxx Nordic 30 and the Stoxx Sub-Balkan 30. Each of these country indices tracks the
value of the respective regions’ blue-chips companies. The data is available since June
2011 until the end of December 2014. All of the tick-by-tick index values are provided
by Deutsche Börse.
For our fixed income analysis we use the German Schatz, Bobl and Bund futures
contracts. To study the impact on European government yields we also include the
Italian BTP Long and the French OAT futures. The data is available from June 2011
until the end of September 2011 for the German and the Italian futures and since 16th
of April 2012 for the French contract. The trade prices are obtained from the EUREX
36Only a few days before the expiration date the new contract has a higher trading volume than the
old one when investors roll over to the new futures.
37Note, we do not have data for the three remaining Euro Stoxx supersector indices: chemicals, real
estate and technology.
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exchange and we select the most liquid contracts as stated above.
We then join the futures trades with the created timestamps for the press conference
content based on the first trade after a given timestamp. The tick-by-tick values are joined
with the rounded timestamps (on 15 second basis). Based on the prices/ index values for
the start and end times we then calculate log returns for the respective categories and
paragraphs.
4.6 Empirical Analysis
Using our previously created timestamps and the clustered topics we can now study
which information revealed by the European Central Bank during its press conference
has the largest impact on financial markets and thus seems most important to market
participants.38
4.6.1 ECB Press Conference Returns
Compared to the pre-FOMC announcement drift as documented by Lucca and Moench
(2015) the pre-ECB announcement return mean-reverts after the start of the press con-
ference (see Schmeling and Wagner, 2019 and Chapter 2 of this thesis).
Table 4.2 shows that until the end of the trading day the magnitude of the average
mean reversion return is -37 basis points which accounts for 70% of the 53 bps pre-
announcement increase as reported in Chapter 2. By splitting the time window into
three distinct parts we can see that the biggest drop falls within the time window from
2:30 p.m. to 2:45 p.m. (with a p-value of 9%) when the introductory statement is pre-
sented by the ECB Chairman. This return on its own accounts for roughly 40% of the
38In general, our analysis is similar to Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2009) who studied how the ECB’s
explanations of their monetary policy decision affect the 3-month Euribor futures market. Based on
taped versions of the press conferences they quantify the aggregate impact of the introductory statement
on absolute Euribor futures returns and using Reuters news snaps they also provide a minute-by-minute
analysis. Compared to their approach our methodology allows us to study the real-time impact of very
fine granular topics based on the automatically created timestamps and the textual analysis of the ECB
statement.
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overall mean-reversion. The point estimates for the Q&A session and the remaining hours
after the press conference are over 20% lower in magnitude and exhibit higher p-values.
Table 4.2: Post-ECB Announcement Returns - Euro Stoxx 50
This table reports the results from the post-ECB announcement dummy regressions
using intra-day Euro Stoxx 50 returns. We use the following model specification:
rt = β0 + β1 × It(ECB) + εt, where r is the percentage value of the derived log return
using the index values of the respective start and end time. The constant β0 measures the
unconditional return for the given time window that is earned on days where the ECB
does not hold a scheduled monetary policy meeting. The term It(ECB) is an indicator
function with a value of one if time t is a day where the ECB scheduled a monetary
policy meeting and zero otherwise (‘ECB Dummy’). We split the trading hours into (i)
the time window of the ECB introductory statement (14:30 -14:45 CET), (ii) the time
of the ECB press conference Q&A session from 14:45 to 15:30 CET, (iii) the remaining
trading hours after the press conference from 15:30 to 17:30 CET and (iv) the full time
window: 14:30 - 17:30 CET. The sample period is from June 2011 to September 2017. Ro-
bust t-statistics are shown in parenthesis. *, ** indicate significance at the 5% or 1% level.
2011 - 2017
Euro Stoxx 50 Returns
14:30-14:45 14:45-15:30 15:30-17:30 14:30-17:30
Constant -0.004 0.003 -0.01 -0.011
(-0.91) (0.57) (-0.78) (-0.73)
ECB Dummy -0.144 -0.112 -0.111 -0.367*
(-1.7) (-1.57) (-1.0) (-2.32)
Obs. 1721 1721 1721 1721
N. of ECB 62 62 62 62
The upper part of Figure 4.6 illustrates this empirical finding showing that the steepest
drop in the cumulative ECB announcement return series falls within the presentation of
the introductory statement. This finding is in line with Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2009)
who emphasize the importance of the press conferences as a tool for explaining monetary
policy decisions.
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Figure 4.6: ECB Announcement Returns
The upper plot shows the average returns on full ECB announcement days. The black
line shows the mean of the cumulative return series from 09:00 to 17:30 CET. The dashed
vertical lines mark the time window of the lower plot (14:25 - 14:50 CET) spanning the
introductory statement of the press conference. The lower plot shows the average cu-
mulative return series around the introductory statement from 14:25 - 14:50 CET. The
average starting (end) time of the introductory statement is marked with ‘Start’ (‘End’).
The blue/ red/ green/ yellow shaded areas mark the average duration of the respec-
tive category (‘Monetary Policy Decision’, ‘Economic Analysis’, ‘Monetary Analysis’ and
‘Summary’). The sample comprises 62 press conferences from June 2011 to September
2017.
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4.6.2 ECB Press Conference Category Returns
After the observation that the largest part of the mean-reversion occurs in the 14:30
to 14:45 CET time window we now want to analyze which information is responsible
for this drop in the stock market. Therefore, we are going to decompose the overall
introductory statement return into the contribution of each ECB press conference
category using our previously obtained timestamps. Table 4.3 shows the respective ECB
press conference category returns. One can see that the pre-ECB announcement return
as reported in Chapter 2 first further increases by around 20% (10 basis points) before
the mean-reversion starts. The beta estimate on the monetary policy decision dummy
variable is positive and significant to the 5% level. After this first initial increase the
Euro Stoxx 50 return experiences a large drop of in total 24 basis points where over 50%
(-13 bps) is realized during the economic analysis. This point estimate shows significance
to the 1% level. The drop continues during the monetary analysis but only to a moderate
extent (-4 bps). At the end of the introductory statement the return decreases by another
7 bps making the intra press conference price changes the largest contribution to the
overall mean reversion dynamic.39 The lower plot of Figure 4.6 summarizes the findings
by showing the time window of the cumulative ECB announcement return series which
covers the introductory statement.
Overall, the monetary policy decision and the economic analysis account for the largest
movements in the financial market. This finding is in line with Cieslak and Schrimpf
(2018) who find that for the ECB growth and monetary shocks explain most of the
variance of stock returns. In contrast, the monetary analysis exhibits the lowest returns
of all categories suggesting that its information are of less importance to the financial
markets. This is consistent with Berger et al. (2011) who conclude that ‘developments
in the monetary sector [...] only played a minor role most of the time’. Given our sample
period from 2011 to 2017 the on average negative return during the economic analysis
might be driven by negative news related to the European sovereign debt crisis. The
positive effect of the monetary policy decisions might reflect the supporting actions of
39Adding up the individual category returns closely resembles the 14 basis point estimate for the 14:30
to 14:45 time window of Table 4.2.
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the European Central Bank. To find evidence for these hypotheses we are now going to
look at the time series of the category returns and relate it to important events of the
euro crisis and decisions of the ECB.
Table 4.3: ECB Introductory Statement Returns - Euro Stoxx 50
This table reports the results from three dummy regressions assessing the impact of
the different content of the ECB’s introductory statement on financial markets. The
regression model is defined as follows: rt = β0 +
∑J
j=1 βj ×It(ECB Content
(j)) + εt, with
β0 being set to zero and j ∈ {1, ..., J} with J being the number of different categories,
meta-topics and topics as defined previously. It(ECB Content(j)) is an indicator function
with a value of one if the section of the introductory statement belongs to a certain
category, meta-topic or topic as described in the table and zero otherwise. rt represent the
log returns of the different sections calculated using futures prices around the respective
start and end time. Specification (1) reports the β estimates for the four categories, (2)
for the six meta-topics and (3) for the 15 individual topics. The sample period comprises
62 ECB press conferences from June 2011 to September 2017. Robust t-statistics are
shown in parenthesis. *, ** indicate significance at the 5% or 1% level.
Euro Stoxx 50 Index Future
ECB Press Conference - (1) (2) (3)
Introductory Statement
Category: Monetary Policy Decision 0.101*
(2.20)




Interest Rate Decision and Explanation -0.003
(-0.11)




Asset Purchase Programs 0.044
(1.51)
Further Details and Comments 0.054*
(2.24)
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Price Development Risks -0.009
(-1.01)
Category: Monetary Analysis -0.039
(-1.66)
Money, Credit and Banking Sector -0.039
(-1.66)










Fiscal Policy and Structural Reforms -0.043**
(-2.76)
Figure 4.7 shows the decomposition of the overall introductory statement return series
into the respective categories. As a robustness check we also plot the sum of the individ-
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ual category returns and the 14:30 to 14:45 and 14:30 to 15:00 CET return series.40 One
can see that the aggregate return tracks the other two time series very closely, especially
the 14:30 to 14:45 returns with a correlation of 95%.
In general, the time series of the full introductory statement returns shows a lot of vari-
ation with large negative returns for example during summer 2012 where the chances of
a eurozone break-up were quite severe. Interestingly, there is also a large negative drop
in December 2015 where the ECB Chairman announced further accommodating non-
standard monetary policy measures which should have had a positive impact on financial
markets. The negative reaction indicates that the market expected the ECB to announce
more supportive measures and thus was disappointed by the announcement. Support for
this interpretation can also be drawn from the first question of the Q&A session where
a reporter shared his observation: ‘...it seems like what you’ve done is a little bit on
the low end of the range of what the financial markets had expected, in terms of your
stimulus package today. It seems like the initial reaction in the financial markets bears
this point...’. This observation is the only large negative return in the first category.
Overall, the return series for the monetary policy decision category shows a lot of posi-
tive returns which correspond to the non-standard monetary policy measures announced
by the European Central Bank. If there are no supportive measures announced (or no
decrease in the key ECB interest rate) then returns are roughly zero. This can be seen
particularly for the last year of our sample period where no further supporting measures
were announced due to the ongoing recovery of the euro area economy.
The negative point estimate for the economic analysis stems from a lot returns being
below zero as illustrated in Figure 4.7. Especially, in the first half of our sample we can
observe large negative category returns reflecting the adverse economic conditions during
the height of the euro crisis. For example, the large drop in August 2011 corresponds
to a period which the ECB characterized as a time when ‘uncertainty [was] particularly
high’. The last year of our sample period shows mostly zero or slightly positive returns
for this category reflecting the ongoing economic recovery in the eurozone.
40Note, some press conferences take a bit longer than 15 minutes.
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The monetary analysis returns do not show a lot of variation in their time series with
most of the returns being around zero. This suggests that information for example about
money growth are not as important for market participants as news about the economic
conditions or the monetary policy decision.
The returns of the last category are mostly close to zero with some larger negative obser-
vations. These often correspond to press conferences where the ECB Chairman urged the
EU countries to implement more labour market reforms and to consolidate their fiscal
policies which emphasized the structural problems underlying the European sovereign
debt crisis.
In a next step we are going to analyze the impact of the respective category topics on
the financial markets to establish a closer link between the press conference content and
the accompanying stock market reaction.
4.6.3 ECB Press Conference Topic Returns
Table 4.3 shows the contribution of each of the press conference topics to the
respective category return. In addition to the individual topics we also aggregate similar
paragraphs into meta-topics which share a common theme.41
Column two of Table 4.3 reveals that the large positive monetary policy decision return
is entirely driven by the non-standard monetary policy measures. The average response
in the equity market is 12 basis points with large t-statistics (above 3). In contrast, the
return for the standard monetary policy is close to zero and not statistically significant.
Looking at the respective topics we see that both estimates for the introduction and
the interest rate decision are not statistically different from zero.42 Assuming efficient
markets this observation comes not as a surprise since the interest rate decision is
already revealed at 13:45 CET in a press release and thus markets should already have
41For example the three paragraphs about ‘Euro Area Inflation’, ‘Inflation Projections’ and ‘Price
Development Risks’ are all about inflation. The meta-topic timestamps are then derived based on the
start (end) time of the first (last) paragraph and the returns are calculated based on these timestamps.
42Note, since the introduction and the interest rate decision are included in every introductory state-
ment the aggregate estimate of 0.005 for the standard monetary policy can be obtained by adding up
the two individual returns (the slight difference is due to rounding errors).
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Figure 4.7: Time Series of ECB Category Returns
This plot shows the return time series for the four categories of the ECB’s introduc-
tory statement as well as the time series based on the sum of the individual category
returns and the 14:30 to 14:45 (15:00) CET returns. The sample comprises 62 ECB press
conferences from June 2011 to September 2017.
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incorporated this information with the start of the press conference.43
The provision of excess liquidity through the ECB’s refinancing operations (MROs,
LTROs and TLTROs) was perceived very positively by the financial markets with
a point estimate of 0.09 which is significant to the 5% level. Especially, during the
high uncertainty period in Summer and November 2011 the announcement of these
operations yielded a very high return (e.g. roughly 0.8% in August 2011 or 0.4% in
October 2011) which is consistent with the finding of Acharya et al. (2018) that the
LTRO programs calmed down the markets temporarily. Also the announcement of the
targeted longer-term refinancing operations (TLTROs) in January 2015 had a large
positive impact on Euro Stoxx 50 returns (about 0.6%).
The estimate for the asset purchase programs (APP) is positive (4.4 bps) but surprisingly
not significant to the 1% or 5% level. This is puzzling at first since the announcement
of the extensive purchases by the ECB should have a positive effect on the economy
and expected dividends and thus on stock prices. Looking into the cluster composition
we can see that this group comprises mainly the asset purchase program as announced
in January 2015. After large positive returns following the announcement in January
and the expansion to €80 billion in March 2016 the returns fluctuate around zero.44
We attribute this to the fact that starting March 2016 the APP information are
already included in the press release which gets published at 13:45 CET. Therefore, we
cannot report a dominant QE-related factor as in Altavilla et al. (2019) but rather a
medium-sized response.
In contrast, additional information about the implementation details are not included
in the press release and thus represent actual news. Therefore, the ‘Further Details and
Comments’ about the non-standard monetary policy measures exhibit a large positive
(above 5 bps) and significant estimate. This is consistent with Coenen et al. (2017) who
state that the contextual release of implementation details for the ECB’s non-standard
43In July 2013 the ECB newly introduced its forward guidance on the future monetary policy inten-
tions. Therefore, after mid of 2013 one can observe a few larger positive returns (e.g. 0.39% in July
2013) when the ECB expected the key interest rates ‘to remain at present or lower levels for an extended
period of time’.
44The mean return of this cluster is 0.07% until March 2016, from April 2016 to September 2017 it is
only -0.02%.
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monetary policy measures has further lowered market uncertainty and thus was perceived
as good news by investors and market participants.
The large negative return for the economic analysis is driven to a similar extent by
information about the real economy (-7 bps) and inflation (-6 bps). In particular, news
about the ‘Euro Area GDP’ yield a negative estimate (-5 bps) reflecting the adverse
economic conditions during the European sovereign debt crisis. The estimate is slightly
not significant to the 5% level which might be due to the positive economic recovery in
the later part of our sample period. The estimate for the macro staff GDP projections
is about one third smaller and has a large p-value indicating that the ECB’s forecasts
do not contain new information for market participants. The information about the
economic outlook is also not statistically different from zero which comes as a surprise
since one would have expected an impact of the ECB’s superior outlook information
on financial markets, especially during the euro crisis. To shed light on this finding we
re-run our regression model with dummy variables for each of the individual clusters
which compose the different topics (as stated in Figure 4.4). The results are shown in
Table 4.4 and one can see that there are two opposite effects that cancel out. First, a
positive impact of cluster 12 (5 bps) and then a negative one from cluster 14 and 16
with a magnitude of around -4 basis points. When looking into the respective cluster
elements we observe that cluster 14 and 16 contain only economic outlook paragraphs
from the first half of our sample. This period covers the height of the euro crisis and
thus one would expect the negative estimate. This is also reflected in the keywords as
can be seen in Figure 4.4: ‘euro area’, ‘tensions’ and ‘insufficient’. On the other side,
cluster 12 contains the paragraphs after the height of the crisis when the European
economy started to recover. The top words do not include the expressions ‘euro area’
or ‘tensions’ anymore but the more optimistic phrase ‘growth outlook’. A similar
observation can be made for the ‘Euro Area GDP’ topic which comprises of two groups:
Cluster 8 has a negative significant impact of -8 bps and cluster 15 a point estimate
close to zero. The former one contains the paragraphs starting June 2011 (until the
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end of 2014) which includes the high uncertainty periods of the euro crisis. The other
cluster starts in January 2015 and thus spans the recovery period of the euro economy.
This asymmetric response to positive and negative news within the same topic is also
found in previous studies (see e.g. Jansen and De Haan, 2005) and is also in line with
Cieslak and Schrimpf (2018) who find that economic news mattered especially in the
period until 2013. Overall, these observations are very interesting since they show
that the wording and phrases used by the central bank differ significantly in periods of
economic crisis and recovery which can be detected by our text-based clustering approach.
Table 4.4: ECB Economic Analysis Returns - Euro Stoxx 50
This table reports the results from two dummy regressions assessing the impact of the
different topics and clusters of the ECB’s introductory statement on financial markets.
The regression model is defined as follows: rt = β0 +
∑J
j=1 βj × It(ECB Content
(j)) + εt,
with β0 being set to zero and j ∈ {1, ..., J} with J being the number of different topics
and clusters as defined previously. It(ECB Content(j)) is an indicator function with a
value of one if the section of the introductory statement belongs to a certain topic or
cluster as described in the table and zero otherwise. rt represents the log return of
the different sections calculated using future prices around the respective start and end
time. Specification (1) reports the β estimates for the three real economy topics and
(2) for the five clusters composing these topics. For the sake of brevity we only report
here the estimates for the real economy section. The sample period comprises 62 ECB
press conferences from June 2011 to September 2017. Robust t-statistics are shown in
parenthesis. *, ** indicate significance at the 5% or 1% level.
Euro Stoxx 50 Index Future
ECB Press Conference - (1) (2)
Economic Analysis
Real Economy
Euro Area GDP -0.049
(-1.86)
CLUSTER 8 (‘Crisis’) -0.076*
(-2.19)
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CLUSTER 7 -0.033
(-1.63)
Economic Outlook Risks -0.002
(-0.13)
CLUSTER 12 (‘Post-Crisis’) 0.050
(1.56)
CLUSTER 14+16 (‘Crisis’) -0.035*
(-2.26)
The inflation news about the euro area has a large negative effect on Euro Stoxx 50
returns. The dummy regression coefficent is around -0.05 [%] and significant to the 1%
level which is consistent with the finding of Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2009) that infla-
tion statements have a large impact on financial markets during the press conference.
Especially in the beginning of our sample in 2011 one could observe high inflation rates
(e.g. in August 2011 the reported HICP inflation rate for July was 2.5%) which were
accompanied by large negative returns (-0.4%). The estimates for the other two inflation
related topics are close to zero and not significant on a stand alone basis.
Looking at the constituents of the monetary analysis we can see that the point estimate
for the money and loans section (which covers e.g. the broad monetary aggregate M3) is
negative but with a low magnitude and not statistically significant to the 5% or 1% level
suggesting a second-order importance of these information to investors. This finding is
in line with Berger et al. (2011) who state that ‘money has become less important in the
ECB monetary strategy’. The estimate of the banking related information is around -2
bps and slightly significant to the 5% level reflecting the importance of news about the
banking sector especially during the European debt crisis.
The last category comprises the cross-check of the economic information with the mone-
tary signals and comments from the ECB Chairman on the implementation of structural
reforms and fiscal policies in the EU member states. The estimate for the cross-check is
negative but not statistically different from zero reflecting the low information content
of this section.45 The concluding comments in the last paragraph often stress the need
45It mostly repeats information from the earlier part of the statement.
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for structural reforms and fiscal consolidation in the eurozone and have on average a
negative effect on the stock market (-4.3 bps). The estimate is also significant to the 1%
level suggesting that information emphasizing the structural problems of the euro area
and its economy lead to downward pressure on equity prices.
Overall, we can see that not every piece of information that is revealed during the press
conference is of same importance to investors. For our sample period we find the largest
asset price responses to news concerning the European sovereign debt crisis and also
stronger inflation dynamics. In general, our derived real-time response measure provides
a natural way to determine the information content of an information piece, in particular
its news component.46 Other studies explicitly measure the ex-ante market expectations
to derive a news shock based on the difference between the new information and the
expectation (see e.g. Rosa, 2011). Our study presents an alternative methodology to
measure directly (ex-post) the corresponding news or information shock.
U.S. Jobless Claims
Every Thursday at 14:30 CET the United States Department of Labor publishes the
new figures on the U.S. jobless claims. Since this news can affect our measured ECB
communication impact we supplement our regression specification to control for this
news. We follow Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2009) who use the (absolute) value of the
surprise component of the release, calculated as the difference between the announced
figures and the market expectations as measured by the median response to a Bloomberg
survey. We can report that neither the actual nor the absolute value of the surprise
component affect our topic estimates as stated in Table 4.3. Both estimated coefficients
are very close to zero and not statistically significant (t-values < 0.85).
4.6.4 Volatility and Trading Activity
In the following analysis we are going to study the effect of the different information
revealed during the press conference on market volatility and trading activity. Therefore,
46Assuming efficient markets asset prices should only react to the news component of an information.
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we follow Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2009) and use absolute returns to study the volatility
and as a measure of trading activity the number of ticks recorded within a given minute
and the traded volume of the Euro Stoxx 50 futures contracts.47
Table 4.5 shows the estimates for the different topics ordered by the average absolute
returns. One can observe that the top three topics with the largest average absolute
returns are all directly related to the European sovereign debt crisis. Each of the topics
has an average market impact of about 14 basis points. The two non-standard monetary
policy paragraphs also exhibit the by far highest trading activity which can be seen
in the high number of ticks per minute (200 and 300) and also the large number of
contracts traded (10,000 and 16,000). These findings underline the importance of these
information as already reported in our previous analysis.
The lower end of Table 4.5 comprises topics with little or no information content. For
example the introduction does not contain any investment relevant information and thus
has the lowest absolute return on average. In addition, the number of ticks is by far the
lowest with only a fifth compared to the refinancing operations. The information content
of the cross-check is also small compared to the other topics. As mentioned previously
this section mostly repeats sentences from the earlier part of the statement and thus
does not contain new information. The risks to price developments topic is also located
in the lower part of this table indicating a minor importance of this section. Maybe that
is the reason why it is dropped from the ECB’s intro statement in the later half of our
sample period.
47As an alternative measure we also use squared returns as a proxy for market volatility.
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Table 4.5: ECB Statement Topic Volatility and Trading Activity - Euro Stoxx
50
This table reports the average absolute and squared returns of the 15 topics of the ECB
introductory statement. The paragraph returns are calculated using the Euro Stoxx 50
futures trades around the respective paragraph start and end times. The number of ticks
and the futures trading volume are first calculated for the full topic length and then
scaled to a minute basis. The sample period comprises 62 ECB press conferences from
June 2011 to Sept 2017.
Euro Stoxx 50 Index Futures
ECB Press Conference - Absolute Squared Number of Trading
Introductory Statement Return Return Ticks Volume
(per minute) (per minute)
Refinancing Operations 0.143 0.054 304 15941
Further Details and Comments 0.139 0.046 218 9558
Euro Area GDP 0.137 0.047 150 5979
Interest Rate Decision and 0.125 0.039 138 6239
Explanation
Fiscal Policy and Structural 0.091 0.022 104 4013
Reforms
Asset Purchase Programs 0.090 0.019 90 2363
Euro Area Inflation 0.087 0.014 131 5273
Inflation Projections 0.081 0.009 123 4516
Economic Outlook Risks 0.075 0.015 135 5673
GDP Projections 0.074 0.012 140 5525
Money and Loans 0.066 0.010 118 4314
Banking Sector 0.051 0.005 88 3842
Cross-Check 0.050 0.007 112 4273
Price Development Risks 0.045 0.004 116 5137
Introduction 0.043 0.009 60 1916
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4.6.5 Cross-Section: Industries and Countries
Euro Stoxx Industries
To assess the impact of the different press conference content on the cross-section of
industries we estimate our previous dummy regression model for each of our Euro Stoxx
supersector indices. The results are shown in Table 4.6.4849 We can see that the banking
and insurance sector have the highest loadings on the non-standard monetary policy
topics. Especially the equity prices of the banking industry appreciate when the ECB
announces the refinancing operations. The 15 bps increase in returns is by far the largest
of all industries. The same holds for the additional details and comments section (+10
bps). These findings are in line with Krishnamurthy et al. (2018) who find that financial
sector stocks increase around OMT events. In addition, the two financial sectors show a
more negative response to information about the real economy than the overall market
index (see Table 4.4). We relate these findings to the fact that the European banks and
insurance companies were closely linked to the course of the European sovereign debt
crisis through the sovereign-bank nexus (see Acharya et al., 2018). A possible default
of one the EU member states would have caused severe losses in the government bond
portfolio of these companies. The findings are also in line with Chan-Lau et al. (2015) who
disentangle the effect of different factors on equity prices and find that the ‘deterioration
of the growth outlook’ had a major impact on the bank returns. In addition, the EU
banking sector also exhibits the strongest loading on the euro area inflation topic.
The lowest average response to the non-standard monetary policy topics can be observed
for sectors like ‘Travel and Leisure’, ‘Health Care’ or ‘Food and Beverages’. They also
exhibit the lowest sensitivity to the real economy information. These industries can be
characterized as non-cyclical and thus were not as closely connected to the course of the
euro crisis as the cyclical or the financial sectors.
48For the brave of clarity we only report estimates for the most interesting paragraphs. The results
are ordered by the loading on the refinancing operations topic.
49Note, since our dataset on the Euro Stoxx supersector indices ends in December 2014 the estimate
for the asset purchase program (which starts in January 2015) is zero.
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Table 4.6: ECB Introductory Statement Returns - Industries
This table reports the results from 16 separate dummy regressions assessing the impact of
the different content of the ECB’s introductory statement on the cross-section of indus-




εt, with β0 being set to zero and j ∈ {1, ..., J} with J being the number of different topics
as defined previously. It(ECB Content(j)) is an indicator function with a value of one if
the section of the introductory statement belongs to a certain topic as described in the
table and zero otherwise. rindt represent the log returns of the different sections for the
various industries calculated using tick-by-tick index values of the respective start and end
time. For the sake of brevity we only report the estimates for a subste of topics. ‘Ref Ops’
refers to the ‘Refinancing ‘Operations’, ‘APP’ to the ‘Asset Purchase Programs’, ‘Details
& Comm’ to the ‘Further Details and Comments’ section, ‘Euro GDP’ to ‘Euro Area
GDP’, ‘Econ Outl’ to the ‘Economic Outlook Risks’ and ‘Euro Infl’ to the ‘Euro Area
Inflation’ topic. The sample period comprises 42 ECB press conferences from June 2011
to December 2014. Robust t-statistics shown in parenthesis. *, ** indicate significance
at the 5% or 1% level.
Monetary Policy Decision Economic Analysis
Industries Ref Ops APP Details & Euro GDP Econ Outl Euro Infl
Comm (Cluster 8) (Cluster 14+16)
Banks 0.151** 0.00 0.102** -0.106* -0.042 -0.099**
(2.81) (0.00) (2.98) (-2.15) (-1.85) (-4.27)
Insurance 0.106** 0.00 0.057* -0.080* -0.043** -0.058**
(2.60) (0.00) (2.35) (-2.57) (-2.60) (-3.01)
Telecommunications 0.098* 0.00 0.050* -0.060* -0.027 -0.055**
(2.49) (0.00) (2.34) (-2.34) (-1.89) (-3.38)
Industrial Goods & 0.076* 0.00 0.039* -0.067** -0.024* -0.038**
Services (2.30) (0.00) (2.07) (-2.62) (-2.24) (-2.69)
Construction & 0.073* 0.00 0.053* -0.074* -0.028* -0.056**
Material (1.98) (0.00) (2.39) (-2.38) (-2.00) (-3.15)
Oil & Gas 0.072* 0.00 0.058* -0.066* -0.021 -0.044*
(2.20) (0.00) (2.17) (-2.21) (-1.59) (-2.41)
Utilities 0.070* 0.00 0.059* -0.073* -0.039** -0.049**
(2.01) (0.00) (2.35) (-2.57) (-2.59) (-3.30)
Automobile & Parts 0.066* 0.00 0.054* -0.087** -0.033 -0.055**
(2.17) (0.00) (2.04) (-2.68) (-1.92) (-2.87)
Financial Services 0.063** 0.00 0.026 -0.050* -0.031** -0.032**
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(2.59) (0.00) (1.53) (-2.24) (-2.73) (-2.59)
Basic Resources 0.054 0.00 0.054* -0.083** -0.025 -0.043*
(1.48) (0.00) (2.57) (-3.18) (-1.79) (-2.41)
Personal & Household 0.053 0.00 0.032 -0.052** -0.026** -0.038**
Goods (1.72) (0.00) (1.82) (-2.69) (-2.80) (-3.00)
Media 0.047 0.00 0.031* -0.046* -0.021** -0.031**
(1.89) (0.00) (2.10) (-2.37) (-2.60) (-2.99)
Travel & Leisure 0.045** 0.00 0.018 -0.041** -0.009 -0.020*
(2.90) (0.00) (1.62) (-2.67) (-1.09) (-1.93)
Health Care 0.045* 0.00 0.041 -0.048* -0.017 -0.038**
(2.17) (0.00) (2.06) (-2.28) (-1.79) (-3.55)
Retail 0.040 0.00 0.044* -0.059** -0.026** -0.030*
(1.35) (0.00) (2.45) (-2.74) (-2.62) (-2.53)
Food & Beverages 0.037 0.00 0.036 -0.038* -0.008 -0.032**
(1.69) (0.00) (2.44) (-1.96) (-1.10) (-2.91)
Euro Stoxx Countries
Table 4.7 shows the results for the STOXX blue-chip indices of different European
countries. The GIIPS countries in this sample (Italy and Spain) exhibit the by far highest
estimates on the non-standard monetary policy content. The average response of Italian
stocks alone to the announcement of the ECB’s refinancing operations is 11 basis points
which is 25% higher than for the aggregate Euro Stoxx 50 index. Also their loading on
the additional details and comments section is significantly higher than for the other
countries in our sample. These findings are in line with Krishnamurthy et al. (2018)
who report rising stock returns for the announcement of the SMP and OMT programs
for all GIIPS countries and also positive reactions to the LTRO programs by Italy and
Spain. We can also observe that Italy and Spain show similar point estimates for the
economic variables: A negative coefficient of -0.09 [%] for the ‘Euro Area GDP’ section
and around -0.03 [%] for the economic outlook. Similar to our previous observations we
interpret these findings as reflecting the course of the European sovereign debt crisis
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which particularly affected the GIIPS countries.50
The estimates for France share the same signs as for Italy and Spain but are lower in
magnitude. The remaining countries (UK, Nordic, Eastern Europe and Sub Balkan)
show significantly lower estimates compared to the first three reflecting that they have
not been at the core of the euro crisis.
Table 4.7: ECB Introductory Statement Returns - Countries
This table reports the results from 7 separate dummy regressions assessing the impact of
the different content of the ECB’s introductory statement on the cross-section of countries




being set to zero and j ∈ {1, ..., J} with J being the number of different topics as defined
previously. It(ECB Content(j)) is an indicator function with a value of one if the section
of the introductory statement belongs to a certain topic as described in the table and
zero otherwise. rcountryt represent the log returns of the different sections for the various
countries calculated using tick-by-tick index values of the respective start and end time.
For the sake of brevity we only report the estimates for a subste of topics. ‘Ref Ops’
refers to the ‘Refinancing ‘Operations’, ‘APP’ to the ‘Asset Purchase Programs’, ‘Details
& Comm’ to the ‘Further Details and Comments’ section, ‘Euro GDP’ to ‘Euro Area
GDP’, ‘Econ Outl’ to the ‘Economic Outlook Risks’ and ‘Euro Infl’ to the ‘Euro Area
Inflation’ topic. The sample period comprises 42 ECB press conferences from June 2011
to December 2014. Robust t-statistics shown in parenthesis. *, ** indicate significance
at the 5% or 1% level.
Monetary Policy Decision Economic Analysis
Industries Ref Ops APP Details & Euro GDP Econ Outl Euro Infl
Comm (Cluster 8) (Cluster 14+16)
Italy 0.108* 0.00 0.081** -0.092* -0.024 -0.065**
(2.42) (0.00) (2.81) (-2.32) (-1.33) (-3.61)
Spain 0.088 0.00 0.076** -0.090* -0.035* -0.067**
(1.95) (0.00) (2.83) (-2.46) (-2.12) (-3.29)
France 0.075* 0.00 0.054* -0.068* -0.028* -0.054**
(2.18) (0.00) (2.29) (-2.32) (-2.20) (-3.31)
UK 0.044* 0.00 0.032 -0.048* -0.000 -0.015
(2.13) (0.00) (1.83) (-1.96) (0.03) (-1.60)
50Chouliaras and Grammatikos (2017) report that the stock market indices of the GIIPS countries
suffered the most during the euro crisis, showing a lot of extreme negative returns.
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Nordic 0.041 0.00 0.042* -0.047* -0.018 -0.025*
(1.26) (0.00) (2.50) (-2.28) (-1.93) (-2.13)
Eastern Europe 0.036* 0.00 0.018 -0.017 -0.012 -0.008
(2.19) (0.00) (1.23) (-0.88) (-1.29) (-0.87)
Sub Balkan -0.009 0.00 0.006 -0.004 0.003 -0.012*
(-0.28) (0.00) (0.80) (-0.59) (0.52) (-2.21)
4.6.6 Other Assets: Fixed Income
European Government Bonds
In Table 4.8 we report the average absolute yield changes for the Italian, French and
German 10 year government bond for the respective intro statement topics.51 One can
see that the by far largest impact on the bond market stems from topics directly related
to the European debt crisis. Especially information related to the ECB’s non-standard
monetary policy actions seem to be of high importance with an average yield change
of 64 bps for the LTRO programs and 60 bps for the additional details and comments
for the Italian bond. This finding is in line with Krishnamurthy et al. (2018) who
report falling Italian yields due to the announcement of the SMP, OMT52 and LTRO
programs.53 The estimates for the German Bund futures are over 10 to 20 bps lower for
the first topics.
In addition to the central bank’s supporting actions also fundamental information about
the European economy seems important, especially for the Italian bond yields (over
50 bps). Again the loadings for the French and German bond are much lower. We
relate these findings to the different sensitivity of the European countries to the course
of the euro crisis.54 These observations are in line with Leombroni et al. (2017) who
51Since we do not find evidence for a pre- or post-announcement drift in the fixed income market and
not observe significant estimates for the raw bond yield changes we omit the respective table here.
52Note, the SMP and OMT programs are included in our ‘Further Details and Comments’ topic.
53The average Italian yield change for the non-standard monetary policy measures using our real-time
methodology is negative and large in magnitude (-0.3%).
54Note, our data on the French government bonds starts only in April 2012 and thus does not include
the first uncertainty peaks of the euro crisis. This could also be a reason for the lower estimates.
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report that around the European sovereign debt crisis the ECB’s communication drove
a wedge between yields of core and peripheral European countries. Overall, these results
are comparable to the country’s equity indices as reported earlier where Italy showed
the highest loadings on the refinancing operations and also the economic topics. The
lowest impact seem to have the introduction and also the paragraph about the price
development risks. As explained earlier these topics do have little or no information
content and thus should not be a major driver of financial markets.
Table 4.8: ECB Introductory Statement and Government Bond Yields
This table reports the average absolute yield changes of European government bond
futures for the 15 topics of the ECB introductory statement. The paragraph returns are
calculated using actual trades of the German Schatz, Bobl, Bund, the Italian BTP Long
and the French OAT futures contracts around the respective paragraph start and end
times. To convert the futures returns into yield changes we divide them by the negative
of duration as in Cieslak and Schrimpf (2018). The sample period comprises 62 ECB
press conferences from June 2011 to Sept 2017. Note, for the French government bond
futures the data is only available since April 2012.
ITALY FRANCE GERMANY
ECB Press Conference - BTP Long OAT Bund Bobl Schatz
Introductory Statement (10 years) (10 years) (10 years) (5 years) (2 years)
Refinancing Operations 0.64 0.39 0.52 0.14 0.03
Further Details and Comments 0.60 0.36 0.36 0.11 0.01
Euro Area GDP 0.53 0.27 0.30 0.09 0.01
Interest Rate Decision and 0.38 0.30 0.34 0.12 0.02
Explanation
GDP Projections 0.35 0.14 0.23 0.12 0.01
Fiscal Policy and Structural 0.30 0.23 0.21 0.07 0.01
Reforms
Euro Area Inflation 0.26 0.20 0.22 0.08 0.01
Economic Outlook Risks 0.24 0.12 0.15 0.06 0.01
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Money and Loans 0.23 0.18 0.25 0.06 0.01
Inflation Projections 0.20 0.18 0.27 0.11 0.01
Asset Purchase Programs 0.16 0.14 0.13 0.03 0.00
Cross-Check 0.16 0.10 0.11 0.04 0.01
Price Development Risks 0.15 0.10 0.13 0.04 0.01
Banking Sector 0.13 0.11 0.12 0.04 0.01
Introduction 0.13 0.06 0.09 0.03 0.00
German Yield Curve
Comparing the responses across the German yield curve one can see that the short-
term Schatz futures contract only marginally reacts to the new information revealed in
the introductory statement. This finding is consistent with Leombroni et al. (2017) who
report that their communication shock hardly affects the short-end of the yield curve.
Compared to the 2 year bond the 5 year Bobl futures exhibit significantly higher loadings.
The highest average absolute yield change of 14 bps can be observed for the refinancing
operations topic. In general, the loadings of the 5 year bond are by factor 2 to 3 lower
compared to the 10 year Bund futures. This observation is in line with Brand et al.
(2010) who report that the ECB’s press conferences have a sizeable impact especially on
longer-term yields.
4.7 Conclusion
In this chapter we present a novel methodology to study the information flow of
communication events. We use modern textual analysis tools and the information
contained in the subtitles of press conference webcasts to fully automatically create
timestamps for the different information revealed. These timestamps can then be used
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to study the real-time impact on financial markets and thus the information content of
the respective news element.
We then apply this methodology to the press conferences of the European Central
Bank and analyze which information of the introductory statement ist most important
to market participants. Exploiting the template structure of the statements using
clustering techniques we derive topics on the category and paragraph level which allow
for a very fine granular analysis on which information is driving asset prices.
Studying the impact on the equity market we can relate the mean-reversion of the
pre-ECB announcement drift as documented in Schmeling and Wagner (2019) and
Chapter 2 of this thesis to the information revealed in the press conference. We find that
first the positive pre-announcement return increases by another 20% driven entirely by
the non-standard monetary policy measures of the ECB before equity prices start to drop
by roughly half the size of the pre-ECB run-up. The economic analysis alone accounts
for over 50% of this fall, with a roughly equal contribution of information about the real
economy and inflation news. We relate the former to news about the European sovereign
debt crisis and its subsequent recovery. Comments about the European banking sector
and the structural and fiscal problems of some EU member states further significantly
decrease the Euro Stoxx 50 returns.
Studying the cross-section of European industries and countries we find that the pos-
itive impact of the ECB’s unconventional monetary policy measures and the negative
loading on the economic information is particular pronounced for the banking and insur-
ance sector as well as the GIIPS countries of our sample. These industries and countries
have been at the core of the euro crisis (also connected via the bank-sovereign nexus) and
thus very sensitive to the announced actions of the central bank as well as its superior
economic (outlook) information. Quantifying the impact on the fixed income markets
further underlines the importance of the announcement of the non-standard monetary
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policy measures as well as the disclosure of the economic information. These effects are




In this thesis, we study announcement returns around ECB monetary policy decision
days. In particular, we focus on the time period from 2010 onwards which represents a
new era of increased importance for the European Central Bank due to the outbreak of
the European sovereign debt crisis. In general, since the start of the euro crisis one can
observe a decoupling of the ECB’s monetary policy decisions from the course of the U.S.
Federal Reserve, the global leader among all central banks.
In Chapter 2 we document a statistically significant and economically large pre-ECB
announcement return for this new era of increased importance (2010 to 2015), whereas
the respective premium for the time period from 2000 to 2009 is statistically speaking
not different from zero. This finding updates the current notion of the literature that
high returns on days surrounding monetary policy decisions are only present for meetings
of the Federal Reserve. We further show that heightened uncertainty is a main driver
of the 24h pre-ECB return which is consistent with the literature that analyzes the
determinants of the pre-FOMC announcement drift. Compared to these studies we
connect the general equity market uncertainty to the course of the European sovereign
debt crisis, in particular we show that the pre-ECB drift is mainly driven by the periods
of high uncertainty of the euro crisis which can be characterized as times of severe
eurozone break-up risks (e.g. Grexit). During these times the importance of the ECB
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was even more exaggerated due to its role as the lender or buyer of last resort. Last, we
document that the pre-ECB announcement return, as opposed to the pre-FOMC drift,
starts to mean-revert after the announcement with the drop in equity prices occurring
predominantly during the ECB’s press conference.
To study the impact of the news that gets revealed during the press conference on
financial markets we use modern textual analysis tools. We lay the foundations for how
these techniques are applied in finance in Chapter 3. In particular, we illustrate the
main challenges inherent in this kind of analysis, present typical research designs and
discuss the most important textual analysis concepts.
Using these text mining methods we then analyze in Chapter 4 which information
disclosed by the ECB Chairman is driving the mean-reversion of the pre-ECB return.
We develop a novel methodology that uses the captions of the press conference webcasts
and modern textual analysis tools to automatically create timestamps for each part of the
ECB’s introductory statement. In addition, we deploy a clustering algorithm to exploit
the template-like structure of the central bank statement and to derive fine granular
central bank topics. Using the created topic timestamps we then quantify the real-time
impact of the different information on financial markets. We find that the largest impact
stems from (positive) news about the ECB’s unconventional monetary policy measures
and also (negative) information revealed during the economic analysis, in particular
about the course of the European sovereign debt crisis and inflation dynamics.
Our findings are important for risk and asset management processes since the
here documented pre-ECB announcement return represents an easy and practicable
investment strategy with a high Sharpe ratio of 1.5. To realize this premium an investor
only needs to buy an Euro Stoxx 50 futures contract (in a very liquid market with
low transaction costs) 24 hours before the ECB’s monetary policy meeting and sell
it right before the announcement. Additionally, one can also trade on the following
mean-reversion of the announcement return by establishing a short position (short selling
the ES 50 futures).
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The insights on how (new) information are perceived by the financial markets are of high
importance to central banks who nowadays use communication as an additional tool to
their classical monetary policy action (‘setting the interest rates’), which is particularly
important in times of interest rates being at the zero lower bound or during a financial
crisis. Therefore, understanding the effect of the different content and its wording on
financial markets is crucial for central bank members. The here developed methodology
provides an easy and intuitive measure for quantifying the real-time market reaction!
In general, our novel methodology can be applied to all kind of communication events
that are accompanied by a press conference, like other central bank meetings or also
annual shareholders’ meetings. In addition to analyzing a statement’s paragraphs, one
could use our methodology on a sentence level, which would allow to find out the exact
(key-)words that drive the asset price response (using for example the regression approach
of Jegadeesh and Wu 2013). Based on the regression estimates, one could then also
create a specific central bank dictionary that comprises of all the significant terms. The
sign of the estimate would then indicate whether it is a positive or negative word, also
the magnitude could be used as a weight for the corresponding term. Such a central
bank dictionary would improve the sentiment analysis of central bank statements, since
‘general’ dictionaries tend to misclassify terms in the monetary policy context. Also it
would be of interest to examine how our real-time asset price responses for the equity and
bond market relate to measurements of the monetary policy and information shock (and
their respective decomposition) using principal components (see Altavilla et al., 2019;
Leombroni et al., 2017) or obtained through exploiting the comovement of stocks and
bonds (see Cieslak and Schrimpf, 2018; Jarocinski and Karadi, 2018). Last, it would be
interesting to observe whether the ECB announcement returns will also be present in the
future or whether they will dissapear like the pre-FOMC announcement drift (see Gilbert
et al., 2018).
Appendix A
Additional Information on ECB
Real-Time Analysis
A.1 Discussion of Clustering Results
The press conference usually starts with the introduction where the ECB Chairman
welcomes the press audience with the phrase ‘Ladies and gentlemen, the Vice-President
and I...’. In Figure 4.5 these paragraphs are shown in purple. All of the dots lie close to
each other indicating a high similarity between the respective introductions. Paragraphs
that are located at the boundary of this topic include for example the presentation of
a new commissioner or Draghi’s personal remarks in his first ECB press conference on
3rd of November 2011 which is marked with a ‘1’ in the figure. The top words (e.g.
‘vice-president’, ‘welcome’ and ‘ladies and gentlemen’) accurately reflect the specific
words and phrases used in the introductory paragraph. The second cluster groups the
introductions where the ECB Chairman expresses his ‘special gratitude’ to the organizers
of the meeting (e.g. another central bank).
After the introduction by the ECB Chairman the standard monetary policy decision
gets revealed, in particular whether there was a change in the key ECB interest rates.1
1Since July 2013 the ECB also includes a forward guidance on the expected path of future interest
rates in their statement which is usually in the same paragraph as the announcement of the interest rate
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In addition to the interest rate decision the statement also provides the rationale for
the decision, in particular how it aligns with the ECB’s monetary policy mandate of
‘maintaining inflation rates below, but close, to 2% over the medium-term’. In the more
recent press conferences this discussion is presented in a separate section but especially
in the beginning of our sample period the statement provides a joint paragraph on the
interest rate decision and the accompanying explanations. Therefore, we use a combined
topic which represents the interest rate decision and its rationale.
The first cluster with the keywords ‘key ecb interest rates’, ‘forward’, ‘guidance’ and
‘decided’ includes the paragraphs from the later part of our sample about the pure
interest rate decision and the forward guidance. The term ‘unchanged’ reflects the
situation of interest rates being at the zero lower bound which could not be lowered any
further within the course of the euro crisis. The second cluster comprises the rationale
for the monetary policy action as well as the paragraphs from the earlier part of our
sample that cover both the interest rate decision and its explanation. These remarks
reconcile the monetary policy actions with the current economic development and its
impact on the inflation aim. The main theme of this section centers around ‘inflation’
which is the most important term of this cluster centroid. Also the terms ‘prices’ and
‘euro area’ underline the focus on price developments within the EU countries. In
general, these explanations comprise of highly standardized sentences which allows the
clustering algorithm to easily group them together. Overall, the respective top words
nicely summarize the content of this topic which contains the interest rate decision and
the accompanying explanation focusing on the inflation objective of the ECB.
To support the European economy during the euro crisis the ECB conducted main
and longer-term refinancing operations (MROs and LTROs) which provided additional
liquidity to the banking sector in the spirit of a ‘lender of last resort’ (see Acharya et al.,
2018). The top words of this cluster reflect on the one hand the words and phrases
announcing the decision like ‘conducting’, ‘operations’ or ‘refinancing operations’. On
decision.
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the other hand the specific measures themselves like ‘mros’ or ‘ltros’ are represented in
the list of words characterizing the cluster centroid as well as the implementation details
like ‘three-month’ or ‘fixed rate tender procedures’.
In addition to the liquidity injection measures the ECB decided in January 2015
to launch an expanded asset purchase program (APP) in the range of €60 billion per
month buying public and private sector securities ‘encompassing the existing purchase
programs for asset-backed securities and covered bonds’.23 The key words of this cluster
centroid reflect the wording used in this paragraph. Like for the refinancing operations,
the name of the measure (‘purchases’) is highly characteristic for this topics as well as
the implementation details like the frequency (‘monthly’), time horizon (‘end’) or the
volume (‘billion’) of the program. Also the expression ‘in any case’ contributes to the
list of keywords which is often used in this section to underline the determination of the
ECB to improve economic conditions.
The last cluster of the first category collects all the remaining paragraphs of the
monetary policy decision that are not yet assigned to the previous topics.This includes
mainly comments related to the European sovereign debt crisis, like the provision of
liquidity to the banking sector, high risk premia, collateral availability, reserve ratio,
or the EFSF/ ESM.4 Compared to the highly standardized inflation rationale for the
monetary policy actions these comments are a direct response to the course of the euro
crisis and thus are quite diverse in nature. We label this group ‘Further Details and
Comments’ about the non-standard monetary policy of the ECB and the euro crisis.
This can also be seen in the cluster’s keywords which on the one hand include phrases like
‘monetary policy’ and ‘measures’ reflecting the non-standard monetary policy measures
2See the introductory statement of the press conference held on 22nd of January 2015.
3In March 2016 the ECB first extended the volume of the APP to €80 billion and then lowered it
again to €60 billion per month in March 2017. In October ‘17 the monthly volume got adjusted to €30
billion and then further reduced on 14th of June 2018 when the ECB decided to first lower the asset
purchases to €15 billion until the end of December 2018 and then end the net purchases.
4EFSF stands for the European Financial Stability Facility, ESM for the European Stability Mech-
anism.
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and on the other hand comprise of terms characterizing the problems underlying the
euro crisis, like the ‘liquidity situation of euro area banks’. Overall, due to the disperse
nature of the different paragraphs (e.g. provision of liquidity vs. collateral vs. reserve
ratio) the cluster exhibits the highest variance which can be seen in Figure 4.5 with the
white dots distributed across the two dimensional plane.
The three paragraphs about the real economy are clustered very accurately as can
be seen in the respective top words in Figure 4.4. For example, the most important
words for the ‘Euro Area GDP’ topic are ‘quarter’, ‘euro area’ or ‘demand’ which
reflect the reported quarterly real GDP growth and also the characterization of the
economic environment, e.g. with respect to the the domestic demand. The top words for
the ‘GDP Projections’ are ‘staff macroeconomic projections’ and ‘real gdp’ which are
highly characteristic for this paragraph. The paragraph about the risks to the economic
outlook can be characterized by words like ‘risk’, ‘growth outlook’ and also ‘downside’
or ‘tensions’ reflecting the negative sentiment during the euro crisis.
Also the three inflation related topics are clustered very accurately as indicated
by the top words. E.g. for the ‘Euro Area Inflation’ paragraph the expression
‘euro area annual hicp inflation’ is highly characteristic since it is only used in this
section (other parts of the statement just use the word ‘inflation’). As for the ‘GDP
Projections’ the phrase ‘staff macroeconomic projections’ is also important for the infla-
tion forecast topic. The two other keywords ‘hicp’ and ‘inflation’ show that the cluster
actually relates to the inflation and not the GDP forecasts. Keywords for the risks to the
price development section are e.g. ‘risks’ or the phrase ‘outlook for price developments’.
Overall, the clustering procedure works perfectly for the economic analysis topics since
the paragraphs get only slightly adjusted for the different press conferences and exhibit
a very similar wording across the statements. This is also illustrated in Figure 4.5 which
shows the six economic analysis cluster well centered around their mean with a low
variance. The smallest variation exhibit the two macroeconomic staff projection groups
where only the forecast target (GDP or inflation) and the corresponding predictions
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(e.g. 2%) are changed from statement to statement.
The two monetary analysis topics are also identified accurately by the k-means
algorithm due to the characteristic keywords and expressions used in the respective
paragraphs. The money and credit section first publishes the broad (M3) and narrow
(M1) money growth figures and then discusses the growth of loans to non-financial
corporations and households and the borrowing conditions in general.5 The most
important keywords for the three sub-clusters are ‘loans’ or ‘m3’. Also the expression
‘turning to the monetary analysis’ is highly characteristic for the cluster composition.
Figure 4.5 depicts the ‘pure’ money supply (loan) topic in the upper (lower) part of the
darkgreen cluster (indicated by number two and four). The paragraphs comprising both
sub topics are located in between (number three).
The section about the banking sector was added during the height of the euro crisis
which is reflected in its content. The paragraphs cover the ‘soundness of banks balance
sheets’ or talk about strengthening the resilience of banks and the funding situation
in general. These topics are also reflected in the top words of the cluster: ‘bank’,
‘strengthened’, ‘soundness’ or ‘banks balance sheets’. Depending on the course of the
euro crisis the wording of the ECB changed from requesting banks to ‘retain earnings’
to ‘substantial progress has been made’ to ‘finalising the assessment’ which can be seen
in the distinct sub clusters in Figure 4.5. After the height and aftermath of the crisis
this section got dropped.
The last category also comprises of two topics. First, the ‘Cross-Check’ of the eco-
nomic analysis with the signals from the monetary analysis.67 Often this part repeats
information from the interest rate explanations which then yields in a high similarity
between these paragraphs (see number five in Figure 4.5). The keywords accurately de-
5Since the information about money and loan growth is often presented in a joined paragraph,
especially in the earlier part of the sample, we group them into one topic.
6Generally, the focus of the economic analysis is on shorter-term price movements. The monetary
analysis focuses on longer-term price trends (see Issing, 2003).
7In the first year this section was rather large, in the latter part of the sample this paragraph only
comprises of one or two sentences.
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scribe this cluster (e.g. ‘cross-check’, ‘to sum up’).
The second topic contains comments from the ECB Chairman with respect to the fiscal
policy and structural reforms of the European countries. These comments also originated
from the European debt crisis where the fiscal discipline of some EU member states and
the implementation of structural reforms were heavily discussed. The characteristic terms
of this cluster like ‘fiscal’, ‘structural reforms’ or ‘implementation’ support this label.
A.2 Sensitivity Analysis
To test the sensitivity of our results to a change in the created timestamps we use
the tick-by-tick (15 seconds) Euro Stoxx 50 index values instead of the acutal futures
trades. We join the index values with the rounded timestamps (on 15 second basis).
Table A.1 shows the results.
Overall, the average category returns are nearly identical. For example, the estimate
for the monetary policy decision is now 0.101 compared to 0.101 when using the actual
trades. The point estimate for the economic analysis is now -0.124 (vs. -0.126), for the
monetary analysis -0.039 (vs. -0.039) and for the last category -0.091 (vs. 0.074). In
addition, the significance levels do not change.
The coefficients for the (meta-) topics are also very similar when using futures trades
and the 15 seconds tick-by-tick index values. The estimate for the standard monetary
policy decision slightly increases from 0.005 (based on futures trades) to 0.014 using the
15 seconds index values. When looking at the topics one can see that the increase stems
mainly from a slightly higher coefficient for the interest rate decision and explanation part
(+0.005). In contrast, we observe slightly lower estimates for the refinancing operations
and APP topic. Since the standard monetary policy explanations typically precede the
non-standard measures we can see here a small shift of the asset price response from the
former to the later topic due to the use of the rounded timestamps. A similar small shift
can also be observed for the economic analysis. Here, the real economy topic slightly
increases by 0.007 whereas the inflation section decreases by a similar amount. In the
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last part of the statement one can see also a shift from the banking related topic to the
cross-check. Here the former increases by 0.008 and the later decreases by the exactly
the same magnitude. This illustrates that a change in the timestamps affects especially
short paragraphs which only consist of one or two sentences, like the cross-check. But
in general one can see that the results for the longer paragraphs and also the meta-
topics and category level are very robust to a change in timestamps. Our main results
do not change when using the 15 seconds index values instead of the actual futures trades!
Table A.1: ECB Introductory Statement Returns - Euro Stoxx 50 Index Values
This table reports the results from three dummy regressions assessing the impact of
the different content of the ECB’s introductory statement on financial markets. The
regression model is defined as follows: rt = β0 +
∑J
j=1 βj ×It(ECB Content
(j)) + εt, with
β0 being set to zero and j ∈ {1, ..., J} with J being the number of different categories,
meta-topics and topics as defined previously. It(ECB Content(j)) is an indicator function
with a value of one if the section of the introductory statement belongs to a certain
category, meta-topic or topic as described in the table and zero otherwise. rt represent
the log returns of the different sections calculated using tick-by-tick (15 seconds) index
values for the respective rounded start and end time (to 15 seconds). Specification (1)
reports the β estimates for the four categories, (2) for the six meta-topics and (3) for the
15 individual topics. The sample period comprises 62 ECB press conferences from June
2011 to September 2017. Robust t-statistics are shown in parenthesis. *, ** indicate
significance at the 5% or 1% level.
Euro Stoxx 50 Index Values
ECB Press Conference - (1) (2) (3)
Introductory Statement
Category: Monetary Policy Decision 0.101*
(2.26)




Interest Rate Decision and Explanation 0.002
(0.11)
Non-Standard Monetary Policy 0.109**
(2.82)
Refinancing Operations 0.066
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(1.70)
Asset Purchase Programs 0.027
(0.89)
Further Details and Comments 0.057*
(2.54)
















Price Development Risks -0.016
(-1.80)
Category: Monetary Analysis -0.039
(-1.68)
Money, Credit and Banking Sector -0.039
(-1.70)










Fiscal Policy and Structural Reforms -0.049**
(-2.58)
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A.3 Additional Figures and Tables
Table A.2: Scheduled ECB Press Conferences: Dates and Start Times
This table reports the start times for the press conferences following the ECB’s monetary
policy decisions. The term ‘excluded’ denotes meetings that are discarded from our
sample. The time of the announcements are obtained from Bloomberg news timestamps
which indicate the start of the speech. We report the dates and start times from January
2011 to April 2018.
2011-01-13 excluded 2013-01-10 14:32:05 2015-01-22 14:37:14 2018-01-25 14:31:34
2011-02-03 excluded 2013-02-07 14:38:30 2015-03-05 14:29:59 2018-03-08 14:30:12
2011-03-03 excluded 2013-03-07 14:30:36 2015-04-15 14:35:12 2018-04-26 excluded
2011-04-07 excluded 2013-04-04 14:34:32 2015-06-03 14:30:10
2011-05-05 excluded 2013-05-02 14:33:12 2015-07-16 14:32:23
2011-06-09 14:33:40 2013-06-06 14:32:07 2015-09-03 14:31:36
2011-07-07 14:33:50 2013-07-04 14:34:00 2015-10-22 excluded
2011-08-04 14:30:43 2013-08-01 14:29:57 2015-12-03 14:30:38
2011-09-08 14:30:51 2013-09-05 14:31:44
2011-10-06 14:37:42 2013-10-02 14:34:11 2016-01-21 14:30:42
2011-11-03 14:33:11 2013-11-07 14:31:29 2016-03-10 14:34:44
2011-12-08 14:31:14 2013-12-05 14:35:41 2016-04-21 14:33:48
2016-06-02 14:25:17
2012-01-12 14:30:22 2014-01-09 14:31:14 2016-07-21 14:29:25
2012-02-09 14:31:23 2014-02-06 14:31:21 2016-09-08 14:30:30
2012-03-08 14:35:00 2014-03-06 14:32:53 2016-10-20 14:30:10
2012-04-04 14:32:44 2014-04-03 14:32:21 2016-12-08 14:28:58
2012-05-03 14:31:43 2014-05-08 excluded
2012-06-06 14:30:35 2014-06-05 14:30:08 2017-01-19 excluded
2012-07-05 14:29:53 2014-07-03 14:30:53 2017-03-09 14:33:25
2012-08-02 14:31:16 2014-08-07 14:30:06 2017-04-27 14:32:38
2012-09-06 14:28:45 2014-09-04 14:29:48 2017-06-08 14:30:05
2012-10-04 14:32:05 2014-10-02 14:36:21 2017-07-20 14:33:55
2012-11-08 14:32:35 2014-11-06 14:31:59 2017-09-07 14:31:55
2012-12-06 14:32:55 2014-12-04 14:33:09 2017-10-26 14:32:34
2017-12-14 14:32:24
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Table A.3: Multi-Word Expressions for ECB Press Conference Transcripts
This table reports a list of the multi-word expressions used in the pre-processing of the
press conference statements ordered by category.
Category Multi-Word Expressions
Monetary Policy ’ladies and gentlemen’, ’press conference’, ’report on the outcome’
Decision ’regular economic and monetary analyses’, ’key ecb interest rates’
’refinancing operations’, ’fixed rate tender procedures’, ’full allotment’
‘net asset purchases’, ‘asset purchase programme’, ’purchase programme’
’non-standard monetary policy measures’
Economic Analysis ’explain our assessment’, ’economic activity’, ’real gdp’
’economic outlook’, ’growth outlook’
’euro area annual hicp inflation’
’outlook for price developments’
’staff macroeconomic projections, staff projections’
Monetary Analysis ’turning to the monetary analysis’, ’bank lending survey’
’banks balance sheets’
Summary ’to sum up’
’fiscal policy’, ’structural reforms’
General Expressions: ‘governing council’, ’interest rates’, ’euro area’,
’monetary policy stance’, ‘monetary policy’, ’inflation rate’,
’inflationary pressure’, ’inflation expectations’
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Glossary
Asset purchase programs (APP) Non-standard monetary policy measures imple-
mented by the ECB under which private and public sector securities are purchased
to increase inflation over the medium term.
Client Computer hardware or software that uses a service hosted by a server.
Corpus Collection of documents.
Document Basic element in text mining that can be very informally defined as a unit of
discrete textual data within a collection that usually, but not necessarily, correlates
with some real-world document (Feldman and Sanger, 2007, p. 3).
Document collection A collection of documents can be any grouping of text-based
documents (Feldman and Sanger, 2007, p. 2).
European Central Bank (ECB) Central bank of the 19 European Union countries
which have adopted the euro.
Feature In machine learning and pattern recognition, a feature is an individual measur-
able property or characteristic of a phenomenon being observed (Bishop, 2006). In
textual analysis popular document features are characters, words, terms or concepts
(Feldman and Sanger, 2007, p. 4f).
Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) Federal Reserve’s monetary policy-
making body.
Federal Reserve (Fed) Central banking system of the United States of America.
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Governing Council Main decision-making body of the ECB.
Longer-term refinancing operations (LTROs) Liquidity-providing operations in
euro that offer additional longer-term refinancing to the financial sector.
Markup language System (such as HTML) for annotating a document that describes
its logical structure (like headlines) and defines its layout on the page.
Natural language processing (or computational linguistics) Set of techniques for
computational processing and analysis of naturally occurring human languages
(Bholat et al., 2015).
Protocol A protocol defines the format and the order of messages exchanged between
two or more communicating entities, as well as the actions taken on the transmission
and/or receipt of a message or other event (Kurose and Ross, 2013).
Server Computer program or device that offers functionality to other devices or pro-
grams.
Structured data Data stored in fields in a traditional database (Bholat et al., 2015).
Supervised machine learning Set of techniques that learn from classified observations
and then assign classes on unseen data, based on the prior observed distribution
(Bholat et al., 2015).
Term frequency-inverse document frequency (tf-idf) Common weighting scheme
used in the text mining literature that consists of giving lesser weight to words that
appear more frequently and greater weight to words that appear less frequently
(Bholat et al., 2015).
Term-document matrix Matrix capturing the frequency of each term in the set of
documents (Bholat et al., 2015).
Glossary 183
Text mining Text mining can be broadly defined as a knowledge-intensive process in
which a user interacts with a document collection over time by using a suite of
analysis tools (Feldman and Sanger, 2007, p. 1).
Tokens Words, phrases, or symbols in text (Bholat et al., 2015).
Training data In text mining, set of classified data used to ‘train’ a supervised algo-
rithm to ‘learn’ the co-occurrence of classes and words (Bholat et al., 2015).
Unconventional (or non-standard) monetary policy measures Forms of mone-
tary policy other than setting the interest rates.
Uniform Resource Locator (URL) Reference to a Web resource (e.g. Web page)
that defines its location on a computer network and a mechanism to retrieve it.
Unstructured data Data not residing in a traditional row/column database format
(Bholat et al., 2015).
Unsupervised machine learning Set of techniques that involve taking unclassified
observations (text or otherwise) and uncovering hidden patterns (Bholat et al.,
2015).
VSTOXX index Measure of market expectations of the volatility of option prices on
the Euro Stoxx 50 index.
